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Preface 
Reconsidering European Contributions to Global Justice (GLOBUS) is 
a Research and Innovation Action (2016 – 2020) funded by the EU’s 
Horizon 2020 programme, Societal Challenge 6: Europe in a changing 
world – Inclusive, innovative and reflective societies. GLOBUS is 
coordinated by ARENA Centre for European Studies at the University 
of Oslo, Norway and has partner universities in Brazil, China, 
Germany, India, Ireland, Italy and South Africa. 
GLOBUS is a research project that critically examines the European 
Union’s contribution to global justice. Challenges to global justice are 
multifaceted and what is just is contested. Combining normative and 
empirical research GLOBUS explores underlying political and 
structural obstacles to justice. Analyses of the EU’s positions and 
policies are combined with in-depth studies of non-European 
perspectives on the practices of the EU. Particular attention is paid to 
the fields of migration, trade and development, cooperation and 
conflict, as well as climate change. 
Migration is one of the most significant issues on the EU’s political 
agenda. It raises a large number of practical questions, but it is also a 
key concern from the perspective of global justice. The question of 
what would be a normatively adequate response to the increase in 
numbers of migrants has been the subject of deep disagreement 
amongst the EU’s member states. The EU’s handling of the question 
has been criticized and the legality of its responses has been 
questioned. This report is the first of several studies to be produced by 
the research group on migration in the GLOBUS project, and which 
aim to examine this complex issue through empirical analyses and 
normative reflection. 
 
Helene Sjursen 
GLOBUS Coordinator 
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Chapter 1  
Migration, justice and the European Union 
 
 
 
Enrico Fassi 
Catholic University, Milan 
The large inflow of migrants to Europe over the last two years has 
made the refugees and migrants issue a focal point of the current po-
litical debate. The strain on the Dublin System and the blatant incon-
sistencies of the European approach to migration have served as a 
‘wake up call’, bringing to the fore the need to overhaul the EU’s role 
in the governance of this policy area, riddled with tensions between 
Member States. Some Member States have accused the European Un-
ion (EU) of imposing regulations that affect them negatively; on the 
other hand, the EU has accused countries such as Italy and Greece of 
failing to comply with the existent rules. Inter-state solidarity has fre-
quently been lacking, and violations of human rights with respect to 
the migrants have been documented. Moreover, the migration crisis 
has disclosed a number of normative and ethical issues connected to 
the current management of migration in the EU: to what extent can 
such a system be reasonably deemed just? Just for whom? Does the 
European management of migration live up to the principles of global 
justice?  
In order to start addressing these questions, it should be acknowledged 
that migration is a highly sensitive area with respect to justice, one in 
which the tension between different conceptions of justice emerges in 
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all its clarity. By definition, migration stands between states, individu-
als and global regimes. It touches on legitimate concerns of different 
communities, individuals and global actors. Hence, the very possibil-
ity of managing migration in a way that satisfies the legitimate justice 
claims of all involved is constrained by the nature of the issue. Accord-
ingly, the EU seems to be particularly well equipped to strike a balance 
among the different justice claims of states, humans and subjective in-
dividuals. This is so precisely because of the EU’s nature as a complex 
polity with a sui generis governance (including states, individuals, 
groups), traditionally compliant with and attentive to the development 
of international law, and a peculiar understanding of its ‘problematic’ 
borders. Whether the Union succeeds or not in this titanic enterprise 
remains however to be explored, and this report presents the first steps 
in GLOBUS’ exploration of the EU’s contribution to global justice in 
the area of migration. The following sections of this chapter give both 
a brief introduction to GLOBUS’ theoretical and analytical framework 
and how this is adopted in the study of migration, and a brief presen-
tation of the remainder of the report. 
Migration and global justice: the GLOBUS approach 
GLOBUS offers a critical assessment of the EU’s impact on justice in a 
global system characterised by uncertainty, risk and ambiguity. The 
aim of the project is to provide in-depth knowledge of how the EU pro-
ceeds to promote justice within climate change, trade & development, 
migration and security policy areas. In order to do so, GLOBUS devel-
ops three different conceptions of justice: justice as non-domination, 
justice as impartiality, and justice as mutual recognition (Eriksen 2016). 
Non-domination refers to a condition in which an actor is not subjected 
to (i.e. is free of) any kind of arbitrary interference or control on the 
part of other actors. Impartiality recalls an idea of ‘equal basic rights 
and liberties’ and the pre-eminence of human rights over sovereignty 
rights. Mutual recognition stresses the role of reciprocity and the right 
of each relevant subject (individual, group or polity) to be recognised 
in their identity, ruling out the possibility to determine ‘a priori’ what 
is normatively right and fair. Each definition gives prominence to some 
challenges to global justice over others. Considering them all, ensures 
considering different justice claims, and underlying the intrinsic ten-
sion among them. Empirically, the project aims to discern inhibiting 
factors of global political justice in order to specify how the EU could 
further contribute to promote justice. 
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The GLOBUS project’s overall framework rests on the assumption that 
states and hybrid polities such as the EU, not individuals, remain the 
primary actors in global politics, the ones that bear the main responsi-
bilities in terms of global justice. The three above-mentioned comple-
mentary, ‘reasonable’ conceptions of justice (Eriksen 2016) have been 
selected accordingly, in order to investigate the normative implication 
of the EU polity’s external relations with a set of analytical tools ade-
quate to the current political context. Nevertheless, migration comes 
across as a peculiar global justice domain because, unlike climate 
change or trade, it concerns individuals that, by definition, are in-
volved in complex relationships with at least two distinct states (or su-
pranational polities) at the same time. In addition to that, since migra-
tion implies physically crossing (with or without consent) the borders 
of political communities, the migrant’s claims are singularly conspicu-
ous and – at least to a certain extent – impossible to be ignored by the 
public authority. As a result, the focus on the international dimension 
of migration policies in terms of global justice – in tune with the gen-
eral orientation of the GLOBUS project – will necessarily be comple-
mented by a thorough investigation of the relationship between indi-
viduals and the polities involved. This relationship reveals the inner 
tensions between the idea of global justice and its confinement into an 
international order of nation states.  
States, indeed, can at the same time be a source of injustice towards 
individuals, as well as the locus where these injustices are addressed 
through the removal of specific sources of injustice, and/or the promo-
tion of actions or policies aimed at promoting justice. The recognition 
of this ambivalence implies to include in our discussion of the three 
conceptions of justice specific questions adapted to the peculiar es-
sence of migration. If in principle dominance or domination are acts of 
injustice no matter if perpetrated towards states, individuals or 
groups, for the sake of analytical clarity, we will use non-domination, 
exclusively in relation to state-like entities or political actors such as 
the EU, its member states and third countries. In terms of impartiality, 
we will inquire how the way in which legal categories are defined im-
pacts on the application of universal norms of human rights. When 
dealing with mutual recognition, we will explore if and how the EU 
and its Member States recognise the subjectivity of migrants, hence 
look at their specific needs as subjectivised individuals rather than ob-
jectivised human beings.  
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The EU migration system of governance 
In order to assess as validly as possible the EU’s contribution to global 
justice concerning migration, the focus of the analysis has been wid-
ened to the European system of migration, so as to encompass the en-
tire multi-level governance system of the EU – although not necessarily 
in compliance with the methodological assumptions of the namesake 
scientific approach. Accordingly, not only the supranational level of 
government – e.g. the border and migration policy of the EU, and the 
interactions within the EU institutional setting in general – but also the 
national one – alongside several Member States’ migration-related pol-
icies, rules and practices – will be investigated. In this sense, the EU 
policies and regulations are conceived as part of a more comprehen-
sive EU Migration System of Governance (EUMSG) where different 
levels of government are involved in partially cooperative and par-
tially conflicting relations, but are not simply mutually exclusive or hi-
erarchically ordered. Among the reasons for this methodological 
choice is also the fact that migration and asylum are shared compe-
tences between the EU and its Member States (Art. 4 TFEU). Addition-
ally, such a comprehensive approach provides the means to grasp the 
inherent friction between two conflicting sets of goals – on the one 
hand delivering an effective management of migration flows, on the 
other preserving the freedom of movement across the Member States 
– as well as the courses of action put into practice in order to handle 
this divergence.  
This approach does not rule out the agency of the EU. As many sys-
tems of governance, the EUMSG deploys a certain diffusion of author-
ity, the emergence of regulatory policies that bypass state sovereignty 
(Higgott 2005, 578), as well as the perpetuation of states’ sovereign pre-
rogatives.  In this system, the Union remains identifiable to a consider-
able extent as an actor in its own right, one that defines and advances 
(more or less forcefully) a distinct agenda in its relations with Member 
States and third states. At the same time, the Union as an actor emerges 
as inextricably intertwined with the broader migration system, whose 
complexity increases by the fact that its boundaries do not entirely 
overlap with the EU membership. The system’s levels also include a 
number of non-EU states with formal links to the EU (such as Norway), 
and other third states that have nevertheless become complementary 
to the EU’s action towards migration – e.g. Turkey after the signing of 
the EU-Turkey Agreement in 2016. The complex, multilevel nature of 
Migration, justice and the EU 5
 
the system is of paramount importance, both in practical and analytical 
terms. 
Focusing on the EUMSG implies that the EU’s normative behaviour 
and its contribution to global justice are hard to assess unless the Un-
ion’s interactions with its Member States and relevant third states are 
taken into account. Traditionally, immigration is one of the policy ar-
eas where the Member States could exercise most independently their 
sovereign prerogative, barely constrained by loose common frame-
works. As this report shows, the EU has generally taken action in this 
domain through Declarations and Directives, only recently turning to 
Regulation – which, unlike the others is a directly mandatory act that 
leaves no scope to Member States. Correspondingly, the Member 
States maintain distinct national legislations that put into effect the 
common framework in very different ways. Whether the resulting re-
lation between national legislations and the common European frame-
work has been one of mutual influence or sometimes tension varies 
widely across national cases. What has emerged in recent years is an 
ever-greater tension, between the principles underlying the freedom of 
movement within the EU (including other countries partaking in this 
common space) on the one hand, and the call for stricter controls over 
international mobility coming from a number of constituencies on the 
other. Remarkably, stricter controls of both European and national bor-
ders is demanded in view of a more flexible management of mobility 
and not, as one would expect, the simple reinforcement of state borders 
and a crackdown on transnational movements. The regulation of mo-
bility, one could say, has come to be a crucial issue in the definition of 
a new institutional and political balance of the EU, with many observ-
ers seeing it as an even greater challenge than the economic crisis. 
A methodological note: the focus on terms, definitions 
and concepts 
The aim of this work is to look into the concepts conceived and used by 
the EU, the Member States and the relevant third States within the 
EUMSG. The expectation underlying this analytical effort is that the 
terms used (e.g. illegal vs irregular migrant) and the way they are de-
fined, may provide valuable insights about deep-seated ideas and as-
sumptions underlying public authorities’ migration policies. Further-
more, it shows the existence of cognitive patterns that affect migration 
management and points to juridically relevant differences on how a 
concept is framed by different actors in the EUMSG. More specifically, 
6 Enrico Fassi
 
in the first place, the way specific terms are formulated, chosen and 
used, provides a preliminary assessment of how an issue is perceived 
by relevant actors and the policy approach that is most likely to ensue. 
Second, ‘wordings’ and conceptual framings outline an issue through 
the creation of certain patterns where terms and concepts (which may 
also pertaining to different domains) acquire a specific relevance. 
Third, the terms used, and the meaning attached to them, shed light on 
underlying principles and values. Fourth, when focused on, the terms 
allow us to analyse narratives independent of practices, and eventually 
assess the compliance of the latter vis-à-vis the former. 
It is clear that terms and definitions can only tell one part of the story. 
A consistent analysis of any system of governance is one where the 
focus on discourses is complemented by a thorough exploration of 
practices. More specifically, the overall analysis has to assess first how 
the relevant actors frame the issue; then the way these actors act in 
practice and how these relate to each other. What this work aims to 
address is just the first step of the analysis of the EUMSG: to provide a 
preliminary insight of the EU’s policy on migration looking specifically 
(and almost exclusively) at the terms it chooses, the definitions it devises 
and the concepts and understandings it endorses. The same terms, def-
initions and concepts used by the EU are also examined with reference 
to a set of national cases – Italy, France, Germany, United Kingdom, 
Hungary, Greece and Norway – whose selection has been based on 
their respective relevance in the practical and analytical definition of 
the EUMSG.  
In the analysis of case studies, the set of terms, definitions and concepts 
that have been considered include ‘migrant’ and ‘immigrant’ (with an 
eye to the ‘legal/illegal’, ‘regular/irregular’ qualifiers), ‘asylum 
seeker’ and ‘refugee’, ‘reception system’, ‘return’ or ‘relocation-reset-
tlement’ of migrants (with the contested concept of ‘safe’ countries), 
‘hotspot’, ‘smuggling-trafficking’ as well as other terms peculiar to 
each case, and their respective semantic areas. The timeframe consid-
ered is the period 2009-2016, and the sources used consist mainly of 
legislation, and documents specifying general legislation (Regulations, 
Press releases, Court acts) as far as national case studies are concerned, 
and binding acts (Regulations, Directives, Decisions), and other rele-
vant documents (Communications, Action Plans, Press releases, Court 
acts) with regards to the EU. Where useful and possible, secondary lit-
erature has been used to support specific interpretations. 
Migration, justice and the EU 7
 
For each case study, the analysis is complemented with a preliminary 
attempt to apply the threefold theoretical approach to global justice 
developed by GLOBUS (justice as non-domination; justice as impar-
tiality; justice as mutual recognition).  
This report is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents an extensive 
study of the terms, definitions and concepts that characterize EU mi-
gration policy. Based on this examination, chapter 3 provides a first 
analysis of the EU’s compliance with the three notions of justice. The 
second half of the report is dedicated to an analogous analysis referred 
to the national cases – with the same emphasis on whether and how 
they adhere to the three conceptions of justice. More specifically, chap-
ter 4 presents the synthesis of the preliminary analysis conducted on 
terms, definitions and concepts in each case study – Italy, France, Ger-
many, United Kingdom, Hungary, Greece and Norway. Chapter 5 
draws together the results of these studies, examined thorough the lens 
of the three conceptions of justice and within the context of the wider 
EUMSG. The conclusions in chapter 6 aim at pointing out and examin-
ing tensions and conceptual overlaps between the mentioned three no-
tions of justice as regards their internal consistency and their actual 
embodiment within the EU institutional setting and policymaking. 

Chapter 2  
EU terms, definitions and concepts on 
migration1 
 
 
Michela Ceccorulli  
Unversity of Bologna 
This chapter deals with terms, definitions and concepts in the realm of 
migration and asylum as conceived by the EU. The literature has spent 
a great amount of ink in assessing EU’s policies and practices but it has 
predominantly failed to provide a thorough assessment of the terms 
and definitions employed by the EU, missing the opportunity to inves-
tigate the ideas, conceptions and understandings beneath peculiar as-
pects of the EU Migration System of Governance (EUMSG).  
There are at least three grounds for affirming that terms, definitions 
and concepts employed in main legal documents are of relevance in a 
preliminary analysis of the EU. First, ‘EUropeanised terms’ suggest 
specific ways the EU has interpreted certain terms common in the 
realm of migration, or concepts adopted on migration. This category 
includes specific articulations of the ‘migration’ terminology but also 
specific EU institutions and devices. Second, ‘EU cornerstone concepts’ 
recalls some concepts employed within the EUMSG that can be con-
sidered key pillars of the EU’s ‘approach’ to migration. Third, some 
                                          
1 We are grateful to Graham Finlay for precious comments and suggestions to an ear-
lier version of this chapter and also chapter 3. 
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recurrent yet frequently overlooked terms suggest the (implicit or explicit) 
purposes of EU’s migration policies, and the constraints they pose.  
In the first category, ‘EUropeanised terms’, are terms such as ‘resettle-
ment’. This has not been coined by the EU but, especially in the last 
years, it has assumed a distinct ‘EU’ connotation, while also becoming 
an instrument to manage the ‘European’ migration crisis. Similarly, 
‘relocation’, a largely used word today, is not an EU term but it has 
acquired a specific meaning within the EUMSG, clearly associated to 
the ‘emergency’ situation facing the European Union. Related to the 
concept of relocation, ‘hotspot’ is neither an original term nor one of 
first usage in the EU’s jargon. Yet, in the realm of migration, it has been 
associated with the ‘migration crisis’ and invariably referred to an area, 
a system and an approach. Some other terms and definitions, instead, 
are immediately associated to the governance of migration as ap-
proached and played out by the EU. This is the case for example of 
terms such as the ‘Blue Card’ for highly skilled workers, the ‘Global 
Approach to Migration and Mobility’, intended as the overarching 
framework of EU external migration policy and the recent ‘Partnership 
Framework (Compacts)’ for relations with third states. Seemingly, 
some Agencies that are part of the governance of migration, entail a 
specific understanding of how flows need to be regulated. A dia-
chronic analysis allows uncovering how some of these peculiar tools 
have been assuming different meanings through time, conflating pur-
poses to combat irregular immigration and to address asylum claims. 
This in turn opens for a number of questions from a justice perspective. 
Not only the functions but also the juridical nature, the autonomy and 
the underpinnings upon which these tools were originally created are 
changing, and with them their definition and role in the EUMSG. Miss-
ing this point would mean failing to understand how this specific sys-
tem of governance is currently being re-defined. 
The second category, ‘EU cornerstone concepts’, includes some con-
cepts that equate to veritable pillars of the EU’s migration policy. This 
is the case for example of the ‘Common European Asylum System’, 
which underlines the purpose of a common understanding of what 
asylum implies in the European Union. ‘Burden sharing’ is another 
evocative concept widely surfacing in this work, mostly referring to 
relations with third states and mainly recalling the necessity that these 
states ‘fairly’ contribute to the management of migration. ‘Solidarity’ 
is mainly used to underline the necessity to share the burden within 
EU terms, definitions and concepts on migration 11
 
the EU, among Member States. The evocative concept of the ‘Dublin 
system’ is a cornerstone of the Common European Asylum System. 
The Dublin system’s contribution extends further than the simple de-
termination of the country responsible to examine an asylum applica-
tion: it also entails a specific understanding of Member States’ recipro-
cal responsibilities within the Union. ‘Return’ is another evocative con-
cept intended as the key recipe to properly address irregular immigra-
tion, but also to provide a credible asylum and admission policy in the 
EU. Return to ‘transit countries’ is a peculiar variant of the EU’s ap-
proach to the matter. Seemingly crucial is the concept of ‘External di-
mension’, mirroring EU’s understanding of the role of third countries 
in migration management. The meaning of ‘integration’ as reported in 
the few documents on the matter, is aimed at the fulfilment of broader 
EU (and not necessarily Member States) goals, such as  remaining com-
petitive, facing the challenge of demographic ageing and being an ef-
fective promoter of basic values and the rule of law. 
Finally, the third category, ‘EU forgotten words’, regroups crucial and 
yet overlooked terms in the assessment of the European approach to 
migration. Failing to emphasize them would mean losing the oppor-
tunity to grasp the ‘constraints’ these terms implicitly entail. For exam-
ple, ‘secondary movements’, ‘asylum shopping’, ‘mixed migratory 
flows or hybrid migratory flows’ and ‘orderly and managed arrivals’ 
are already telling of EU’s understanding of migration and of the ways 
to cope with it.  ‘Mixed migratory flows’ suggests the idea that flows 
are constituted by both persons likely to fall under EU’s criteria of pro-
tection and by persons who do not, no matter for example of the sever-
ity of their economic needs. The almost automatic and widely repeated 
use of these terms should be given greater attention, as done in this work. 
For the sake of simplicity, the work follows the division of asylum into 
irregular immigration, legal migration and the external dimension of 
migration.2 Ultimately, this allows entering deep into each domain and 
                                          
2 The work draws on the most relevant legal documents produced by the EU on mi-
gration and asylum. The work does not focus on all terms, definitions and concepts 
provided by the EU. Rather, in order to start reasoning on the EU’s contribution to 
global justice, it puts the focus on terms that provide a better understanding of how 
the EU conceives how the governance of migration should look like. The analysis of 
terms, definitions and concepts also covers the last proposals for Directives and Reg-
ulations drafted by the European Commission as they seem to significantly shift from 
previous legislative acts (for a critical assessment of the role of ‘legislation’ in the cur-
rent EU’s migration policy see for example Menéndez 2016).  
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understanding the main idea behind them as conceived by the EU. Ad-
ditionally, it opens for uncovering how concepts have changed 
through time (the approach is diachronic) and the direction this change 
has taken. Indeed, it is fair to underline that contamination between 
these domains has been wide and that some words and concepts are 
key in most of the domains.  
Asylum 
Asylum can be considered an (almost) universal term. However, a cru-
cial issue in this domain is to understand what ‘asylum’ means for a 
political system and more so on what ‘providing asylum’ implies for 
the same political community. As any other policy, it entails selection, 
prioritization and discrimination. Undoubtedly, more than in other 
fields of political action asylum embodies broader ethical and justice 
considerations, irreducible to easy solutions. Thus, assuming that asy-
lum is perceived and defined (not to say practiced) differently in dif-
ferent political contexts is a wrong and misleading starting point.  
With this in mind, analysing how the EU defines ‘asylum’ is far from 
trivial. Reading through EU documents leads to the disclosure of a spe-
cific pattern constituting the understanding of ‘asylum’ in the EU. 
What emerges from this analysis is a pattern of words substantiating 
the leading concept in the domain, that is, the Common European Asy-
lum System (CEAS). These words are: ‘secondary movements’, ‘asy-
lum shopping’, ‘mixed migratory flaws’, ‘safe country of origin’, ‘safe 
third-country’, ‘first country of asylum’, ‘burden sharing resettlement’, 
‘relocation’ and ‘hotspot’, among others.  Related terms that may be 
found in other domains of the EUMSG but when used in the realm of 
asylum assume a specific meaning are ‘return’ and ‘external dimen-
sion’ for example. Even in the case of ‘predictable words’ (such as ‘pro-
tection’, ‘family reunification’, ‘refugee’ etc.), there is still need for close 
analysis as each may come with its own specificity in terms of rights, 
obligations, duration, exceptions. That is, terms are not neutral, and 
their meaning may well change through time. 
Accordingly, a first element to be taken into account is that the creation 
of a Common European Asylum System (CEAS) – which should first 
lead to the setting of basic common standards among Member States 
and then to a whole harmonization of asylum practices – is a very long 
term process, dating back to Tampere Council of 1999. A second ele-
ment, which is provided by the term itself and that will be crucial in 
EU terms, definitions and concepts on migration 13
 
the following analysis, is that the EU conceives ‘asylum’ as a system, 
composed of multiple facets and that the system should be shared 
(common) among Member States. 
For the sake of simplicity, this section on asylum keeps the partition 
operated at the EU level, and is divided in three sub-sections: proce-
dures, qualification, Dublin system and reception. 
Procedures 
The first fundamental pillar of the CEAS is the definition of common 
procedures for international protection. Overall, the EU’s reasoning 
behind ‘common procedures’ was to ‘improve the quality of examina-
tion and the speed of procedures’ (European Commission 2003b, 8).  
The very first document produced after the Tampere Council discuss-
ing common procedures for international protection, was very clear in 
explaining that ‘protection’ in the EU could no longer be granted only 
on the basis of the Geneva Convention, given the increasing mismatch 
between ‘the nature of the demand and the criteria of the Geneva Con-
vention’ (European Commission 2000, 5). Probably, the legacy of the 
Balkan wars left space for a broader interpretation of protection re-
sponsibilities within the Union. Reference was made to the European 
Convention on human rights, which was said to have set the basis for 
many alternative forms of protection at the national level aside from 
the one granted by the Geneva Convention.  
However, already in this first document, where much of the attention 
was focused on rendering the EU a space of protection, the objective to 
limit ‘secondary movements’ was mentioned. This entails the possibil-
ity for asylum seekers to move from a Member States to another with-
out prior authorization, something that common procedures for Mem-
ber States could prevent (European Commission 2000, 6). Ultimately, 
this is intended to describe a situation whereby asylum seekers tend to 
go to states with ‘easier procedures’, which would disproportionally 
affect certain Member States. A related term started to surface the pub-
lic debate and made its appearance in a EU 2000 Commission docu-
ment (European Commission 2000, 10), that of ‘asylum shopping’, re-
ferring to the ever frequent practice to apply for asylum in different 
Member States even at the same time, duplicating costs and efforts in 
the EU.  
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In setting the first stones of the CEAS the European Commission 
brought to relevance another term/concept normally used on irregular 
immigration but said to be key for the ‘credibility’ of the EU asylum 
system: ‘return’ (European Commission 2000, 10-11). In this context re-
turn was intended as the effective possibility to send back those people 
found ineligible for any form of protection and not risking any sort of 
persecution in their country of origin or of residence. Return as a build-
ing block of the asylum system was further urged in 2003, when the 
European Commission delivered a Document addressing the proposal 
by the United Kingdom to look for forms of protection outside the EU 
and close to displacement areas. This reflection was seemingly under-
gone by the UNHCR at the time through the ‘Agenda for Protection’ 
and the ‘Convention Plus’ initiatives (European Commission 2003a). 
The concepts of ‘mixed migratory flows’ (European Commission 
2003a) or ‘hybrid migratory flows’ (European Commission 2003b) 
were guiding UK’s proposal but also EU’s reflection. . The concepts 
inferred that asylum seekers were not only people searching for inter-
national protection, but to an increasing extent economic migrants 
‘abusing’ the EU asylum system (European Commission 2003a, 11). 
Again, properly facing mixed migratory flows was considered key to 
EU asylum system’s ‘credibility’. The argument of the UK (endorsed 
by the EU) was that by effectively enforcing return of ‘economic mi-
grants’ they would eventually be discouraged to abuse the asylum sys-
tem, thus reducing the caseload of applications the EU would have to 
consider. In turn, this would save resources to help countries and re-
gions of origin to face the immediate need of displaced persons and 
refugees. It is noteworthy to notice how the CEAS concept was broad-
ening to encompass an important ‘external dimension’: the EU asylum 
system had to be intended to gradually improve protection capacities 
in third countries in order to reduce the necessity of people in need of 
protection elsewhere (i.e. the EU) (European Commission 2003a, 13). 
Accordingly, ‘burden sharing’ meant that third countries had to con-
tribute to offer protection to persons in need given that providing as-
sistance timely and as close as possible to the real needs was the ‘logic 
and preferred protection option’ (European Commission 2003a, 16). 
This further elaboration of the CEAS concept is fundamental to under-
stand future EU policies in the domain. In particular, in these first doc-
uments there is reference to ‘orderly and managed arrival’ of persons 
in need of international protection from the countries of origin. This 
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implicitly made resettlement3 a preferred option and long-term objec-
tive for the European Union (European Commission 2003a, 13). Later 
on the EU would be clearer in maintaining that ‘the approach aims to 
end irregular and dangerous movements and the business model of 
smugglers, and to replace these with safe and legal ways to the EU for 
those who need protection. Protection in the region and resettlement 
to the EU should become the model for the future, and best serve the 
interests and safety of refugees’ (European Commission 2016a, 2). 
Fact sheet 2.1: Resettlement  
Resettlement as a concept has only recently found greater usage 
in the European Union. Resettlement has always existed but there 
was no common EU framework on the matter. Yet, since the very 
starting of talks on a common asylum system resettlement has 
been considered a key instrument. Similarly, to other words exam-
ined in this work it does not simply imply a ‘procedure’. A patterned 
scheme of related words, concepts and tools together make sense 
of what resettlement means. Hence, pertinent terms encompasses 
Regional Protection Programmes, durable solutions, orderly proce-
dures and legal and safe arrivals, external asylum policy, the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the European 
Asylum Support Office (EASO) and the new European Agency for 
Asylum, relocation and integration. Even though there exists a def-
inition of ‘resettlement’  shared among international protection In-
stitutions, an interpretative analysis underlines the nuances that the 
term has assumed throughout years, the new objectives supporting 
it but also the new shape it is about to assume. 
In its bare definition resettlement is intended as ‘the transfer of in-
dividual displaced persons in clear need of international protection, 
on request of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 
from a third-country to a Member State, in agreement with the lat-
ter, with the objective of protecting against refoulement and admit-
ting and granting the right to stay and any other rights similar to 
those granted to a beneficiary of international protection’ (European 
Commission 2015a, 4).  It was considered as a possible ‘durable 
solution’ for persons in need of protection, persons to be identified 
by the UNHCR (European Commission 2009, 3). An ‘European’ 
idea of resettlement (as different from Member states’ practices) 
                                          
3 Resettlement is here described as ‘transferring refugees from a first host country to a 
second, generally a developed country, where they enjoy guarantees of protection, in-
cluding legal residence, and prospects for integration and autonomy’ (European Com-
mission 2003a, 14). 
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concretely emerged in relations with Regional Protection Pro-
grammes established by the EU. The main idea was that resettle-
ment was central to provide assistance to the countries envisaged 
under these programmes (Tanzania, Belarus Moldova and Ukraine 
at that time) (European Commission 2009, 2).  Hence, before the 
Arab Spring, resettlement was considered as a way to show soli-
darity with third countries of first asylum (European Commission 
2009, 2) but also a way to ensure orderly procedure for recipient 
countries while assuring safety for resettled refugees (European 
Commission 2009, 3). However, resettlement plans were intended 
to be voluntary, with EU only providing financial contribution 
through the EU Refugee Fund and the support of EASO on infor-
mation sharing (European Commission 2009, 2, 3).  
It was specified that resettlement had a different understanding with 
respect to intra-EU resettlement of refugees (relocation). In fact, it 
implied the transferring of persons from outside of the EU into a 
Member State and had to be intended as a humanitarian measure 
and an expression of solidarity with third states instead of a meas-
ure of burden sharing among Member States (as relocation was) 
(European Commission 2009, 3).  
With the recent massive arrivals of migrants and asylum seekers 
into the European Union, the EU started to conceive resettlement 
as an ever necessary tool to be developed at the EU level to avoid 
that displaced persons and refugees had to resort to criminal net-
works, to prevent the further loss of lives and to hamper secondary 
movements of resettled refugees among Member States (Euro-
pean Commission 2015a, 3). The idea evolved that resettlement 
would also entail specific obligations of the resettled persons: to 
remain in the Member State of resettlement (European Commis-
sion 2015a, 5). Additionally, resettlement plans were referred to 
specific countries, such as North Africa, the Middle East and the 
Horn of Africa (European Council 2015a, 4).  
A thorough assessment of what resettlement is today can be found 
in the Commission’s proposal for Regulation that, if accepted, will 
be the first ‘legal’ document ever produced on resettlement by the 
European Union. The most important novelties brought to the un-
derstanding of resettlement are 1) a common EU approach must 
be developed on the matter, and 2) (somehow related) resettlement 
cannot only be voluntary but also a binding EU mechanism regu-
lated by specific procedures at the EU level (hence part of the rea-
son for the choice of a Regulation). Ultimately, the proposal is to 
create a Union Resettlement Framework (European Commission 
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2016b). The fundamentals of the revised understanding of resettle-
ment and in particular of the Union Resettlement Framework are: 
To provide a common approach to safe and legal arrival in the 
Union for third-country nationals in need of international pro-
tection, thus also protecting them from exploitation by migrant 
smuggling networks and endangering their lives in trying the 
reach Europe; help reduce the pressure of spontaneous arri-
vals on the Member States' asylum systems; enable the shar-
ing of the protection responsibility with countries to which or 
within which a large number of persons in need of international 
protection has been displaced and help alleviate the pressure 
on those countries; provide a common Union contribution to 
global resettlement efforts. 
(European Commission 2016b, 3) 
Hence, the idea was also there that, aside from its ‘external dimen-
sion’ resettlement could work as a tool of migration and crisis man-
agement (European Commission 2016b, 2) supported in its task by 
the new European Union Agency for Asylum. The eligible persons 
would fall well beyond a traditional understanding of refugees ac-
cording to UNHCR practices by encompassing for examples socio-
economic vulnerabilities, displaced persons, and those with family 
links (European Commission 2016b, 10-11).  
Finally, two main understanding have been underlined in the proposal: 
first, that secondary movements have to be prevented (which partly 
explains the choice for a Regulation); and second, that irregular 
movements are absolutely to be avoided and punished. In this 
sense, persons who have irregularly entered, irregularly stay, or 
have attempted to irregularly enter into the territory of the Member 
States during the last five years prior to resettlement have to be 
excluded from resettlement schemes (European Commission 
2016b, 11). 
The first Directive on minimum standards on procedures for granting 
and withdrawing refugee status in the EU, delivered on 2005 (Euro-
pean Council 2005), listed applicants’ rights: legal assistance, proper 
translation, assistance by relevant agencies, an interpreter, the possi-
bility of an interview and indeed the right to be informed about the 
motivations of a negative answer and the right to appeal (European 
Council 2005, Art. 10). ‘Minors’ were also recognized to be in need of 
specific procedural guarantees. Yet, in this first Directive, a request for 
protection was understood to fall under the Geneva Convention (and 
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its 1967 Protocol). The recast 2013 Directive on common procedures for 
granting and withdrawing international protection (European Parlia-
ment and Council 2013a) confirmed these rights, extending them to en-
compass provisions in terms of medical needs; ‘free’ legal assistance in 
appeals; strengthened information rights at maritime borders and ter-
ritorial waters; inserting a peculiar attention to the ‘gender perspective’ 
and to unaccompanied minors (European Parliament and Council 2013a, 
Artt. 8-12). With respect to the 2005 Directive, the 2013 one enclosed ‘sub-
sidiary protection’, as a legitimate form of international protection.   
Already in the 2005 Directive on procedures, three key concepts were 
mentioned: ‘safe country of origin’, ‘safe third countries’ and ‘first 
countries of asylum’. In all cases, the aim was to expedite the applica-
tion examination procedure by either evaluating requests’ soundness 
(in the case of safe countries of origin) or their possible consideration 
in another ‘safe’ country, hence their inadmissibility (safe third-coun-
try and first country of asylum). In the words of the Commission, ex-
pedite procedures would allow focusing more thoroughly on persons 
in true need (European Commission 2003b, 8). These concepts were 
largely specified in the proposal for Regulation on common proce-
dures for international protection delivered in 2016 (European Com-
mission 2016c). The ‘safe country of origin’ concept indicates a country 
where 
on the basis of the legal situation, the application of the law 
within a democratic system and the general political circum-
stances, it can be shown that there is generally no persecution 
(…) no torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment and no threat by reason of indiscriminate violence in sit-
uations of international or internal armed conflict. 
(European Commission 2016c, Artt. 44-50)  
Fact sheet 2.2: A common list of safe countries of origin 
The concept of safe country of origin has acquired great relevance 
in the last years. The concept specifically refers to unfounded appli-
cations for international protection, which especially given the ‘mi-
gration crisis’ are a burden for the proper working of the asylum sys-
tem and should therefore be dealt with quickly. 
In a proposal for Regulation put forward by the Commission in 2015 
(European Commission 2015b), a common list of safe countries of 
origin is mentioned, and it is exactly this concept that is of extreme 
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interest for the purpose of this work. In fact, through the concept, the 
EU aims at defining the criteria for the assessment of a safe country 
of origin, at standardizing different understandings among Member 
States, at possibly introducing the concept in the legislative frame-
work of some Member States that do not have such list (see below) 
and at avoiding secondary movements of applicants. 
The common list of safe countries of origin draws from Directive 
2013/32/EU (European Parliament and Council 2013a) on proce-
dures (recast) (see above), which specifies that safe countries of 
origin should be evaluated according to: 
(a) the relevant laws and regulations of the country and the 
manner in which they are applied; (b) observance of the rights 
and freedoms laid down in the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
and/or the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights 
and/or the United Nations Convention against Torture, in par-
ticular the rights from which derogation cannot be made under 
Article 15(2) of the said European Convention; (c) respect for 
the non-refoulement principle in accordance with the Geneva 
Convention; (d) provision for a system of effective remedies 
against violations of those rights and freedoms. 
(European Commission 2015b, 2-3) 
It is a list informed by consultation with multiple organizations and 
structures, among which the UNHCR, EASO, the European External 
Action Service, the Council of Europe and which defines Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedo-
nia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey as safe countries of 
origin according to the criteria above (European Commission 2015b, 
6).  The Common list is not intended to be exclusive, as further coun-
tries may be added (or removed) especially on the basis of the 
amount of applicants for international protection received by the EU, 
which makes Pakistan, Bangladesh and Senegal likely candidates 
for the future (European Commission 2015b, 6). Yet, the concept 
reiterates the understanding that applications consideration should 
be individual and based on the single circumstances of every appli-
cants (European Commission 2015b, 8). 
The understanding of a Common list of safe countries of origin is 
intended to strongly relate and even overlap to the one of EU’s Can-
didate States, which should already fulfil a series of requirements 
with respect to ‘stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the 
rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities’ 
(European Commission 2015b, 7). 
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In turn, a ‘first country of asylum’ has to be intended as a country 
where  
(a) the applicant has enjoyed protection in accordance with 
the Geneva Convention in that country before travelling to the 
Union and he or she can still avail himself or herself of that pro-
tection; or (b) the applicant otherwise has enjoyed sufficient 
protection in that country before travelling to the Union and he 
or she can still avail himself or herself of that protection. 
(European Commission 2016c, Art. 44) 
Finally, and slightly different, a ‘safe third-country’ can be considered one 
where  
(a) life and liberty are not threatened on account of race, reli-
gion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion; (b) there is no risk of serious harm as defined 
in Regulation on Qualification; (c) the principle of non-re-
foulement in accordance with the Geneva Convention is re-
spected; (d) the prohibition of removal, in violation of the right 
to freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment as laid down in international law, is respected; (e) the pos-
sibility exists to receive protection in accordance with the sub-
stantive standards of the Geneva Convention or sufficient pro-
tection as referred to in Article 44(2), as appropriate. 
(European Commission 2016c, Art. 45)  
Indeed, all three terms open up many normative dilemmas, as for the 
effective impact on migrants. The choice of words does not help; what 
does ‘sufficient protection’ mean for example? 
Delivered only three years after the recast 2013 Directive on proce-
dures and right in the middle of the ‘migration crisis’, the 2016 pro-
posal for Regulation is explicitly aimed at homogenizing procedures 
within the EU and avoiding asylum shopping and secondary movements 
(European Commission 2016c, 3-4). The basic idea supporting the en-
tire Document is that the application process has to be as quick as pos-
sible: quick in rejecting unfounded applications and quick in returning 
non-eligible migrants. The main reasons, attaining to the credibility of 
the asylum system as evidenced before, are underlined by the need to 
face irregular immigration, dangerous movements and smuggling 
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phenomena (European Commission 2016c, 2). In turn, a quick proce-
dure would be beneficial to those really in need of protection. Thus, 
the idea that efficient procedures for international protection have to 
envisage time constraints. This has led to the proposal  of an ‘accelerated 
examination procedure’ that would deal with cases of ‘manifestly un-
founded claims’ such as ‘when the applicant makes clearly inconsistent 
or false representations, misleads the authorities with false infor-
mation’ or when the application ‘is clearly abusive’, aimed at delaying 
or frustrating the enforcement of a return decision, or when it is not 
submitted in the first country of irregular entry or where the applicant 
is legally present or, of interest, ‘when an applicant comes from a safe 
country of origin’ (European Commission 2016c, 15). Given the ‘ur-
gency’ attached to the whole process, doubts arise on the possible im-
plications this may have for the effective and careful evaluation of sin-
gle cases – an issue that becomes particularly visible in the analysis of 
these concepts in terms of justice claims, and especially through the 
concept of justice as mutual recognition (see chapter 3). 
Following this same logic, duties on applicants are strengthened – such 
as those regarding mandatory fingerprints; presence and stay in the 
Member State of application, a duty that if contravened may have im-
plications on the asylum request; respect for time constraints in the ap-
plication phases – and sanctions for related ‘abusive’ behaviours are 
reinforced (European Commission 2016c, 4-5).  
Qualification 
A closer look to the content of the asylum domain of international pro-
tection and the nature of protection granted in the European Union 
(synthesized with the word ‘Qualification’) is even more telling. As in 
the case of all developments in the asylum system, the legislative path 
has followed the instruction provided by the Tampere Council (1999), 
envisaging a short-term timeline for the approximation of qualification 
standards and a long-term timeline for their harmonization. The anal-
ysis of the words and the concepts used reveals the existence of at least 
two distinct trends: on the one hand, we identify an attempt to improve 
the concept of protection provided in the EU after the poor results 
achieved with first streamlining attempts. This phase lasted until 2014. 
On the other hand, it suggests an apparent restrictive interpretation of 
the content of protection and the nature of protection granted, espe-
cially in the 2016 new proposal for Regulation on Qualification.  
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The protection system for persons in search for asylum in the European 
Union is based on two main conceptual grounds: ‘persecution’ and ‘se-
rious harm’. These terms have different legal bases, give birth to dif-
ferent statuses and entail different protection guarantees. The scope of 
protection has to a great extent been the object of revision.  
The 2004 Directive on minimum standards for the qualification and 
status of third-country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as 
persons that otherwise need international protection and on the con-
tent of protection granted (European Council 2004a) made clear that 
the 1951 Geneva Convention and its 1967 Protocol was the legal provi-
sion supporting the protection system in the EU. It also stated that non-
refoulement was its core principle (European Council 2004a). Respect 
for human dignity and the right to asylum were underscored as guid-
ing values of EU’s action, according to the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union (Art. 1 and Art. 18 respectively).4 It also 
underlined that the refugee status was by no means the only form of 
protection granted by the EU but that subsidiary protection was com-
plementary. At that time, a Directive on ‘qualification’ meant the ap-
proximation of the rules for the identification and the recognition and 
provision of a minimum level of benefits to persons in need of interna-
tional protection. Providing common guidelines would limit ‘second-
ary movements’ by providing similar legal systems in Member States 
(Council 2004a). Yet, when looking at the legal systems in Member 
States, the vagueness of some concepts and the optional nature of some 
provisions in the Directive had not lead to similar identification, recog-
nition and procedures.  Moreover, incomplete or incorrect transposi-
tion was contributing to uneven standards in the Member States, to-
wards, most of the time, lower protection levels than those expected 
by the European Commission (2013, 16). Hence, the 2004 Directive nei-
ther affected the direction of flows nor posed a limit to the problem of 
secondary movements (European Commission 2013, 16). More similar 
standards on protection would imply that there was no point for asy-
lum seekers to choose either a specific country or to move within the 
Union to increase the chances for better protection. 
                                          
4 At that time, the Charter did not have the same legal basis as it would assume after 
the Lisbon Treaty of 2009.  
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With this in mind, the recast 2011 Directive on qualifications aimed at 
better reducing discrepancies in Member States and improving stand-
ards of protection (European Parliament and Council 2011). The Di-
rective specified the core definition of the protection system better than 
was the case in the previous Directive. ‘International protection’ meant 
both the refugee status and the subsidiary protection status, extending 
the opportunity to get protection in the EU. A ‘Refugee’ was defined as: 
A third-country national who, owing to a well-founded fear of 
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, po-
litical opinion or membership of a particular social group, is 
outside the country of nationality and is unable or, owing to 
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protec-
tion of that country, or a stateless person, who, being outside of 
the country of former habitual residence for the same reasons 
as mentioned above, is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling 
to return to it, and to whom Article 12 does not apply. 
(European Parliament and Council 2011, Art. 2) 
Instead, a ‘person eligible for subsidiary protection’ was defined as:  
A third-country national or a stateless person who does not 
qualify as a refugee but in respect of whom substantial grounds 
have been shown for believing that the person concerned, if re-
turned to his or her country of origin, or in the case of a stateless 
person, to his or her country of former habitual residence, 
would face a real risk of suffering serious harm (…) and is un-
able, or, owing to such risk, unwilling to avail himself or herself 
of the protection of that country. 
(European Parliament and Council 2011, Art. 2) 
Details were provided of the definitions of ‘persecution’ and ‘serious 
harm’, which, respectively, substantiated the ground for the refugee 
status and the subsidiary protection status. Importantly, in both cases, 
the nature of the actors perpetrating the act spanned over the national 
state by encompassing ‘parties or organisations controlling the State or 
a substantial part of the territory of the State’ and ‘non-State actors’ 
(European Parliament and Council 2011, Art. 6).  
In both the cases of refugee and subsidiary status, protection was en-
larged to the ‘family members’ of the persons in need. This included 
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the spouse or his/her unmarried partner in a stable relationship (ac-
cording to Member States’ legislation on the matter); the minor chil-
dren on condition that they are unmarried and regardless of whether 
they are adopted as defined under national law; and the father, mother 
or another adult responsible for the beneficiary of international protec-
tion when that beneficiary is a minor and unmarried (European Parlia-
ment and Council 2011, Art. 2). ‘Minors’ (under 18 years) and ‘unac-
companied minors’ (a minor who arrives on the territory of the Mem-
ber States unaccompanied by an adult responsible for him/her) were de-
voted exceptional guarantees (European Parliament and Council 2011, Art. 
2), recognizing their peculiar vulnerabilities. This is another aspect particu-
larly relevant in terms of the tensions between different conceptions of jus-
tice, such as ‘impartiality’ and ‘mutual recognition’ (see chapter 3). 
Being a refugee or entitled of subsidiary protection meant having spe-
cific rights. First and foremost, the right to non-refoulement, but also the 
right to information, to maintain family unity, to have residence per-
mits, travel documents, access to employment, education, social wel-
fare, and healthcare (European Parliament and Council 2011, Artt. 21-
30). In most of the cases, persons entitled to international protection 
were granted the same rights as Member States’ nationals (access to 
employment, education, recognition of qualifications, social welfare 
and healthcare). Differences in rights remained between refugees and 
persons entitled of subsidiary protection when it came to resident per-
mits (3 years and 1 years at least renewable respectively) and social 
assistance, given that subsidiary protection was considered a more 
‘temporary’ form of protection. Importantly, the 2011 Directive al-
lowed persons entitled to international protection the possibility to ob-
tain the long-term resident status in the EU to entice their social and 
economic integration (see below). 
The refugee crisis and the need to make up for the loopholes of the 
European asylum system, speeded up regulation work. In 2016 a Com-
mission proposal for a Regulation aimed at further harmonizing the 
common criteria for recognizing applicant of international protection. 
This was going to be accomplished by creating more detailed rules (di-
rectly applicable) and by removing most of ‘optional’ ones. Many as-
pects of interest in terms of definitions and concepts can be underlined.  
First, common qualifications were part and parcel of the mechanism to 
avoid asylum shopping (‘asylum should be granted according to Dublin 
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parameters’) and secondary movements (‘the state of residence is the 
state who grants protection’) and hence avoid uneven protection dis-
tribution among Member States (European Commission 2016d, 2). 
Contributing to common protection could also mean the adoption of a 
common list of safe countries of origin (European Commission 2016d, 9). 
Second, it was made clear that being entitled to international protec-
tion was both a duty and a right. Most importantly, the duty of the 
applicant to substantiate the application for international protection 
and the duty to remain in the Member States that granted that protec-
tion now seems to extend to refugees as much as to asylum seekers 
(European Commission 2016d, 6, 13-15).  
Third, the concept of protection in the EU was somewhat ‘limited’. The 
obligation to verify ‘internal protection’ options was phrased as ‘the 
conditions that he or she can safely and legally travel to, gain admit-
tance to and can reasonably be expected to settle in another part of the 
country of origin (…) to determine that the applicant is not in need of 
international protection’ (European Commission 2016d, 13). Most im-
portantly, in this understanding of protection as a ‘limited’ and ‘limit-
ing’ concept was the clear affirmation of the ‘non-permanent’ nature of 
the protection status, for as long as it was needed.5 The Commission stated: 
The absence of checks on the continued need for protection 
gives the protection a de facto permanent nature, thereby cre-
ating an additional incentive for those in need of international 
protection to come to the EU rather than to seek refuge in other 
places, including in countries closer to their countries-of-origin. 
(European Commission 2016d, 4) 
Indeed, this marks a deep watershed to previous understanding of asy-
lum in the European Union, with possibly great implications for spe-
cific rights – and thus justice claims – as applied to this institution. 
                                          
5 In the past the Court of Justice had been called to provide judgment on specific cases 
regarding the revocation of the refugee status and contributed to specify (in a ‘positive’ 
sense for the refugee) a provision whose interpretation was not unidirectional, see Sal-
ahadin Abdulla and Others (Court of Justice of the European Union 2008). 
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Table 2.1: Duration of residence permits for beneficiaries of interna-
tional protection (AIDA 2016, 16) 
Country Legal basis Duration of residence  
permit (in years) 
 Refugee  
status 
Subsidiary 
protection 
EU Minimum Art. 24 Qualification Directive ●●● ● 
Austria Art. 8(4) Asylum Act ●●● ● 
Belgium Art. 49 Aliens Act ●●●●● ● 
Bulgaria Art. 6 Trans. Prov LAR ●●●●● ●●● 
Cyprus Arts. 18A(3 & 19(4) Refugee law ●●● ● 
Czech Rep. Sects. 50 & 53a Asylum Act Permanent ● 
Germany Sect. 26 Residence Act ●●● ● 
Denmark Aliens Act as reformed ●● ● 
Estonia Art. 38 AGIPA ●●● ● 
Spain Art. 36(1)(c) Asylum Law ●●●●● ●●●●● 
Finland Sect. 57(7) Aliens Act ●●●● ●●●● 
France Arts. L313-13 & L314-11(8)-(10) 
Ceseda 
●●●●●●●●●● ●● 
Greece Art. 21 Law 4375/2016 ●●● ●●● 
Croatia Art. 75 LITP ●●●●● ●●● 
Hungary Sect. 23 Gov. Decree 251/2007 ●●●●●●●●●● ●●● 
Ireland  Permanent ●●● 
Italy Art. 23 LD 251/2007 ●●●●● ●●●●● 
Lithuania Art. 89 Law on Status of Foreigners Permanent ● 
Latvia Sect. 36 Asylum Act Permanent ● 
Luxembourg Art. 57 LITP ●●● ●●● 
Malta Art. 20 Refugee Regulations ●●● ●●● 
Netherlands Art. 28 Aliens Act ●●●●● ●●●●● 
Poland Art. 89i Law on Protection ●●● ●● 
Portugal Art. 67 Law 26/2014 ●●●●● ●●● 
Romania Art. 20(5) Asylum Act ●●● ● 
Sweden6 Aliens Act to be reformed ●●● ● 
Slovenia Sect. 91 International Protection Act Permanent ● 
Slovakia Sect. 24 Asylum Act Permanent ● 
UK Rule 339Q Immigration Rules ●●●●● ●●●●● 
Norway Sect. 60 Immigration Act ●●● ●●● 
Switzerland7 Arts. 58ff & 83ff Asylum Act ● ● 
Serbia Arts. 43 & 61 Asylum Act Permanent ● 
Turkey8 Art. 83 LFIP ● ● 
                                          
6 Permits issued to beneficiaries of subsidiary protection will be valid for 13 months under the 
proposed reform.  
7 Switzerland has a ‘temporary admission’ regime, not subsidiary protection. The ‘F-Permit’ 
issues in cases of temporary admission does not amount to a residence permit, but rather as 
a confirmation that deportation is suspended. 
8 Beneficiaries do not receive a residence permit, but rather an identification document. This 
refers to ‘conditional refugees’ i.e. persons originating from non-European countries. Refu-
gees recognised under the Refugee Convention in Turkey are entitled to a 3-year identifica-
tion document. 
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The Dublin System 
The ‘Dublin System’ is the cornerstone of the CEAS. Its ancestor, the 
Dublin Convention, was already in place in 1990, well before any at-
tempt to provide guidelines on a common asylum. Since 2003, it has 
had a bigger impact on Member States than any other provision on 
asylum. Its ultimate objective has not changed since: the determination 
of the state responsible for the examination of an application for inter-
national protection. The trajectories travelled to pursue this objective, 
instead, have changed since. ‘Dublin’ is certainly the most frequently 
used reference in EU’s speeches, especially in last years, when its 
proper functioning was said to be crucial for the management of the 
‘refugee crisis’ even though its weaknesses have become more appar-
ent. The Dublin System is both regulative with respect to applicants for 
international protection in the EU, and relations among Member 
States. Responsibility and solidarity are the key terms in the Dublin sys-
tem, and the aim of the Regulations produced through time was ex-
actly to strike a balance between these two key concepts (Council 
2003a). As such the normal functioning of the Dublin System has been af-
fected by the ‘internal crisis’ of the European Union, which has revealed the 
deepest ontological fragilities of the common approach to asylum. 
For the purpose of this work referring to Dublin as a regulation would 
be reductive.9 As a matter of fact, Dublin is a system: an ensemble of 
concepts which in themselves are highly relevant for the idea of a com-
mon European system (responsibility, solidarity); of devices considered 
key to the functioning of the system (EURODAC, Visa Information 
System (VIS), EASO and in the future the New European Agency for 
Asylum); and of terms that inform its logic (secondary movements and 
family reunification among others).  
The Dublin System was little more than a bare sum of technicalities in 
2003; a much more detailed framework for the definition of the ‘re-
sponsible’ state attentive to the basic and fundamental rights of the ap-
plicant in 2013; and finally, with the new proposal for Regulation, a 
central pillar of the Common European Asylum System, aimed at 
quickly providing protection and at curbing secondary movements 
                                          
9 In the proposal for Regulation COM (2016) 272 final (p. 2), the Dublin System is defined as 
the joint work of the Dublin and the EURODAC Regulation, but for the purpose of this work 
this understanding is reductive. 
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within the European Union. We will now take a closer look at these 
phases.  
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and in par-
ticular its Article 18, the ‘right to asylum’, is the cornerstone support-
ing the principles and values enshrined in the Dublin Regulation 
(Council 2003a). In general terms, when reference is made to the Dub-
lin system, it is article 10 of the Regulation that is quoted: 
Where it is established, on the basis of proof or circumstantial 
evidence (…) that an asylum seeker has irregularly crossed the 
border into a Member State by land, sea or air having come 
from a third-country, the Member State thus entered shall be 
responsible for examining the application for asylum. 
(Council 2003a, art 10) 
For the finalities of the Regulation, any information that could prove 
the asylum seeker’s transit through one of the frontier states of the EU, 
such as a residence document, or a registration in any of the database 
storing information on third-country citizens entering the EU space 
was key (EURODAC or the VIS). 
Fact sheet 2.3: EURODAC 
The system called EURODAC is one of the best examples of how 
concepts and terms can assume different meanings throughout 
time. Since it was created in 2000 by Regulation, it has then been 
significantly revised both in 2013 and in 2016. It now assumes a 
much broader meaning and absolves greater tasks than it was in-
tended for. As a system aimed at collecting and sharing data among 
Member States, it fully adhered to the objective of developing a com-
mon approach to asylum. 
EURODAC has been conceived as a system for the comparison of 
fingerprint data, ‘consisting of a Central Unit, to be established within 
the Commission and which will operate a computerised central da-
tabase of fingerprint data, as well as of the electronic means of trans-
mission between the Member States and the central database’ 
(Council 2000, Art. 2). It was created to help implement the Dublin 
Convention for the identification of the state responsible to examine 
an application for international protection. In order to meet that ob-
jective, a system had to be created both for the identification of ap-
plicants for asylum, and for discovering whether an application had 
already been submitted in another Member State (Council 2000). 
Germane here is the definition of ‘hit’, defined as ‘the existence of a 
EU terms, definitions and concepts on migration 29
 
match or matches established by the Central System by comparison 
between fingerprint data recorded in the computerised central data-
base and those transmitted by a Member State with regard to a per-
son’ (Council 2000, Art. 2). The 2000 Regulation postulated a key 
obligation for the ‘common European asylum’: to take the finger-
prints of all asylum applicants and of all aliens apprehended while 
irregularly crossing an external border of a Member State. Yet, at 
that time, two limitations were set: First, fingerprints of irregular 
crossing alien were taken only for the purpose of identifying the 
country responsible for the examination of an asylum application and 
were stored for a limited amount of time. Second, the fingerprints of 
minors under 14 were not taken (Council 2000, Art. 8). 
Thirteen years later, after terrorist attacks, increasing inflows to-
wards the European Union, increasing urgency to create a common 
and working asylum, and a Dublin Regulation modified accordingly, 
EURODAC assumed a broader meaning. The two main shapers of 
the new understanding of the system were the linkage established 
with law enforcement tools and the introduction of subsidiary protec-
tion to the understanding of international protection (European Par-
liament and Council 2013b). Particularly when it comes to law en-
forcement tools (‘prevention, detection, investigation of terrorist of-
fences and other serious criminal offences’), EURODAC could be of 
extreme relevance for specific authorities of the Member States or 
for the European Police Office (EUROPOL). This is because of the 
data stored in EURODAC that could be made available (under cer-
tain conditions though) (European Parliament and Council 2013b). 
Hence, a clear change in the purpose of the system can be ob-
served.  
The 2016 proposal for revision of the EURODAC Regulation has 
significantly modified the understanding and the purpose of the sys-
tem in many ways. Most notably, it has been transformed from 
mainly an asylum tool to a device for broader migration purposes, 
for example the return of irregular immigrants found illegal in the 
Member States (European Commission 2016e). As a matter of fact, 
it has been proposed that EURODAC take the fingerprints not only 
of those persons illegally crossing an external border of a Member 
State for the identification of the responsible state, but also of those 
not fingerprinted irregular migrants already in the Member States 
who are not applying for asylum. The main idea was that ‘thousands 
of migrants remain invisible in Europe, including thousands of unac-
companied minors, a situation that facilitates unauthorised second-
ary and subsequent movements and illegal stay within the EU’ (Eu-
ropean Commission 2016e, 2). 
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 Hence, attention shifted from irregular immigration to the EU to ir-
regular immigration in the EU (European Commission 2016e, 2). In 
addition to the original objective of EURODAC (linked to the realm 
of asylum), there was also a proposal to identify illegally staying 
third-country nationals to ‘assist a Member State to re-document a 
third-country national for return purposes’ by using improved biomet-
rics for identification, such as facial recognition and digital photos (to 
be eventually be taken and transmitted also by the European Border 
and Coast Guard) (European Commission 2016e, 2-3). Accordingly, 
two main underpinnings of the EURODAC system changed: first, the 
idea that minors were not fingerprinted; second, that irregular immi-
grants’ fingerprints could only be stored for a limited amount of time. 
As for minors’ fingerprinting (proposed now at 6 years), the argu-
ment was that this could help both addressing smuggling phenom-
ena, and identifying possible connections to family members (Euro-
pean Commission 2016e, 4). As for irregular immigrants appre-
hended at the external border or found in an illegal situation within 
the Member States, the broadened scope of the EURODAC Regu-
lation to fight illegal immigration required the storing of data for a 
quite extended period (5 years), as for other databases in the Justice 
and Home Affairs domain (European Commission 2016e, 4). 
Finally, the modified understanding of the system required that data 
were shared with third countries for the purpose of return, previously 
forbidden according to data protection criteria (European Commis-
sion 2016e, 4). Additionally, it allowed to share all data stored for law 
enforcement purposes (European Commission 2016e, 5). 
As plainly stated in the proposal for the Regulation, EURODAC must 
be understood as strongly related to several key terms and concepts: 
the CEAS, the EU return policy, internal security and the European 
Border and Coast Guard (European Commission 2016e, 5-6). Hotspot 
will also be added as a term, in that ‘urgency’ has been attached to 
identify, register and fingerprinting all the persons arriving through 
them, both for relocation and return purposes (European Commission 
2016e, 9). Indeed, the big modification EURODAC has gone through 
open many normative dilemmas that need careful investigation and 
assessment. However, the definition of responsibility in the Dublin 
system is essentially based on two other key elements: minors (and in 
particular unaccompanied minors) and family unit. The principles have 
almost always been that minors could not be separated from their par-
ents or guardian; that unaccompanied minors have to join their family 
legally present in one of the Member States, provided that is in the 
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main interest of the minor (Council 2003a, Art. 6); and that this repre-
sents the views of the minor according to age and maturity (European 
Commission 2016a, Art. 8). From this point of view, vulnerable catego-
ries seem to be particularly protected with respect to others. Notably, 
Member States hosting family members already granted international 
protection or waiting for a decision on their asylum application should 
also take responsibility for asylum applicants (European Commission 
2016a, Art. 12). Additionally, it is important to underline that the last 
Proposal for Regulation issued by the European Commission in 2016, 
has extended the understanding of family members to encompass the 
sibling or siblings of the applicant (European Commission 2016a, Art. 2).  
As seen before, most of the Dublin system is about regulative aspects 
among Member States and their duties and responsibilities. It is espe-
cially here that most of the changes have been made through the dif-
ferent Regulations, and also where most of the controversies have 
arisen among Member States. The 2003 Dublin Regulation understand-
ing of international protection did not encompass subsidiary protection, 
and this was somehow conflicting with other Directives (such as the 
Qualification Directive). This could represent a limitation to the right 
of family unity for certain categories of applicants (European Commis-
sion 2007b, 6). Moreover, the application of the Dublin Regulation 
raised the issue of internal solidarity. A reflection over the concept of 
solidarity was promoted in a complex situation: asylum and mixed mi-
gratory flows towards the European Union were putting extraordinary 
pressures on some countries; and in turn, it was exactly these countries 
that were particularly called to be responsible and observe EU’s regula-
tions, at the risk of endangering the EU asylum system (European 
Council 2012, 1). Responsibility and solidarity as the two faces of the 
same coin could be profitably handled through the help of FRONTEX 
and EASO, assisting Member States particularly affected by inflows. 
Furthermore, it was specified that solidarity could be assisted by relo-
cation, defined as the voluntary acceptance of beneficiaries of interna-
tional protection as attempted through Pilot Project for intra-EU Relo-
cation from Malta (EUREMA) (European Council 2012, 5).  
Fact sheet 2.4: Relocation 
As seen above, relocation as a concept is not new to the European 
Union. Overall, it should be referred to the binary objective of soli-
darity and fair sharing of responsibilities mentioned in other parts of 
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this work. Hence, as in the case of other concepts, it is not only in-
tended as a mechanism, but as a meaningful term that specifically 
plays out in relations among the Member States. In recent years, it 
has been employed in relation to the ‘migration crisis’ and it has been 
intended accordingly, as an exceptional, provisional measure to ad-
dress an emergency situation (the one witnessed in the Mediterra-
nean throughout 2015 and 2016). Nevertheless, a more elaborated 
concept of Crisis Relocation Mechanisms is being developed, which 
suggests a less ‘extemporaneous’ measure and instead provides 
the idea of a device to solve future structural crises affecting the EU. 
As in the case of other concepts, relocation is better understood and 
assumes a more coherent story when its pattern of reference is 
made clear: EASO, solidarity, fair responsibility sharing, roadmap, 
hotspot, secondary movements, fingerprints, EURODAC and Dublin 
are the words which reiterate the most in the documents on the sub-
ject matter. 
In its bare definition, relocation is defined as ‘the transfer of an ap-
plicant from the territory of the Member State (…) responsible for 
examining his or her application for international protection to the 
territory of the Member State of relocation’ and a member state of 
relocation as ‘the Member State which becomes responsible for ex-
amining the application for international protection (…)of an appli-
cant following his or her relocation in the territory of that Member 
State’ (Council 2015b, Art. 2(e)). Nevertheless, and as argued 
above, in the last years, relocation has been particularly related to 
the concept of ‘crisis’, which is likely to affect the EU in many ways. 
Hence, it was intended as a device to address the considerable 
pressure to the migration and asylum systems of Italy and Greece 
(and Hungary) due to unprecedented flows of migrants. The geo-
graphical delimitation of the concept is worth noting. Relocation can 
be applicable in these countries and concerns persons having 
lodged their applications for international protection in these states 
(Council 2015b, Art. 3). Additionally, it is specified that the unprece-
dented arrivals of migrants include applicants for international pro-
tection who are ‘in clear need of international protection’ (Council 
2015b), namely those extremely likely to be recognized as refugees 
in the EU: Syrians, Eritreans and Iraqis. 
The idea of relocation as a tool to solidarity should be complemented 
by the idea that relocation is based on effective responsibilities fall-
ing on the states subject to relocation provisions. In other words, 
effective relocation presupposes that Italy and Greece bring forward 
structural adjustments to their asylum and migration systems, which 
should be listed in a roadmap. Migration and asylum systems are 
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intended in their capacity of ‘asylum assessment’, ‘first reception’ but 
also ‘return’ (Council 2015b).The relationship between relocation 
and the hotspot approach (see below) and between relocation and 
agencies such as EASO (see below) but also FRONTEX and EU-
RODAC (see above) is apparent given that applicants for relocation 
have to be fingerprinted first (Council 2015b, Art. 5(5)).  
A further idea subsumed in relocation is that ‘an applicant does not 
have the right under EU law to choose the Member State responsi-
ble for his or her application’ (Council 2015b, 5). Therefore, deciding 
the state of relocation is not a right of the persons that are relo-
cated.10   Accordingly, avoiding secondary movements is important 
to the concept of relocation and to properly inform applicants of the 
possible constraints on their protection rights is reflected in the pre-
cept (in principle confined to the Member States providing them in-
ternational protection) (Council 2015b). 
Indeed, the idea of relocation is somewhat linked to the idea of a 
distribution key among Member States. Distribution formula have 
been particularly central to a specific reflection on relocation that has 
given a more structural dimension to the concept with the develop-
ment of the idea of a Crisis Relocation Mechanism. This idea entails 
that ‘a number of applications for international protection shall be 
examined by the Member State of relocation’ in derogation from the 
principle set in the Dublin Regulation (European Commission 2015d, 
Art. 33(2)). The idea (proposed by the Commission in 2015) is that 
of an overall system and not only of a method; its underpinnings re-
mains solidarity and fair responsibility sharing. This time, though, the 
relocation concept is especially related to the Dublin System given 
that the mechanism is triggered when the normal functioning of Dub-
lin is put in question. The EU made a proposal for ‘a permanent sys-
tem of relocation to be triggered in crisis situation’ and impinging on 
the determination of the responsible state for the examination of an 
application for international protection (European Commission 
2015d, 2). The geographical specificities of the above concept is 
therefore lost. ‘Selection’ criteria are instead still based on national-
ity; explicit responsibility for states experiencing pressures remain 
and prevention of secondary movements is still one of the linchpins 
of the system (European Commission 2015d, 10). The crisis situa-
tion is defined as ‘of such a magnitude as to place extreme pressure 
even on a well prepared and functioning asylum system, while also 
                                          
10 While Member states may express a preference for applicants to be relocated on the 
basis of language, cultural and social ties or demonstrated family likely to positively 
contribute to integration. 
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taking into account the size of the Member State concerned’ (Euro-
pean Commission 2015d, 7). 
Fact sheet 2.5: Temporary protection 
The definition of exceptional schemes to offer immediate protection to 
persons displaced and without the possibility to return to their country 
of origin was in place in 2001, through the so-called ‘Temporary Protec-
tion Directive’, created because of the massive inflows of persons in the 
aftermath of the Yugoslavia breakdown. Temporary protection was de-
fined as: 
A procedure of exceptional character to provide, in the event of 
a mass influx or imminent mass influx of displaced persons from 
third countries who are unable to return to their country of origin, 
immediate and temporary protection to such persons, in partic-
ular if there is also a risk that the asylum system will be unable 
to process this influx without adverse effects for its efficient op-
eration, in the interests of the persons concerned and other per-
sons requesting protection. 
(Council 2001, Art. 2(a))
Temporary protection would be offered to entitled migrants. The idea 
behind this Directive was to prevent secondary movements and to pro-
mote a balance of efforts between Member States ‘in receiving and 
bearing the consequences of receiving displaced persons’ (Council 
2001). Yet, the Directive has never been employed. 
Fact sheet 2.6: Hotspots 
While not new in the EU jargon, the concept of ‘hotspot’ (as relocation) 
has been increasingly associated with the ‘migration crisis’. It is not easy 
to provide a definition of what the hotspot is, as it has invariably been 
referred to physical ‘areas’ (European Commission 2015e) but also to a 
broader ‘approach’.  
The ‘hotspot’ approach is intended as the joint support of EU’s agencies 
to frontline Member States experiencing disproportionate migratory 
pressures at the external borders. Two elements are implied: first, the 
hotspot can be conceived as a ‘border control’ device; second, by en-
visaging the joint work of many agencies, the approach absolves differ-
ent functions. More precisely, FRONTEX deals with the screening, doc-
ument check, fingerprinting and registration of persons in the hotspot; 
EASO helps with asylum applications and relocation and EUROPOL 
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assists frontline states on forged documents and, together with EURO-
JUST, smuggling and trafficking phenomena (European Commission 
2015e, 5). 
All these elements are of relevance to understand what the ‘hotspot ap-
proach’ is. Furthermore, this approach is strongly related to EURODAC 
and to its finalities as reframed in the 2016 Regulation seen above: reg-
istration of people for the twofold objective of channelling them into the 
international protection path (also through the relocation programme) or 
speeding up their return if not in need of protection. 
The first seeds of the challenges to Dublin were already observed but 
became self-evident when a sentence of the Court of Justice of 2011 de-
clared Greece as a non-safe country, de facto prohibiting the application 
of the Dublin Regulation. This and other events were brought to atten-
tion by many organizations, paved the way for a revision of the Dublin 
Regulation in 2013. The revision aimed particularly at extending the 
rights of applicants in every step of the responsibility determination 
process11 (European Parliament and Council 2013b, Artt. 4-6). The idea 
of a ‘fitness check’ to assess the effects of the Dublin Regulation on fun-
damental rights (European parliament and Council 2013b) and the de-
ficiencies testified by the Court of Justice in Greece (only implicitly 
mentioned), were aimed to protect the rights of applicants set out in 
the Union asylum acquis and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, other international human rights, and refugee rights 
(European Parliament and Council 2013b). In the 2013 Dublin Regula-
tion (recast), subsidiary protection entered the concept of international 
protection, and the European Union Asylum Support Office (EASO) 
entered into force to assist Member States in implementing the Dublin 
Regulation and to provide solidarity measures to particularly affected 
states (European Parliament and Council 2013b).  
Fact sheet 2.7: The European Asylum Support Office (EASO) and the 
European Union Asylum Agency 
The European Asylum Support Office (EASO) was established in 
2010 after the new impetus on migration and asylum policy triggered 
                                          
11 Right to a personal interview, to get appropriate information, the possibility of ef-
fective remedy on a decision of transfer to a given Member States and to get a human 
transfer, to limit and provide appropriate conditions in detention, and especially of 
vulnerable categories such as minors and unaccompanied minors and giving priority 
to family unity 
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by the Lisbon Treaty (2009), the new Pact on Migration (2008) and 
similar documents. It was first intended as a ‘support’ Office, but has 
been gradually upgraded as one of the key tools at the EU’s dis-
posal, especially after the ‘migration crisis’. Hence, the idea of an 
asylum Office has gradually changed into the idea of an effective 
Agency, more powerful and proactive in its tasks. It can be argued 
that this shifting ‘nature’ resonates the progressive modification of 
EURODAC but also that of FRONTEX, quickly modified into the Eu-
ropean Border and Coast Guard. 
If EASO is a ‘practical’ device, we should not miss the contribution 
this term brings to the CEAS. Indeed, it suggests that Member 
States should be assisted in their asylum practices, especially when 
facing severe pressure. The concepts and terms EASO is discussed 
in relation with help providing a coherent story about its relevance in 
the European asylum system. These concepts/terms are: external 
dimension, (safe) countries of origin, FRONTEX, reception, reloca-
tion, solidarity, resettlement, and capacity building. This list makes 
clear that if the primary task of the Office is assistance to Member 
States, a key external dimension is part of the definition, a dimension 
that was further extended with the proposal for an Agency drafted 
by the Commission in 2016. 
EASO is primarily a Support Office enjoying independence in tech-
nical matters and legal, administrative and financial autonomy (Eu-
ropean Parliament and Council 2010). Additionally, the Office is 
working in cooperation with EU agencies (FRONTEX and the FRA 
in particular) and other agencies (especially the UNHCR), drawing 
on their expertise (European Parliament and Council 2010). As re-
ported in the Regulation that established it, EASO should be in-
tended as ‘a European centre of expertise on asylum’, where its 
main tasks are ‘contributing to the implementation of the CEAS, sup-
porting practical cooperation among Member States on asylum and 
supporting Member States that are subject to particular pressure’ 
(European Parliament and Council 2010). It was clearly specified 
that, considering the aim to improve the implementation of the 
CEAS, the Office had to be involved in the CEAS’s external dimen-
sion (European Parliament and Council 2010, Art. 2(1)). With partic-
ular reference to this latter dimension, EASO was intended to help 
in the provision of information on countries of origin and on resettle-
ment programmes (European Parliament and Council 2010, Art. 4). 
Additionally, given its ‘support’ nature and its technical skills, it could 
provide assistance to third countries on capacity building and recep-
tion systems, while also contributing to the implementation of Re-
gional Protection Programmes and other actions related to ‘durable 
solutions’ (European Parliament and Council 2010, Art. 7). As for 
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Member States subject to severe pressure, EASO was intended to 
help with relocation efforts.  
Since it was created, EASO came to embody new meanings corre-
sponding to new tasks, especially triggered by the ‘migration crisis’. 
Its ‘implementation-check’ function became even more needed as a 
complement to the CEAS, hence the proposal to enhance EASO 
and transform it into something partly new (European Commission 
2016f, 2). Instead of a support office, it became more of an Agency, 
a centre of expertise in its own rights, not relying on information pro-
vided by Member States and able to provide operational and tech-
nical assistance to Member States (European Commission 2016f, 
2). Inevitably, this required a new mandate, new resources in terms 
of staff and a new budget. The role of the Agency in promoting uni-
form application of asylum law and in promoting convergence in the 
assessment of applications for international protection among Mem-
ber States has been particularly underlined (European Commission 
2016f, Art. 1). Hence, EASO is no longer conceived as a pure assis-
tance tool but as an active agent of harmonization of Member States’ 
actions on asylum. The Agency has to assume also a central role in 
the assessment of safe countries of origin, safe third countries or 
first countries of asylum (European Commission 2016f, Art. 11). 
As in the case of other proposals for Regulation put forward in 2016, the Eu-
ropean Union has specified how the new Dublin system should look like. The 
new system aims to determine the state responsible for the examination 
of an asylum application while envisaging a) more efficient ways to show 
solidarity among Member States; b) clear provisions on applicants’ obliga-
tions and the consequences of non-compliance so as to avoid possible 
abuses of the system; and c) quick procedures for the identification of the 
responsible state. As for point a), the proposal for an automatic collective ac-
tivation mechanism was put forward, intended as the following: 
[A] corrective mechanism in order to ensure a fair sharing of re-
sponsibility between Member States and a swift access of appli-
cants to procedures for granting international protection, in situa-
tions when a Member State is confronted with a disproportionate 
number of applications for international protection for which it is 
the Member State responsible under the Regulation’. Its aim was 
that to ‘mitigate any significant disproportionality in the share of 
asylum applications between Member States resulting from the ap-
plication of the responsibility criteria. 
(European Commission 2016a, 18) 
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In this sense, the necessity for the creation of a new EU Agency for Asylum 
was underlined (European Commission 2016a, 17) (see fact sheet 2.7). 
With respect to point b), the aim was to avoid applicants’ secondary 
movements, underlining the obligation to apply in the first country of 
entrance and remain in the Member States assigned as responsible (Eu-
ropean Commission 2016a, 4). As stated in the proposal, ‘With this 
amendment it is clarified that an applicant neither has the right to 
choose the Member State of application nor the Member State respon-
sible for examining the Application’ (European Commission 2016a, 
15). The purpose of the proposal put forward by this Regulation to ex-
pand the understanding of the family members to encompass siblings 
was exactly to avoid further secondary movements. As for point c), 
speeding up the determination process was in line with the new un-
derstanding of the CEAS. One of the most important proposals in this 
sense was the elimination of the ‘cessation of responsibility clause’, 
previously set at 12 months. Another one was the obligation for the 
Member State of application to first check the ‘inadmissibility’ of the 
asylum claim with respect to the safe country of origin, first country of 
asylum or the safe third-country concepts (European Commission 2016a, 
15). Finally, other duties explicitly set time limits for different phases 
of the determination process both for Member States and for appli-
cants. For example, a quick determination process encompassed appli-
cants’ obligation to provide the relevant elements and information re-
garding the determination process, respecting the time schedule set by 
the proposal, to the risk of no consideration of information unjustifi-
ably provided afterwards (European Commission 2016a, 15).  
Reception 
The last building block of the CEAS are the reception conditions of asy-
lum seekers into the territory of the European Union. As in the case of 
the other policies substantiating the CEAS, the ones on reception have 
been subject to modifications, and a proposal was issued in 2016 to re-
vise the reception system. Overall, tensions have always accompanied 
the understanding of reception conditions in the European Union. On 
the one hand, there is a definition of minimum standard to respect hu-
man dignity (even though no clear definition is provided as for what 
this term stands for). On the other hand, there is a necessity of progres-
sive harmonization to prevent secondary movements, determined by the 
different reception conditions in Member States (Council 2003b). 
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The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the 
protection of human dignity (‘dignified standard of living’) were said to 
be at the basis of the 2003 Directive on reception, laying down mini-
mum standards for the reception of asylum seekers (Council 2003b). 
The Directive specified two similar yet partly different definitions. 
First, reception conditions were intended as ‘the full set of measures that 
Member States grant to asylum seekers/applicants’. Second,  material 
reception conditions were the reception conditions that include housing, 
food (also non-food items with the 2016 Directive, a positive improve-
ment this latter) and clothing, provided ‘in kind’, or as financial allow-
ances or in vouchers, and a daily expenses allowance (Council 2003b). 
The difference is important in that material reception conditions, 
which specify the nature of reception conditions, also specify the re-
strictions applied to their provision. By specifically providing disposi-
tions for the reception of ‘applicant with special reception needs’, the 
document scores positively on the protection of vulnerable categories 
of persons (European Parliament and Council 2013c). 
The recast reception Directive laying down standard (and not ‘mini-
mum’ standards) for the reception of applicants of international pro-
tection (European Parliament and Council 2013c) has brought about 
important changes to the understanding of reception conditions. First, 
the consideration that these applications were extended to applicants 
for subsidiary protection, thus expanding the category of persons af-
fected by the Directive. Second, the idea that family unity and child 
rights were to be especially protected. Third, that detention had to be 
particularly detailed, especially as an answer to the many contestations 
regarding the effective implementation of the practice. Fourth, that re-
ception conditions had to better ensure human dignity and hence had 
to be improved (European Parliament and Council 2013c). 
The rights embodied in reception conditions encompass being timely 
informed about rights and duties and appeal possibilities. This meant 
timely release of a certificate proving the status of ‘applicant’ after 
lodging an application or certifying the right to stay in the territory 
throughout the examination of the asylum application; right to freely 
move in the territory of the host state or within the area assigned; to be 
kept with the own family (when possible); to have the same access to 
education as nationals; to have access to the labour market (after a cer-
tain period) and with the only limit of specific preferences for nationals 
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or Union citizens; and to get access to the healthcare or at least to emer-
gency care and essential treatment of illness or mental disorders 
(Council 2003b, Artt. 5-15). When provided, housing is intended as: 
Premises used for the purpose of housing applicants during the 
examination of an application for international protection 
made at the border or in transit zones; accommodation centres 
which guarantee an adequate standard of living; private houses, 
flats, hotels or other premises adapted for housing applicants. 
(European Parliament and Council 2013c, Art. 18) 
In these structures, the right of family unity should be supported, to-
gether with the right to communicate with and grant access to family 
members, the UNHCR, legal advisors and other organizations. On the 
other hand, applicants’ residence always has to be communicated to 
the authorities of the host state and applicants’ permanence in the as-
signed places may be condition for the effective provision of material 
reception conditions (Council 2009b, Art. 7(6)), hence reducing free-
dom of movement.  
As argued, one of the most controversial terms provided in the Di-
rective is detention, all the more relevant in the case of applicants for 
international protection. Detention is intended as the ‘confinement of 
an asylum seeker/applicant by a Member State within a particular 
place, where the applicant is deprived of his or her freedom of move-
ment’ (Council 2009b, Art. 2(k)). The deprivation of the freedom of 
movement should differentiate between ordinary detention and recep-
tion in accommodation centres, intended as any place used for collec-
tive housing of asylum seekers/applicants (Council 2009b, Art. 2(l)). 
The recast Directive of 2013 provided the idea of detention as a last re-
sort measure, and if no other less coercive measures could be applied 
(European Parliament and Council 2013c, Art. 8), with a specific em-
phasis on minors and unaccompanied minors. Its scope was limited to 
verify or determine an applicants’ identity or nationality; to determine 
those elements on which the application for international protection 
was based, which could not be obtained in the absence of detention (in 
particular when there is a risk of absconding of the applicant); to de-
cide on the applicant’s right to enter the territory; to prepare the return 
and/or carry out the removal process when detention precedes a re-
turn procedure (and the Member State thinks that the application for 
international protection is made merely in order to delay or frustrate 
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the enforcement of the return decision); to protect national security or pub-
lic order; and to determine the responsible state according to the Dublin 
criteria (European Parliament and Council 2013c, Art. 8). Eventually, with 
the 2016 proposal for Directive, detention may also be implemented in case 
an applicant has been assigned a specific place of residence but has not com-
plied with this obligation (European Commission 2016g, Art. 8 (3) (c)).  
However, applicants detained should benefit from specific rights, 
starting from the right to be detained for as short as the procedure re-
quire; to be duly informed of the reasons of detention and of the opportu-
nities shared in this condition (even though free legal assistance and rep-
resentation may depend on the national law); the right to access open-
air spaces; to communicate with the UNHCR, family members, legal 
advisors and other organizations; and to be kept with the family or 
keep a gender-based partition if contingent situations do not oblige 
otherwise (European Parliament and Council 2013c, Artt. 9-10). Detention 
is thought to be implemented in specific detention facilities. If a prison is 
used for detention purposes, applicants have to be kept separate from 
prisoners (this possibility never applies for unaccompanied minors which 
should be lodged with adult relatives and with siblings when possible, in 
accommodation centres with special provisions for minors or in other suit-
able accommodations (European Parliament and Council, Art. 11.) 
The 2016 proposal for a revised Directive on reception brings about 
important changes to the concept of reception (European Commission 
2016g). The main idea is that important differences still persist on both 
the organization and the standard provided in the Member States. In 
particular, discrepancies among too generous and too restrictive reception 
conditions leave space to secondary movements. Contrasting this trend is ut-
most important for the EU, especially given the high migration pressure of 
recent years (European Commission 2016g, 3). Nevertheless, given social 
and economic conditions in each Member State, a thorough harmonization 
is neither possible nor advisable (European Commission 2016g, 6).  
With this in mind, the provision of standards on reception conditions at 
the EU level is an attempt to further harmonization, reducing the dis-
tance among Member States’ measures. This will be achieved through 
operational standards and indicators on reception conditions developed 
by the EASO and the future European Union Agency for Asylum, and 
through the set-up of contingency plans in case of massive arrivals (Eu-
ropean Commission 2016g, 3). Additionally, the idea that reception 
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conditions at the EU level have to contribute to the orderly management 
of flows is included. The conditions should also contribute to the easy 
identification of the country responsible for the examination of an ap-
plication for international protection according to the Dublin Regula-
tion, and to the provision of timely and effective assessment of appli-
cants’ claims according to the Procedure Regulation. Hence, the possi-
bility to restrict the freedom of movement of the applicants, the assign-
ment of specific places, as well as the provision of material reception 
only ‘in kind’, is contemplated (European Commission 2016g, 3, 4, 5). 
In line with other proposal issued in 2016, this Directive more explicitly 
underlines duties for applicants and more clearly specifies the conse-
quences of not abiding by these obligations in terms of material recep-
tion provisions. The definition of absconding provided in the Directive 
is interesting from this point of view. It means ‘both a deliberate action 
to avoid the applicable asylum procedures and the factual circum-
stance of not remaining available to the relevant authorities, including 
by leaving the territory where the applicant is required to be present’ 
(European Commission 2016g, Art. 2(10)), which is open to many in-
terpretative possibilities (among others, how to assess a deliberate ac-
tion?). Finally, access to the labour market in the Member States is 
made swifter.12 This represents indeed a positive provision, contrib-
uting to the idea of social integration. Yet, this measure together with 
the request for further harmonization was both intended to promote appli-
cants’ ‘self-reliance’ and to reducing asylum shopping for employment pur-
poses and related secondary movements (European Commission 2016g, 4). 
In summary, it can be said that the EU has undertaken important steps 
forward in extending the content and domain of protection. Yet, im-
portant limitations remain, which somehow hamper a full-enjoyment 
of rights within the European space as for EU citizens and that seems 
to mainly leave out other specific claims of protection that deviate from 
EU’s criteria. The trait-d’union linking the developments undergone in 
all asylum phases is that to avoid ‘secondary movement’ within the 
Union, an objective whose priority is all internal to the EU, while put-
ting on the back burner the migrants with his/her own need of protec-
tion. This objective has also informed the last proposal for revision of 
the asylum system, putting emphasis on ‘urgency’ and ‘duties’ of ap-
                                          
12 Access is reduced from no later than nine months to no later than 6 months and in 
the cases of well-founded applications to three months.  
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plicants and persons already entitled of protection; in both cases a ‘pe-
jorative’ protection stance can be already inferred and more specula-
tions about that will follow in the third part of this work. 
Irregular Immigration 
Return 
Since the EU got competences on migration, tackling irregular immi-
gration has been a key aim. In the first documents on the matter the 
term ‘illegal immigration’ was used, even if it was explained that the 
term ‘illegal’ was used following EU legal terminology and was not 
intended to label the person as being illegal but rather her ‘status’ as 
not in compliance with the law on entry or residence (European Com-
mission 2002, 7). Nevertheless, the use of the term has been subject to 
many criticisms, and has mostly been substituted by irregular immi-
gration in EU’s documents, although not always consistently in the last 
years. It was specified that addressing irregular immigration was indi-
visible from the creation of a common migration and asylum policy 
(European Commission 2001a, 5). It was mainly interpreted as a threat 
or a severe challenge given that the jargon used spoke about ‘combating or 
fighting’ illegal immigration (European Commission 2001a, 5, 7). 
It was recognized that the phenomenon was variegated as for the ‘in-
dividuals concerned and the patterns of their illegal entry and resi-
dence’ (European Commission 2001a, 7). In fact, different ‘illegalities’ 
could characterize the term: an illegal border crossing, or the use of 
false or forged documents for ‘illegal entry’ which in turn could occur 
individually or by mean of smugglers or facilitators. ‘Overstayers’ was 
the term used to describe people who entered in a legal way, by means 
of a valid VISA or residence permit but stayed longer than what their 
permits allowed. Seemingly, illegal stay may characterize the situation 
whereby persons do not need a VISA for short-stay terms (3 months) 
but which embark on unauthorized employment activities or whereby 
persons violate residence regulations (European Commission 2001a, 
7). According to the 2008 Directive on Return, ‘illegal stay’ means the 
presence on the territory of a Member State, of a third-country national 
who does not fulfil, or no longer fulfils the conditions of entry as set 
out in Article 5 of the Schengen Borders Code or other conditions for 
entry, stay or residence in that Member State (European Parliament 
and Council 2008, Art. 3(2)). Hence, both illegal entry and illegal resi-
dence account for illegal/irregular immigration.  
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The return of irregular immigrants, illegally entered or staying in the 
Union, has from the very beginning constituted the key recipe to 
properly address irregular immigration. While return as a practice was 
already implemented at the Member States’ level, a ‘common’ policy 
on return had to envisage common principles, standards and measures 
(European Commission 2001a, 24). Basic principles supporting return 
were, on the one hand, priority of voluntary return over forced return, 
and on the other hand, the obligations under international law to read-
mit own nationals. 
As for other terms/concepts analysed in this work, return does not 
simply reflect a practice, but it entails specific understandings related 
to the regulation of migration, specific responsibilities, rights and obli-
gations. It acquires meaning if also taking into account relations with 
third countries; and informs and moulds the work of agencies and in-
struments disposable at the EU level (see the case of hotspots and EU-
RODAC above). As such, the pattern of terms/concepts somehow re-
lated to return and relevant for this work encompasses: readmission, 
transit and origin countries, detention, Global Approach to Migration and 
Mobility (GAMM), reintegration, VIS, SIS, FRONTEX, EURODAC (from 
2015) and hotspot. These concepts help draw the contour of the EU idea 
of return, which does not necessarily overlap with that of its Member 
States or of other international actors. Above all, two terms have al-
ways characterized the jargon used on return: integrity and credibility. 
More precisely, the EU has always conceived the development of an 
effective return policy key both in the fight against illegal immigration 
and inescapable for the integrity and the credibility of the EU migra-
tion and asylum system (European Commission 2002, 4; European 
Commission 2003c, 9; European Parliament and Council 2007; Euro-
pean Commission 2015f, 2). Further, the possibility to force return was 
central to ensure the integrity of the common migration and asylum 
policy (575/2007/EC). It was maintained that an effective return policy 
allows more support by the public opinion in favour of legal immi-
grants’ admission and of persons in real need of protection (European 
Commission 2002, 8). Through time, this basic understanding of return 
has not changed; it has ‘crystallized’ through the development of an 
effective Return Policy in 2008 and it has ‘adjusted’ with respect to the 
contingencies of different moments, either emphasizing respect for hu-
man rights or the necessity to be as effective and immediate as possible. 
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According to the 2008 Return Directive (on common standards and 
procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-
country nationals), return means: 
The process of a third-country national going back — whether 
in voluntary compliance with an obligation to return, or en-
forced — to: his or her country of origin; or a country of transit 
in accordance with Community or bilateral readmission agree-
ments or other arrangements; or another third-country, to 
which the third-country national concerned voluntarily de-
cides to return and in which he or she will be accepted. 
(European Parliament and Council 2008, Art. 3(3)) 
The best interest of the child and respect for family life, the state of 
health of the person to be returned and the principle of ‘non-re-
foulement’ were said to be primary concerns in the application of the 
Directive. A ‘third-country national’, instead, is defined as ‘any person 
who is not a citizen of the Union (…) and who is not a person enjoying 
the Community right of free movement (…)’ (European Parliament 
and Council 2008, Art. 3(1)). Two key elements in the definition comes 
to mind: first the possibility for return to be voluntary or forced. Only 
the effective implementation of the latter, could open the way to the 
former and could convey a clear message to both illegal immigrants 
within the EU and outside (European Commission 2002, 8). Addition-
ally, forced return was intended as fundamental for the admission pol-
icy and for enforcing the rule of law (European Commission 2002, 8). 
Second, return referring to the readmission of ‘third-country nation-
als’. This element is key, as international obligations only exist for re-
turn of own citizens.  
Readmission agreements are therefore especially relevant for transit 
countries. Readmission is intended as an act by a state accepting the re-
entry of an individual (own nationals, third-country nationals or state-
less persons), who has been found illegally entering to, being present 
in or residing in another state’ while a Readmission agreement is: 
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An agreement setting out reciprocal obligations on the contract-
ing parties, as well as detailed administrative and operational pro-
cedures, to facilitate the return and transit of persons who do not, 
or no longer fulfil the conditions of entry, presence or residence in 
the requesting state. 
 (European Commission 2002, 24-25)  
Thus, the Readmission agreement facilitates the return of irregular mi-
grants.  
Given these definitions, a series of other terms and concepts revealed 
key for the understanding of common standards on return. In particu-
lar, an entry ban was intended as ‘an administrative or judicial decision 
or act prohibiting entry into and stay on the territory of the Member 
States for a specified period, accompanying a return decision’ (Euro-
pean Parliament and Council 2008, Art. 3(6)). Additionally, the concept 
of detention assumed great relevance when applied to return, ‘in order 
to prepare and/or to carry out the removal process’ (European Parlia-
ment and Council 2008, Art. 15(1)). Intended as an ‘Act of enforcement, 
deprivation of personal liberty for return enforcement purposes within 
a closed facility’ (European Commission 2002, 25) the concept strug-
gled with a ‘human rights’ perspective. Detention had to take place in 
a specialized detention facility; if occurring in prisons, migrants to be 
return had to be kept separate from other detainees. Rights and duties 
of detained migrants were to be reiterated along with rules regarding 
facilities’ working modalities (European Parliament and Council 2008, 
Art. 16). Unaccompanied minors and family with minors should only 
be detained as last resort for the shortest period possible. Unaccompa-
nied minors should benefit of appropriate accommodations; family 
should be given separate accommodation, while minors should be pro-
vided leisure activities, and depending on the duration of their stay, 
education (European Parliament and Council 2008, Art. 17). In this 
sense, separate treatment is provided to ‘vulnerable’ categories. 
The concept of detention as adopted in the 2008 Directive on Return 
was especially vague with respect to: the duration of detention (no 
more than six months extendable under exceptional circumstances to 
no more than 18 months); ‘reasonable intervals’ at which detention 
should be reviewed (European Commission 2014a, 14); and the moti-
vations of detention (such as the risk of ‘absconding’). These loopholes 
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gave way to many pronouncements by the Court of Justice of the Eu-
ropean Union (i.e. Kadzoev) (Court of Justice of the European Union 
2009) in favour a ‘protective’ (for migrants) interpretation of detention 
(European Commission 2014a, 27). The Arslan ruling (Court of Justice 
of the European Union 2013a) effectively underlined the different con-
cepts and safeguards of detention for return and detention under asy-
lum (European Commission 2014a, 28), insisting on a certain ‘categori-
zation’ of migrants with different rights. In general, there were several pro-
tests regarding Member States’ discretional interpretation of these con-
cepts. These contestations also asked for more attention to the funda-
mental rights of migrants to be returned. Among others, FRONTEX was 
forced to embody fundamental rights and respect for dignity considerations 
within its working modalities on return (European Commission 2014a, 6). 
Fact sheet 2.8: FRONTEX and its development into the European 
Border and Coast Guard 
The European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooper-
ation at the External Border of the Member States of the European 
Union was established in 2004 (Council 2004b) and became opera-
tional in October 2005. The Agency was created as autonomous in 
terms of legal, administrative and financial capabilities (Council 
2004b). It was intended to improve the ‘integrated management’ of 
the external borders of EU’s Member States (Council 2004b, Art. 2). 
As such, it was thought to improve and facilitate coordination among 
Member States on the control and surveillance of the external bor-
der. At the basis of FRONTEX stood two main ideas. First, ‘the re-
sponsibility for the control and the surveillance of external borders 
lies with the Member States’ (Council 2004b, Art. 1(2)). Second, that 
the EU had a role in implementing the ‘integrated management’ of 
its external borders to ensure uniform and effective control and sur-
veillance, given that this played as a pre-requisite for the free move-
ment of persons in the EU and for the area of freedom, security and 
justice (Council 2004b). 
There was indeed an element of solidarity in the idea behind FRON-
TEX, substantiated by the argument that control of the external bor-
der was a matter of utmost relevance to the Member States regard-
less of their geographical position (Council 2004b). Accordingly, 
FRONTEX was created both for times of ‘normality’ and of ‘emer-
gency’, that is, situations of high migratory pressures. This is also 
observable in the hotspot approach, which FRONTEX contributes 
to. The concepts of ‘border control’, ‘risk analysis and assessment’, 
‘border guards’ training’ and ‘technological research’ were central in 
the understanding of FRONTEX. The concept of return is also key, 
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according to which the Agency is called to assist Member States by 
organizing joint return operations and identifying best practices on 
the acquisition of travel documents and the removal of irregular im-
migrants (while observing the non-refoulement principle). As such, 
FRONTEX also fit into the meaning of the EU’s external dimension.  
With the creation of an independent FRONTEX Fundamental Rights 
Officer in 2012, monitoring the Agency’s operations and the adoption 
of a FRONTEX Code of Conduct for joint return operations, the 
Agency, fallen prey of many criticisms, underlined respect for dignity 
and human rights as own key pillars (European Commission 2014a, 
6). In parallel, though, the Agency understood more as a return tool. 
Specifically on this dimension, a proposal was made for the Agency 
to act not only as ‘facilitating cooperation between’ or ‘assisting’ 
Member States but also with an autonomous role on the return of 
irregular immigrants (thus far a prerogative of Member States), a 
shift that would have significantly impacted its concept and definition 
(European Commission 2015f, 8). Along this line, the meaning of 
‘risk analysis’ was to be extended to ‘collect and analyse data on 
irregular secondary movements’ of third-country nationals within the 
EU’, to help enforce the return of irregularly staying migrants (Euro-
pean Commission 2015f, 8). Again, this was intended to far extend 
the meaning of FRONTEX as an Agency devoted to operations ‘at 
the border’. 
FRONTEX has been the launching pad of what is today the Euro-
pean Border and Coast Guard, replacing FRONTEX. The idea was 
not new. In the 2001 Commission Communication on a Common 
Policy on Illegal Immigration, the proposal for the creation of a Eu-
ropean Border Guard was already made clear, as it was bluntly ex-
plained that border management encompassed a variegated set of 
tasks, illegal immigration being only one of many (traffic security, 
customs, security threats, dangerous or illegal goods control) (Euro-
pean Commission 2001a). Indeed, the ‘refugee crisis’ has given 
great impetus to the effective creation of the Agency and to its work-
ing modalities. For example, the hotspot system concept has been 
fully ingrained. Being also an instrument pursuing the aim to ‘Secur-
ing borders’, the definition of the neonate agency spans over that of 
FRONTEX. Interestingly, the European Parliament speaks of a Eu-
ropean Border and Coast Guard ‘system’ (European Parliament 
2016). While a formal definition is not provided, the main idea con-
veyed is that of an Agency with a ‘shared responsibility’ for the man-
agement of the external borders (strongly criticized by some Mem-
ber States as an intrusion towards sovereign prerogatives), both in 
normal and emergency time, representing a ‘deepening’ with respect 
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to FRONTEX (European Parliament 2016), due to increased re-
sources in terms of staff and funds. The Agency works with national 
authorities responsible for border management (including coast 
guards) and together they form the European Border and Coast 
Guard, performing ‘integrated border management’. This complex 
and multifaceted concept is intended for the purpose of border con-
trol; search and rescue operations; analysis of the risk for internal 
security of affecting the functioning of the external border; coopera-
tion between Member States; inter-agency cooperation at the na-
tional and EU level; cooperation with third countries (neighbouring 
countries, countries of origin and transit of illegal immigration); tech-
nical and operational measures within Schengen related to border 
control; return of third-country nationals; use of up-to-date technol-
ogy and information systems; quality control mechanisms and soli-
darity (European Parliament 2016, Art. 4). 
While not lingering on the details of the new Agency, which largely 
draws on FRONTEX, it is here relevant to emphasize the words that 
more than others provide an understanding of the logic informing it: 
mixed migratory flows, improved return, hotspots, search and res-
cue, fight against cross-border crime, Schengen, internal border 
controls, EASO, EUROPOL, EUROJUST and European Agency of 
Fundamental Rights (European Parliament 2016). The objectives of 
the Agency do not only rest with the management of irregular immi-
gration, but also with internal security (from possible threats linked 
to smuggling, trafficking or terrorism) and the safeguard of freedom 
of movements within the Union (preservation of the Schengen sys-
tem). Hence, the priority given to ‘security’ concerns may be likely to 
overshadow concerns more related to migrants’ right in general and 
rights of specific categories of migrants in particular. 
The concept of reintegration was also considered as part and parcel of 
the understanding of effective return. As a matter of fact, the act of re-
turning migrants well encompassed the entire migration journey and 
had to ensure to be sustainable (durable) so as to not open up new op-
portunities for new emigration (European Commission 2003c, 9). Re-
turn assistance would increase the opportunities for voluntary returns, 
constituting a good solution both for migrants and for the EU, ensuring 
a cost-effective measure (European Parliament and Council 2007). 
Thus, relations with third countries were not only necessary for read-
mission but also for reintegration, key concepts for the understanding of 
return and  to be included in the Global Approach to Migration and Mo-
bility (GAMM), ‘the overarching framework for external migration and 
asylum policy’ (European Commission 2014a, 2).  
50 Michela Ceccorulli
 
As for other concepts discussed in this report, also ‘return’ has been re-
interpreted through the lenses of the ‘refugee crisis’ of the last few 
years. It has not assumed other meanings, but its urgency has been un-
derlined, and this has side-lined concerns over human rights. In par-
ticular, two main imperatives have reinterpreted the concept. First, re-
turn has to be incremented and second, it must be done quicker (see 
also the use of the ‘hotspot’ as presented before under this logic). In-
creasing the rate of return was given a geographical priority, empha-
sizing the urgency to conclude return and readmission agreements 
with African countries (European Commission 2015f, 10). Inevitably, 
the refugee crisis further emphasized the link between return and asy-
lum putting a strong importance on returning rejected asylum seekers. 
The idea that the return of irregular immigrants (included rejected asy-
lum seekers) could maintain public trust in the EU asylum policy, 
could support and free resources for persons in real need of interna-
tional protection was brought to the table again (European Commis-
sion 2015f, 2; European Commission 2015g, 2). Additionally, the idea 
that an effective and swift return policy would discourage those persons not 
in need of international protection to risk their lives and spend much 
money to reach the EU was put forward (European Commission 2015f, 2).  
Hence, swift return procedures had to be applied also in cases of un-
founded asylum claims, reiterating the connection between return and a 
functioning asylum system (European Commission 2015f, 5). The em-
phasis on forced return was underlined. ‘Flexibility’ was underlined 
regarding the conditions of closed detention for migrants under the 
‘emergency clause’ of the Return Directive for situation of migratory 
pressures. Simplified and swift return procedures for migrants appre-
hended or intercepted in irregular border crossing were encouraged. 
Finally, detention for the purpose to avoid secondary movements was 
advanced in the Commission Action Plan on Return (European Com-
mission 2015f, 4). As seen before, many agencies have been related to 
the concept of a Common EU Return policy, among others FRONTEX, 
facilitating the organization of joint return operations and individuat-
ing best practices on return matters (acquisition of travel documents 
and removal practices) (European Parliament and Council 2007). Other 
‘flanking measures’ proved increasingly relevant throughout time in 
the field of return, such as the VIS for the identification and documen-
tation of persons to be returned, or the SIS for the issuing of EU-wide 
entry ban (European Commission 2014a, 4). In the last documents 
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drafted by the Commission, the role and mandate of the different agen-
cies with respect to return was extended. In particular, this applied to 
FRONTEX (see table on FRONTEX), while EURODAC was proposed 
for the first time as a potentially useful instrument not only on asylum, 
but also on return (see Fact sheet 2.3). 
Legal migration 
Unlike the cases of asylum and irregular immigration, ‘legal migration’ 
does not play an extended role in the EU. Nevertheless, some concepts 
and terms are equally interesting as they say something about the 
scope of rights conferred to migrants and the domains where these 
rights seem more likely to be achieved.  
Undoubtedly one of the key terms in the legislation on migration is 
‘family reunification’. On the one hand this stands as one of the key 
ways to legally enter the European Union. On the other hand, it refers 
to a fundamental right, embodied in the European Charter of Funda-
mental Rights, putting family unity at centre stage of EU’s normative 
façade. Yet, it must be said that the Right to family reunification, en-
shrined and regulated by the 2003 dedicated Directive, has often been 
interpreted in a restrictive way by Member States, creating a varie-
gated governance on the matter. This is also related to the vagueness 
of some provisions of the text and to omissions in the same, which have 
conceded a large degree of discretion when it comes to the interpreta-
tion and implementation of the right. However, no new document has 
been produced thus far and partial modifications have mainly been 
embodied in the new Directives on asylum as discussed above. This 
essentially means that the governance of family reunification remains 
largely fragmented and allows for different interpretations of the right of 
family reunification (with all the implications this entails for migrants).  
The right to family reunification codified by Directive 2003/86/EC of 
2003 (European Commission 2008a) draws on the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and on the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (which in turn 
derives from the Convention above). Family reunification as discussed 
at Tampere (1999) was aimed at providing third-country nationals le-
gally residing in the territory of the European Union with comparable 
rights and obligations as those of EU citizens, also with a view to better 
integration (European Commission 2008a). Family reunification was 
considered as a step toward promoting family life, which had to be 
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provided in an equal way throughout the EU, hence, the necessity for 
the harmonization of national legislations on the matter. Family reuni-
fication was defined as: 
The entry into and residence in a Member State by family mem-
bers of a third-country national residing lawfully in that Mem-
ber State in order to preserve the family unit, whether the fam-
ily relationship arose before or after the resident's entry. 
(European Commission 2008a, Art. 2(d)) 
The ‘sponsor’ was ‘a third-country national residing lawfully in a Member 
State and applying or whose family members apply for family reunification 
to be joined with him/her’(European Commission 2008a, Art. 2(c)). 
As explained by an EU document, the original proposal of the Com-
mission for a Directive on the right to family reunification was more 
‘open’, while the final test mirrored a more restrictive understanding, 
much in line with the legislation of Member States (European Commis-
sion 2008a). A restrictive interpretation of the Directive was motivated 
by Member States’ argument that family reunification represented an 
overused tool to get legal access to the EU (European Commission 
2008a; European Commission 2011a).  
 
Figure 2.1: First Residence Permits issued by reason, EU-28, 2008-
2015 (EUROSTAT 2016) 
The Directive clearly explains that family reunification applies in any 
case to members of the nuclear family, that is, to the spouse and the 
minor unmarried children (European Commission 2008a, 1). There were 
however some restrictions to these categories: in the case of polygamy, 
no more than one spouse was allowed and the reunification of further 
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children could be restricted (European Commission 2008a, 6). Indeed 
this was inevitably likely to impact certain categories of migrants more 
than others. A minimum age for the sponsor and the spouse (21) could 
also be introduced, with the objective to prevent forced marriages (Eu-
ropean Commission 2008a, 6). With respect to ‘protected’ migrants, 
such as ‘minors’, some restrictions were imposed. In their assessment 
of entry and residence of minors above 12 years arriving inde-
pendently from their families, national authorities could evaluate 
whether they fulfilled integration conditions required in the Member 
States (European Commission 2008a, Art. 4 (1) (d)). Furthermore, for 
minors of more than 15 years, entry on grounds other than family reu-
nification could be required (European Commission 2008a, 5). Aside 
from that, it was up to Member States to allow entry and residence and 
hence to consider ‘dependent parents and unmarried adult children of 
the sponsor or his/her spouse, and an unmarried partner (duly at-
tested long-term relationship or registered partnership) of the sponsor’ 
as family members (European Commission 2008a, 6). A renewable res-
idence permit of at least one year (but no longer than that of the spon-
sor) was a specific right of family members. Also, family members 
were entitled to the same rights as the sponsor in terms of access to 
education, access to employment and self-employment activities 
(pending possible conditions set by Member States), access to vocational 
guidance, training and retraining (European Commission 2008a, Art. 14).  
It was made clear that refugees should be conceded more favourable 
conditions for the exercise of family reunification, recognizing hence 
their peculiar condition.  Other family members could join the refugee 
if dependent on him. Additionally, in the case of unaccompanied mi-
nors ‘the entry and residence for the purposes of family reunification 
of his/her first-degree relatives in the direct ascending line’ was man-
datory for Member States. Refugees were not required to provide ac-
commodation and other resource evidence as in the case of other spon-
sors, nor were they required to have resided for a certain period after 
being joined by their family (see below) (European Commission 2008a, 
Art. 12). Other than that, though some possible limitations remain even 
for refugees (European Commission 2011a, 6). However, if a sponsor 
whose status of refugees was recognized could apply for family reuni-
fication, no such possibility was initially envisaged for persons entitled 
of ‘subsidiary protection’ (European Commission 2008a, Art. 3 (2)(c)), a 
measure corrected by the recast Qualification Directive of 2013, scoring 
hence a positive point on the extension of rights. 
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There was also left a large space to interpretation with regard to the 
‘requirements’ necessary to exert the right of family reunification. In 
particular, it was explained that Member States ‘may’ require the pro-
vision of evidence as for accommodation, sickness insurance, stable 
and regular resources sufficient to also maintain the reunified family 
without recourse to the social assistance system of the Member States 
(European Commission 2008a, Art. 7). This vagueness has led Member 
States to impose many different requirements, as well as recourse to 
the Court of Justice on interpretative grounds has been wide.  
One of the most debated and criticized issues is that a sponsor can exert 
the right to family reunification when holding a residence permit valid 
for at least one year provided he/she has ‘a reasonable prospects of 
obtaining the right of permanent residence’ (European Commission 
2008a, Art. 3(1)). This provision has raised many interpretative dilem-
mas (European Commission 2011a, 2). The possibility for Member 
States to require compliance with ‘integration measures’ for members 
of the family has also been widely debated (European Commission 
2008a, Art. 7(2)). These ‘integration measures’ have given birth to a 
plethora of measures, some of which examined also by the Court of 
Justice, which has concluded that these measures  should have the fa-
cilitation of the integration of family members as its ultimate objective 
(European Commission 2011a, 4). A further ‘possible’ requirement that 
Member States could introduce was to request the sponsor to have 
stayed lawfully in the hosting territory for a period of no more than two 
years before finally reunite with his family (European Commission 
2008a, Art. 8). As a derogation, ‘a three year’ period was introduced (at 
the request of Austria), for countries having to match family reunifica-
tion with a quota system. Because of this feature, peculiar to the Aus-
trian case, issues regarding the appropriateness of such a provision on 
the EU Directive were raised (European Commission 2008a, 8). Omis-
sion, as much as vagueness, was hence blameworthy. No reference was 
made to the likelihood of ‘fees’ to be applied in different phases of the 
family reunification process (for application, VISA fees, residence per-
mits, pre-entry language texts). Consequently, many Member States 
have applied different fees (some of which quite high) and no harmoniza-
tion currently exists on the matter (European Commission 2011a, 8).  
Integration 
The integration of foreign nationals has always been one of the key ob-
jectives of the European Union. An objective that can only partly be 
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discussed at the European level, given that, it only acquires a full 
meaning when dealt at the Member States’ level, matching with differ-
ent historical, cultural and administrative background (European 
Commission 2008b). Here again, the patchy governance of migration 
is all the more relevant. In fact, no binding legislation exists on the mat-
ter. Nevertheless, integration has a European dimension as it conflates 
with some fundamental principles of the Charter of the Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union and as it is essential to meeting other 
key tasks of the EU in other domains. It is reasonable to suppose that 
integration acquires a specific meaning in the EU, linked to the values 
it supports and to the objectives it aims to achieve. Hence, defining 
what the EU means with integration and what it expects Member 
States to endorse in their national legislation is of the utmost relevant 
and deserves scrutiny.  
Before delving into the concept, it is appropriate to underline that in-
tegration as intended by the EU is better understood in its broader pat-
tern of reference, which encompasses words and concepts such as com-
petitiveness, demographic change, ageing, legal and illegal migration, en-
try and residence, family reunification, third countries, return, refugees, 
non-discrimination, long-term residents and resettlement. Each of these 
words help define the meaning and purpose of integration in the EU. 
‘Integration’ is defined by the EU as a ‘two-way process based on mu-
tual rights and corresponding obligations of legally resident third-
country nationals and the host society which provides for full participa-
tion of the immigrant’ (European Commission 2003d, 17-18). There are 
three immediate aspects of this definition. First, that integration is a 
process and therefore needs the active participation of immigrants and 
host societies. Second, that integration is about the definition of rights 
as well as obligations. Third, that integration applies to legal migrants. 
‘Illegal immigrants’ (this is the term used in 2003, when the first rele-
vant document was issued) are covered by basic human rights, which 
encompass emergency healthcare and primary school education for 
children. However, the best approach with illegal immigrants is re-
portedly to return them, as they do not benefit from integration 
measures (with connected rights), and would be further marginalized 
(European Commission 2003d, 25).  
Since its first treatments, integration has been emphasized with a view 
to the possible contribution of legal migrants to the competitiveness of 
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the EU, given also the economic and social challenges of demographic 
ageing (European Commission 2003d, 3). ‘The successful integration of 
immigrants is both a matter of social cohesion and a prerequisite for 
economic efficiency’, reported a Commission document (European 
Commission 2003d, 17). Also because of that, integration has aimed to 
provide legal migrants with rights and obligations comparable to those 
of EU citizens (European Commission 2003d, 4), scoring positive result 
on non-discrimination. Even though the EU does not have a specific 
mandate on integration, it has intervened in other legislative domains 
underlining the importance of integration. For instance, this has been 
done in the case of family reunification (see above), considered as a key 
tool for integration, of long-term residents, of the conditions of entry and 
residence for paid employment or self-employment activities, of non-
discrimination (European Commission 2003d, 5). 
Fact sheet 2.9: Long-term residents  
Long-term residents have taken on a specific importance in the de-
bate on integration and are one of the few categories where the EU 
has delivered a Directive, in an attempt to harmonize Member 
States’ practices. Given the fact that the EU and Member States en-
dorse the principle that ‘the length of residence has an influence on 
the level of rights of the person concerned’, third-country nationals 
meeting the requirement for long-term resident status are those 
mostly benefitting of integration provisions and hence of rights in the 
EU (European Commission 2003d, 5). Since 2010, long-term status 
has been extended to beneficiaries of international protection, alt-
hough it cannot be given to asylum seekers, persons residing tem-
porarily, having a temporary protection, residing for the purpose of 
study or vocational training, hence discriminating according to the 
‘time-length’ of permanence in the EU. Legal and continuous resi-
dence for at least five years are preconditions for the long-term sta-
tus. Additionally, eligible persons need to provide evidence of having 
enough resources for them and their family not to have recourse to 
the social assistance system and to have sickness insurance (Coun-
cil 2003c, Art. 5).  
The status is permanent and long-term residents should be given a 
residence permit of at least five years. Most importantly, they enjoy 
equal treatment with nationals when it comes to access to employ-
ment and self-employed activity, education and vocational training, 
including study grants in accordance with national law; recognition 
of professional diplomas, certificates and other qualifications, in ac-
cordance with the relevant national procedures; social security, so-
cial assistance and social protection as defined by national law; tax 
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benefits; access to goods and services and the supply of goods and 
services made available to the public and to procedures for obtaining 
housing; freedom of association and affiliation and membership or-
ganizations representing workers or employers or similar organiza-
tions; and freedom of access to the entire territory of the Member 
State concerned, within the limits provided for by the national legis-
lation for reasons of security. Some limitations ‘may’ exist on em-
ployment (prioritizing EU, EEA or nationals citizens), education (lan-
guage proficiency) or social assistance and social protection.  Fi-
nally, they also have the possibility to reside in a second Member 
States (Council 2003c, Artt. 14-23). Indeed, with respect to other 
categories of migrants, persons eligible for long-residence status en-
joy much higher rights, leading to easier integration prospect. 
Fact box 2.10: The EU Blue Card  
The term ‘Blue Card’ immediately recalls the European Union’s effort 
to attract highly qualified immigrants to the overall benefit of her 
competitiveness and economic growth. 
The EU Blue Card entitles its holder to reside and work in the terri-
tory of a Member State (Council 2009, Art. 2(c)). The main idea be-
hind the Blue Card is that, to attract highly qualified workers, it is 
necessary to facilitate their admission as well as that of their families 
and to provide them with equal social and economic rights as of EU’s 
citizens in a number of areas. In the Directive that first tried to har-
monize criteria at the EU level, a series of persons were excluded 
from the possibility to apply for a EU Blue Card, among those, ben-
eficiaries of international protection (Council 2009, Art. 3(2)(b)). In 
the Proposal for a revised Directive in 2016 this exclusive measure 
has been relaxed and beneficiaries of international protection (but 
not of temporary protection) and resettled persons are envisaged as 
potentially falling within the Blue Card if highly skilled (European 
Commission 2016h). This is a positive shift with respect to rights ex-
tension. The rights enjoyed by persons having the EU Blue Card are 
quite extensive: labour market access; temporary unemployment 
safeguard; equal treatment with respect to working conditions; free-
dom of association; affiliation and membership in organizations rep-
resenting workers or similar; recognition of education and profes-
sional qualifications; provisions for social security; access to good 
and services for the public; free access to the entire national territory 
(Council 2009, Artt. 12-17).  
Of utmost importance are the extended rights for family reunification 
envisaged for this category of legal migrants (which starkly contrast 
‘ordinary’ migrants). The 2016 proposal for Directive hopes to extend 
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these rights even further by reducing time limits for family reunifica-
tion, removing the need for prospect for permanent residence, re-
moving the time limit for access to the labour market and removing 
impediments conditions (Council 2009, Art. 15). In a similar way, the 
path towards the application for the ‘long term residence status’ in 
the EU is easier, by cumulating periods of residence in different EU 
Member States (Council 2009, Art. 16) (a provision not envisaged 
for non-skilled migrants). Intra-EU mobility of the Blue Card holder 
and of his/her family is also eased and plans have been made to 
make it even easier in the 2016 proposal for Directive (Council 2009; 
European Commission 2016h).  
However, as one of the few instruments of the EU realm of legal 
migration, the EU Blue Card has not had the success hoped for. 
Minimum standards (inevitable before the Lisbon Treaty when una-
nimity was required) have provided a large margin of manoeuvre in 
Member States (European Commission 2014b). Sometimes the 
‘Blue Card’ has been synonymous of intricate admission and intra-
mobility conditions. Hence, the new proposal for Directive issued by 
the Commission hopes to upgrade the relevance of the instrument 
by addressing these shortcomings. Most importantly, if adopted, the 
new Directive would change the understanding of the EU Blue Card, 
by making it the only available avenue to the admission of highly 
qualified third-country nationals in the EU, something that would by-
pass Member States’ prerogatives thus far. In fact, ‘only action at 
EU level can offer highly skilled workers the possibility to easily 
move, work and reside in several EU Member States’, the Commis-
sion makes clear (European Commission 2016h, 6). 
Two basic features that have informed the EU’s and Member States’ 
understanding of integration are the ‘incremental approach’ and the 
‘holistic approach’. According to the first, certain categories of immi-
grants can benefit from integration measures. These are labour mi-
grants, family members admitted under family reunion agreements, 
refugees and persons enjoying international protection. For these per-
sons integration entails ‘a balance of rights and obligations over time’, 
which essentially means that ‘the longer a third-country national re-
sides legally in a Member State, the more rights and obligations such a 
person should acquire’ (European Commission 2003d, 18). Hence, im-
mediate integration (which translates into specific rights and obliga-
tions) should apply to immigrants with a prospect for a more perma-
nent or stable residence in the EU. Refugees, resettled refugees and 
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persons entitled to subsidiary protection should also benefit of integra-
tion measures. Length of stay and specific needs therefore affect inte-
gration and accordingly, asylum seekers are not included in the cate-
gory of persons above. According to the ‘holistic’ approach, integration 
should not only take into account economic and social aspects, but also 
cultural and religious diversity, citizenship, participation and political 
rights as well as integration into the labour market, education and lan-
guage skills, housing and urban issues, health and social services, the 
social and cultural environment, nationality, civic citizenship and re-
spect for diversity (European Commission 2003d, 19). Interestingly, 
some integration measures have a specific impact on the possibility of 
return. As in the case of measures on education, these would contribute 
to acquire qualifications that can be used in the origin country (Euro-
pean Commission 2003d, 19).  
Additionally, two other specific peculiarities inform integration as in-
tended by the EU. First, the idea that a holistic approach should not 
only cross different sectors but also encompass a variety of actors at 
the local, national, regional, European level as well as countries of 
origin, and be the most inclusive possible, working with social part-
ners, the research community, NGOs and the migrants self (European 
Commission 2003d, 24), emphasizing the multi-faceted governance of 
the phenomenon. Third countries of origin, for example, could work at 
three levels: preparing the arrival of immigrants with measures related 
to integration; support migrants in the EU, through embassies for ex-
ample; and profiting of migrant’s acquired competence when these re-
turn to their residence countries (European Commission 2011b, 10). 
Second, integration includes the idea that some persons may have spe-
cific needs, such as refugees and persons entitled of international pro-
tection, immigrant women (because of both their sex and ethnic origin) 
and second and third generation immigrants (European Commission 
2003d, 25). In this sense, migrants’ subjectivity is particularly taken care of. 
Fact box 2.11: the Common Agenda for Integration 
The ‘Common Agenda for Integration’ tried to provide further guide-
lines to Member States’ on the principles upon which integration 
should be promoted in the EU. These are the principles that still to-
day inform the debate on integration and provide meaning to the 
concept as intended in the EU. Some of them seem to reflect efforts 
at involving migrants and their exigencies in the process:  
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1. Integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accom-
modation by all immigrants and residents of Member States 
2. Integration implies respect for the basic values of the Euro-
pean Union 
3. Employment is a key part of the integration process and is cen-
tral to the participation of immigrants, to the contributions im-
migrants make to the host society, and to making such contri-
butions visible 
4. Basic knowledge of the host society’s language, history, and 
institutions is indispensable to integration; enabling immi-
grants to acquire this basic knowledge is essential to success-
ful integration 
5. Efforts in education are critical to preparing immigrants, and 
particularly their descendants, to be more successful and 
more active participants in society 
6. Access for immigrants to institutions, as well as to public and 
private goods and services, on a basis equal to national citi-
zens and in a non-discriminatory way is a critical foundation 
for better integration 
7. Frequent interaction between immigrants and Member State 
citizens is a fundamental mechanism for integration. Shared 
forums, intercultural dialogue, education about immigrants 
and immigrant cultures, and stimulating living conditions in ur-
ban environments enhance the interactions between immi-
grants and Member State citizens 
8. The practice of diverse cultures and religions is guaranteed 
under the Charter of Fundamental Rights and must be safe-
guarded, unless practices conflict with other inviolable Euro-
pean rights or with national law 
9. The participation of immigrants in the democratic process and 
in the formulation of integration policies and measures, espe-
cially at the local level, supports their integration. 
 (European Commission 2005a, 5-10) 
Recently, the debate has resented the echoes of the ‘refugee crisis’ and 
the European Commission has delivered an Action Plan emphasizing 
the need to immediately provide integration measures, with an insist-
ence on pre-departure venues. This is an argument in line with the in-
creasing focus on orderly arrivals, making resettlement a privileged 
channel of entry (European Commission 2016i). There has also been 
put emphasis on the early and full integration of all third-country na-
tionals, including refugees. Refugees’ integration in the labour market 
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is considered as paramount and is in line with what envisaged in the 
Qualification Directive. It has also been specified that support to the 
integration of third-country nationals should not come at the expenses 
of other vulnerable, disadvantaged group or minority in the Member 
States (European Commission 2016i). 
The external dimension to migration and asylum 
The idea that migration necessitates of an ‘external dimension’ did not 
only come about from the perception of a blurred divide between in-
ternal and external affairs. Rather, it was somehow intrinsic in the 
same definition of migration as a movement across a national border 
recognizing the existence of a place from where migrants originate and 
transit before arriving. It became clear that to try to govern the phe-
nomenon and to regulate it, third countries had to be engaged some-
how. Together with migration other home affairs issues, such as ‘ter-
rorism’ and ‘organized crime’ shared the fact of necessitating a vigor-
ous external action able to dilute their capabilities to exploit transna-
tional nets, and that acquired even more urgency given the security 
dimension. Hence, the first reference to the external dimension of the 
area of freedom, security and justice (European Commission 2005b).  
As specifically for migration, the idea was not only to better manage 
the movement of persons through the engagement of third countries; 
it was also about addressing the root causes of such movements. Hence 
the idea was that of a ‘comprehensive approach’ with respect to issues 
such as admission and reception in the EU to encompass phenomena 
and development in third countries (European Commission 2005b, 4). 
Through time, the external dimension of migration has acquired its 
own relevance, detached or not always overlapping with border man-
agement efforts more in general. An increasing set of words have been 
associated with this specific facet of migration: irregular immigration, 
return, readmission, asylum, refugees, Regional Protection Pro-
grammes (later Regional Development and Protection Programmes), 
durable solutions, capacity building, Mobility Partnership, Circular 
migration, VISA facilitation, Partnership Frameworks (Compacts) and 
Trust Funds. Indeed, this is not an exhaustive list and many more 
words testify to the ‘external dimension’. However, these provide a 
glimpse of what ‘externally’ entails in this EUs effort. Going through 
the concept delves into EU’s interpretation of how relations with third 
countries have to be framed, into supporting principles and values, 
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into specific aims and into what is required to maintain an internal area 
of freedom, security and justice. 
As a starting point, it is relevant to underline how the concept of ‘resil-
ience’, which now seems to be the linchpin of EU’s external action in a 
variegated set of domain, was already well ingrained to migration in 
the idea of an ‘external dimension’. More specifically, it was ingrained 
in the form of ‘respect for the rule of law’ and ‘capacity building’ of 
third states (those from where migrants originated or transited). 
Through time, this understanding enriched to encompass an even 
more comprehensive approach, pulling together actions and aims in 
different domains. To a certain extent it is possible to affirm that the 
understanding behind the external dimension to migration has always 
overlapped with ‘resilience’: 
Societies based on common values such as good governance, 
democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights will be 
more effective in preventing domestic threats to their own se-
curity as well as more able and willing to cooperate against 
common international threats.  
(European Commission 2005b, 4) 
Different principles have informed the understanding of ‘the external 
dimension of migration’, among others, geographic prioritization 
(some countries are prioritised in their relations with the EU); differ-
entiation (idea of tailor-made approaches); flexibility (to timely re-
spond to new circumstances); cross-pillar coordination (pulling to-
gether of different external actions); partnership (idea of joint ap-
proaches with third countries) (European Commission 2005b, 6-7). 
Two instruments that have been informing the understanding of the 
external dimension are, for example, Mobility Partnership and Circu-
lar Migration. The main idea behind Mobility Partnerships was to 
frame relations with third countries on the basis of increased opportu-
nities for legal migration and corresponding duties to fight irregular 
migration. In particular, the idea was set forward that more coopera-
tion on the fight against irregular migration and on readmission would 
ensure increased opportunities for legal migration (European Com-
mission 2007a, 2, 4). Mobility Partnership contemplated also the idea 
of possible countermeasures against brain drain phenomena, that is, the 
deprivation of important resources for the development of a third-
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country as a result of the partnership. Yet, these were not firmly part 
of the arrangement with third countries, but could be added, to the 
request of the third-country (European Commission 2007a, 7). The con-
cept of circular migration, instead, was put forward to intend ‘a form of 
migration that is managed in a way allowing some degree of legal mo-
bility back and forth between two countries’ (European Commission 
2007a, 8). Of particular relevance is the possibility for third-country na-
tionals to have temporary access to the EU for work, study, research 
and training. Nevertheless, the concept of circular migration presup-
poses as fundamental condition the return and the reestablishment in 
the country of origin. Hence, both concepts seem to be largely based 
on ‘conditionality’ imposed upon third countries. Brain drain of possi-
ble skills with a particular attention to specific sectors is given more 
attention by Circular Migration. However, circular migration was also 
intended as a possible contribution to ‘brain gain’ given by temporary 
emigration experiences, opportunities that may be profitably exploited 
through adequate reintegration programmes and the creation of local 
professional opportunities (European Commission 2007a, 12). 
With the Arab Spring and the increasing arrivals of migrants on Euro-
pean shores the need to deepen relations with third countries turned 
more urgent and the external dimension was enriched by a new key 
concept, the Global approach to migration and mobility (GAMM) (Euro-
pean Commission 2001b). Presented in 2011, GAMM was intended ‘in 
the widest possible context as the overarching framework of EU exter-
nal migration policy, complementary to other, broader, objectives that 
are served by EU foreign policy and development cooperation’ (Euro-
pean Commission 2001b, 4). This attempt at providing a new impetus 
and a new specification of the external dimension of migration was 
aimed at pursuing even more coherent external actions, at defining ge-
ographic priorities and at more thoroughly pursuing EU strategic ob-
jectives (European Commission 2001b, 3). Again, elements recalling 
the ‘resilience’ approach of the EU are to be underlined: ‘The GAMM 
should respond to the opportunities and challenges that the EU migra-
tion policy faces, while at the same time supporting partners to address 
their own migration and mobility priorities, within their appropriate 
regional context and framework’ (European Commission 2001b, 5). 
Hence, the emphasis was on fruitful cooperation and capacity build-
ing, not only on migration (managing migration and reducing irregu-
lar migration) and security  (fight against smuggling and trafficking), 
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but also on asylum (not a new approach if one considers for example 
the Regional Protection Programmes already encountered in this work).  
Accordingly, the main idea was that an effective cooperation with (se-
lected) third countries had to be framed around 4 main pillars: legal 
migration and mobility; irregular migration and trafficking in human 
beings; international protection and asylum policy; maximizing the de-
velopment impact of migration and mobility (European Commission 
2001b, 6). Again, the principle of differentiation was at the basis of the 
GAMM, ‘the EU will seek closer cooperation with those partners that 
share interests and are ready to make mutual commitments with the 
EU and its Member States (European Commission 2001b, 7). Mobility 
Partnership was individuated as the key instrument to fulfil the aims 
of the GAMM, revised to offer ‘visa facilitation based on a simultane-
ously negotiated readmission agreement’, though a ‘more for more’ 
logic (read as conditionality) (European Commission 2001b, 11). 
The massive inflows characterizing the last years have brought further 
emphasis on the external dimension of migration. More than previ-
ously, the external dimension has been conceived as inextricable with 
respect to other external actions and geographical prioritization has 
been emphasized. In this sense goes, for example the set-up of Trust 
Funds, intended as ‘an innovative mechanism under the EU’s Financial 
Regulation used in the field of development cooperation to pool large 
resources from different donors to enable a swift, common, comple-
mentary and flexible response to the different dimensions of an emer-
gency situation’, directed specifically at the Sahel and Lake Chad re-
gions, the Horn of Africa and North Africa (European Commission, 
2015h). A similar geographical prioritization is envisaged in the new 
framework for relations with third countries, the Partnership Framework 
(Compacts), seemingly intended to foster resilience. The main tenets of 
this concept are: the development of safe and sustainable reception ca-
pacities and the provision of lasting prospects close to home for refu-
gees; the creation of effective resettlement prospects in the EU to dis-
courage irregular migration and dangerous journeys and effective pol-
icies for the return and readmission of third-country nationals (Euro-
pean Commission 2016l, 2). Again, ‘standing ready to provide greater sup-
port to those partner countries which make the greatest efforts’ was behind 
the concept of compacts (European Commission 2016l, 2). As framed, the 
‘Compact’ approach was aimed both to face short-term crises as well as to 
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address the root causes of migration. The idea was a package encompass-
ing different policy elements within EU competence (neighbourhood pol-
icy, development aid, trade, mobility, energy, security, digital policy, etc.). 

Chapter 3  
EU migration terms,definitions and 
concepts: Perspectives of justice 
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This chapter draws together the results of the preliminary analysis in 
chapter 2 on terms, concepts and definitions in EU migration docu-
ments, and examine them through the lens of the three conceptions of 
justice developed by GLOBUS: Justice as non-domination, justice as 
impartiality, and justice as mutual recognition. In view of these per-
spectives of justice, the EU migration concepts and definitions seen so 
far already reveal the tensions and potential contradictions existing 
both between different demands of justice and within different com-
ponents of the EU Migration System of Governance (EUMSG). 
Justice as non-domination 
Non-domination refers to a condition in which one is not subjected to 
(i.e. is free of) any kind of arbitrary interference or control on the part 
of political and legal institutions (or powerful private actors). Main-
stream literature relates the concept to that of freedom, especially in its 
negative form (Pettit 1997, 2001), and the classic ‘republican tradition’, 
which entails a crucial role of the state serves as the primary guarantor 
of freedom, and hence justice (see section on Hungary and migration, 
Chapter 4). 
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On an international level, a context characterized by a non-domination 
stance is one where the integrity and sovereignty of states are re-
spected together with their systems for protecting rights (Eriksen 2016, 
11). The transposition of these normative concepts from the domestic 
to the international realm is quite complicated, given the different po-
litical rationale underpinning the latter. In general, when applied to 
international relations, this notion of justice is premised by the West-
phalian assumption that states are uniform, sovereign actors that set 
and enforce migration policies – and, in doing so, conceivably abuse 
their power to the detriment of either individuals (migrants) or other 
polities (states and/or the European Union) (see section on Hungary 
and migration, Chapter 4). This seems particularly true of the migra-
tion policy area, as our analysis confirms that, as argued by Eriksen 
(2016, 5), the absence of powerful supranational institutions with reg-
ulative power is a potential source of ‘domination’ in a Westphalian 
system (i.e. the lack of freedom determined by arbitrary interferences 
with the country’s choices) (Eriksen 2016, 8). 
In line with the relation between non-domination and negative free-
dom, the only acceptable interference is one where troubled states (or 
their populations) are helped based on a duty of beneficence (inform-
ing humanitarian intervention) and not for the sake of any overarching 
‘right’, or ‘substantive’ notion of justice (Eriksen 2016, 11). In this re-
gard, it is quite interesting that the EU’s legitimising discourse about 
‘resettlement’, has been aimed at defining the practice as a way to alle-
viate the pressure experienced by third countries of first asylum. The 
European Union’s extended use of the concept of ‘safe country of 
origin’ in the recent years, may equally be intended as a way to confirm 
states’ sovereignty and respect for their respective systems of protec-
tion of rights. Moreover, the specific way in which ‘integration’ has 
been prescribed to be in the EU – that is, ‘fair terms of cooperation with 
states external to the EU’ advantageous for both parties (Eriksen 2016, 
11) – may represent ‘non-domination’ attitudes.  
On the other hand, it can be affirmed that even in some of the defini-
tions above, instances of domination persist. In general, we can iden-
tify instances of failed uphold of non-domination justice in the EU’s 
response to migration, both towards its Member States and third coun-
tries. As for third countries, several examples can be made: 
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The concept of ‘safe third-country’ respects the system of protecting 
rights in place in the country, but also conceals a clear domination trait 
by presupposing the return of ‘third’ citizens. The definition of some 
countries as ‘safe’ may in turn open broader justice assessment be-
tween these states and those that are considered to be ‘not’ safe.  
The concept of ‘return’ and, in particular, of ‘readmission’ reiterates a 
Westphalian concept, that is the international obligation to accept own 
citizens that are returned; however, similarly to the concept of ‘safe 
third-country’, it falls into domination when, as intended by the EU, it 
also contemplates the possibility of returning to ‘transit countries’. As 
bluntly stated by the EU, a readmission agreement ‘works mainly in 
the interest of the EU’ (European Commission 2002, 24). In this sense, 
the failure to sign readmission agreements with North African coun-
tries is to be interpreted as an act of ‘resistance’ to such domination.  
The concepts of ‘Mobility Partnerships’ and ‘Circular Migration’, that 
have progressively been developed as facets of the ‘external dimen-
sion’ to migration of the European Union and that represent specific 
ways of regulating migration with third countries, link cooperation 
perspectives to corresponding duties. In the case of Mobility Partner-
ship, to increase opportunities for legal avenues into the EU, corre-
sponding duties are envisaged to fight irregular migration and to re-
turn own immigrants (and possibly ‘third citizens’). Hence, legal mi-
gration is defined as an ‘opportunity with conditions’. In the case of 
Circular migration, whereby some degree of legal mobility is allowed 
‘back and forth between two countries’ (European Commission 2007a, 
8), the return of migrants to their own residence and to their activities 
in the country of origin after the mobility experience, is required. Also 
in this case, possibilities for legal migration are conditioned and spe-
cifically dependent upon the final return to the country of origin. A by-
product of these two concepts is the possible ‘brain drain’ that this 
would cause to third countries, which is in itself an act of domination 
since depriving the country of resources may de facto worsen their sit-
uation. As a palliative, the EU, which has not been blind to this even-
tuality, has linked the concept of Circular Migration to possible ‘rein-
tegration measures’ to be promoted with origin countries (the concept 
of Mobility Partnership has not been so explicit on measures to redress 
possible ‘brain drain’ phenomena). 
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Domination traits are clearly present also in the understanding behind 
the ‘Global Approach to migration and mobility’, ‘the overarching 
framework of EU external migration policy’ (European Commission 
2011c, 4) launched in 2011. This attempt was aimed at providing a new 
impetus, and a new specification of the external dimension of migra-
tion was aimed at pursuing even more coherent external actions, as 
well as at defining geographic priorities and at more thoroughly pur-
suing EU strategic objectives (European Commission 2011c, 3). In the 
logic of the Global Approach, the ‘issues’ for cooperation (legal migra-
tion and mobility; irregular migration and trafficking in human beings; 
international protection and asylum policy) are decided by the EU. The 
EU also decides the countries with whom to engage in cooperative ef-
forts according to a ‘differentiation principle’, whereby ‘the EU will 
seek closer cooperation with those partners that share interests with 
and are ready to make mutual commitments with the EU and its Mem-
ber States’ (European Commission 2011c, 7). The ‘more for more’ logic 
subsumed in the Global Approach to Mobility Partnership found con-
crete application through ‘visa facilitation based on a simultaneously 
negotiated readmission agreement’ (European Commission 2011c, 11). 
Moreover, the recent ‘migration crisis’ has brought attention to the ex-
ternal dimension, which continues to be imbued with geographical 
prioritization, that inevitably makes some countries of EU’s selection 
‘more relevant’ than others. In this direction goes, for example, the def-
inition of Framework Partnership (Compacts) – the new framework for 
relations with third countries. The main objectives of this concept are:  
the development of safe and sustainable reception capacities and the 
provision of lasting prospects close to home for refugees; the creation 
of effective resettlement prospects in the EU in order to discourage ir-
regular migration and dangerous journeys; and effective policies for 
the return and readmission of third-country nationals (European Com-
mission 2016l, 2). Conditionality, though, is still largely present, as the 
EU stands ‘ready to provide greater support to those partner countries 
which make the greatest efforts’ (European Commission 2016l, 2). 
The revised external dimension relies to a great extent on the necessity 
to make third-states ‘resilient’: from the point of view of justice as 
treated in the GLOBUS project, upholding the respect of international 
law (a facet of the concept of resilience) in relations with third-coun-
tries does not represent an act of domination as would probably be in-
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terpreted as strengthening sovereign prerogatives. However, for ex-
ample, insisting that third-states improve their asylum system, may 
sound as an unduly interference and would conform more to a defini-
tion of justice as ‘impartiality’, where the duty with respect to third 
countries is one of ‘rights and justice’ (Eriksen 2016, 11) and has the 
protection of human rights as ultimate objective, and interference may 
be a way to limit the State’s power on its own citizens.  
Traits of domination are also encompassed in some of the concepts and def-
initions the EU has proposed for the ‘internal’ management of migration. 
The ‘safe country of origin’ concept assumes a relevance at the EU level 
when intended as a ‘Common list of safe countries of origin’ decided 
at the EU level, based on specific criteria and aimed at avoiding dis-
crepancies in national legislations. It is hence directed to uniform the 
list of countries considered as ‘safe’ for Member States which have al-
ready their own lists, while forcing the adoption of a list decided at the 
EU level for those countries lacking one.  
An analogous path has been followed in the proposal for revision of 
the ‘Blue Card’ Directive. Mirroring the European Union’s effort to es-
tablish common guidelines to attract highly qualified immigrants to 
the overall benefit of its competitiveness and economic growth, the 
new Blue Card framework would become the only available avenue 
for the admission of highly qualified third-country nationals in the EU.  
Discomfort has also been expressed with the recently established Eu-
ropean Border and Coast Guard, for the ‘shared responsibility’ for the 
management of the external borders it implies, both in normal and 
emergency time, perceived as a violation of sovereign prerogatives. 
‘Integration’ as a domain, instead, is specifically recognized as peculiar 
to Member States, to their different historical, cultural and administra-
tive background, hence possibly qualifying as a self-affirmed non-
domination attitude by the EU.  
The ‘Dublin system’ (establishing the responsible state for the exami-
nation of an asylum application), the ‘relocation system’ (envisaging 
the redistribution of persons ‘in clear need of international protection’ 
among Member States) and the ‘hotspot system’ (setting joint support 
of EU’s agencies to frontline Member States experiencing dispropor-
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tionate migratory pressures at the external borders and practically or-
ganized as to select irregular migrants to be returned, asylum seekers 
to be relocated and other asylum seekers), have all been accused of be-
ing acts of domination of the EU with respect to some Member States 
particularly affected by these provisions (mostly frontline states). With 
respect to, for example, the hotspot approach, Morgese (2015) wonders 
whether this can be interpreted as the internal translation of the ‘more 
for more’ approach applied with third countries, making the relocation 
mechanism and the provision of financial resources contingent to the 
strict application of the hotspot approach and of the EURODAC Regu-
lation. This is clearly explicable, according to Morgese, by the fact that while 
not having a legal nature, it is in fact binding for Italy and Greece. 
Justice as impartiality 
According to justice as impartiality, individual human beings are the 
ultimate units of moral concern (Eriksen 2016, 14) and their full legal 
standing requires ‘equal basic rights and liberties’. Consequently, a 
policy intended to promote this notion of justice would have to uphold 
human rights and grant them pre-eminence over sovereignty rights 
(Eriksen 2016, 16-17). The protection of individuals as human beings 
has to be unencumbered by bias related to any allegiance, sense of be-
longing or identity features. In safeguarding natural rights, national 
and supranational institutions are called to be informed by universal 
values and objectives, acting at ‘local enforcers’ of a cosmopolitan order. 
The entire legislation of the EU, starting with the Amsterdam Treaty 
up to the recent revision proposals, traces a parabola with respect to 
the definition of justice as impartiality, and this holds true for almost 
all migration policy domains. While making reference to relevant Con-
ventions on Human Rights, to the Geneva Convention of 1951 and the 
1967 Protocol, and to the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the Eu-
ropean Union, the first legislative phase (2003-2005) can be considered 
quite restrictive in terms of human rights protection. This is so either 
because the standardization effort has been minimal and transposition 
poor, leaving  room to manoeuvre for the Member States, or because the 
Member States have deliberately steered away from harmonization so that 
the measures actually implemented would be more restrictive compared to 
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the Commission’s proposals. In general terms, regardless of the time-pe-
riod, ‘Europeanization’ has led to divergent national provisions and lower 
standards (Menéndez 2016). An example is provided in table 3.1.13 
The second big phase of legislation (2011-2013) seems instead to be 
characterized by a far greater attention to the protection of human 
rights, partly due to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the legal 
relevance of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the EU’s attempt 
at responding to harsh external criticism on its first phase of migration 
management. Accordingly, it is in this period that the EU came up with 
new human rights monitoring devices, such as the EU Agency for Fun-
damental Rights (2007), the Fundamental Rights Officer for FRONTEX 
(2012), or the FRONTEX Code of Conduct for joint return operations. 
Table 3.1: Pejorative changes in residence permits for international 
protection status after the Recast Qualification Directive 
(2013) (AIDA 2016, 5). 
Country Refugee status (in years) Subsidiary protection (in 
years 
Before After Before After 
Austria Permanent 3 1 1 
Belgium Permanent 5 1 1 
Denmark 5 2 5 1 
Hungary 10 10 5 3 
Sweden14 Permanent 3 Permanent 1 
Yet, over the last two years, the EU legislation seems to have been at 
odds with the protection of human rights under three main aspects: the 
increased obligations that both migrants and asylum seekers have to com-
ply with; the overall idea to ‘accelerate’ the procedures relative to the man-
agement of migration and asylum; and the transformation of EU’s Agen-
cies into tools to deal with different facets of the migration process (dealing 
both with irregular immigration and asylum).15 Moreover, EU documents 
have shown an increasing use of the term ‘illegal’ – instead of ‘irregular’ 
                                          
13 It is important to notice, however, that some Member States have maintained their 
standards of protection, often higher than those of the EU. For instance, France has 
recently increased the resident permit for subsidiary protection from one year to two. 
14 Under the proposed reform, residence permits for refugees will be valid from 3 years 
and 13 months for beneficiaries of subsidiary protection, from 20 July 2016 to 19 July 
2019.  
15 ‘EURODAC’, for example, – originally a tool for the collection and comparison of 
applicants’ fingerprints – is likely to be transformed into a device for broader migra-
tion purposes, among which, the return of irregular immigrants found illegal in Mem-
ber States. 
74 Michela Ceccorulli and Sonia Lucarelli
 
– with reference to migrants, to the detriment of textual coherence, and 
marking a U turn compared to the EU’s increasing use of the term ‘irregu-
lar’ in previous policy and legislative documents (ECRE 2016b). 
A final general observation is that, while in the asylum domain justice 
as impartiality tends to be pursued more consistently – because of the 
EU’s more active engagement and higher level of authority in this 
field, and, most importantly, thanks to the many legal and binding 
documents and institutions on the protection of the rights of the refu-
gees – the results are mixed in the realm of irregular immigration, legal 
migration, integration and external relations. It is significant, for exam-
ple, that as of yet no Member State has signed the 1990 International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of their Families. This makes an attentive reflection on these 
topics even more urgent. 
A more detailed assessment of how terms and definitions stand with 
respect to impartiality reveals many interesting insights for further re-
search. The aim to hamper ‘secondary movements’ is one of the key 
finalities of the EU – a reference that runs throughout all its legislation. 
Indeed this refers not only to irregular immigrants, but also, and in-
creasingly so, to asylum seekers and persons entitled of international 
protection, resettled persons included.16 The message conveyed and its 
implications in terms of rights are twofold: first, these people (refugees 
included) are not free to circulate in the EU as citizens of the EU are, 
and second, they cannot decide where to ask and receive protection in 
the EU. The negative connotation imbued in the term ‘asylum shop-
ping’ (the practice by asylum seekers of applying for asylum in several 
countries), which is widely used by the EU, goes in the same direction. 
The frequent reference to ‘orderly and managed arrivals’ in the EU 
opens more avenues for evaluation: the concept has been linked to the 
necessity to ensure ‘safe arrivals’, and in this sense it cares for the loss 
of lives that many migrants experience in their migratory journey. 
However, the term only refers to asylum seekers, and even for them it 
poses ‘conditions’ on the modalities of entry into the EU. Indeed this 
                                          
16 This has been also visible in the 2016 proposal for the revision of the Directive on 
reception, where the provision of material reception is proposed (European Commis-
sion 2016g, 3, 4, 5), and not for asylum seekers in another Member State than that as-
signed under Dublin. This would contradict, according to ECRE, ‘the principle of en-
titlement to reception conditions as a corollary of asylum seeker status, elaborated in 
the Cimade and Gisti ruling of the CJEU’ (ECRE 20116d, 7). 
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clearly stands in contrast with the disorder and chaos often character-
izing dire situations that persons escape from. The preference for ‘or-
dered and managed arrivals’ has made ‘resettlement’ the preferred 
tool to let people in need enter the EU. And yet, resettlement opportu-
nities are limited in number by definition, and seem to be subject to 
‘geographical prioritization’ from where most flows arrive, i.e. North 
Africa, Middle East, and the Horn of Africa, (Council 2015a, 4).17 Also, 
resettlement presupposes an already recognized ‘refugee’ status. 
Hence, in these cases, the possibility for asylum seekers to reach the 
European Union and ask for protection seems to be reduced, some-
thing which undoubtedly contravenes some basic rights, such as the 
Right to Asylum as established in the Charter of the Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union. 
The concept of ‘safe country of origin’ has increasingly gained atten-
tion and has in parallel been subject to much criticism. Two controver-
sial points are worth noticing here: first, the criteria that the EU adopts 
for this assessment, and second, the real finality of a list of ‘safe coun-
tries of origin’. As for the first point, the fulfilment of the Copenhagen 
criteria (strongly based on democracy and the promotion of human 
rights) has automatically elected some of the ‘safe countries’ of the list. 
However, the latest reports on these countries seem to question the 
EU’s choice, and perhaps reduce the validity of such an automatic ap-
proach (this is visible, for example, in the case of Turkey), which seems 
to be ‘stereotyping applications on the basis of their nationality’ (ECRE 
2015, 2). As for the second, it is not entirely clear whether ‘human 
rights’ stand fully at the basis of EU’s considerations in drafting the 
list, since the same EU reports state that ‘further countries may be 
added (or removed) especially on the basis of the amount of applicants 
for international protection received by the EU’ (which makes Paki-
stan, Bangladesh and Senegal likely candidates for the future) (Euro-
pean Commission 2015b, 6). The concept also opens the possibility that 
applications from ‘safe countries of origin’ could be considered as ‘un-
founded’ before prior examination (ECRE 2015, 3). The legal basis of 
the ‘safe third-country’, ‘first country of asylum’ and ‘safe third-coun-
try’ concepts is not clear, and the ‘safe country of origin’ concept 
                                          
17 In the 2016 proposal for a Union Resettlement Framework, it was specified that per-
sons who had irregularly entered, irregularly stayed in, or attempted to irregularly 
enter the territory of the Member States during the last five years prior to resettlement 
had to be excluded from resettlement schemes (European Commission 2016b, 11). This 
has further reduced the opportunities for resettlement for certain categories. 
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bluntly violates, according to ECRE (2016c) the principle of non-dis-
crimination according to race, religion, country of origin as stated un-
der Art. 3 of the Geneva Refugee Convention of 1951. 
Resting with asylum, it cannot be neglected that the EU has tried to 
enlarge the scale of protection conferred to persons in need. This has 
been particularly so by encompassing ‘subsidiary protection’ within 
the concept of international protection, hence going beyond the Ge-
neva Convention and contemplating both persecution and serious 
harm as grounds for asking and receiving protection (included the pos-
sibility for family reunification). Since 2010, the possibility to apply for 
the EU ‘long term status’ resident (a particularly advantageous recog-
nition in terms of rights in the EU) has been extended.18 In 2016, a pro-
posal was made by the European Commission to extend the possibility 
to apply for the EU Blue Card to the beneficiaries of international pro-
tection, in order to attract highly qualified workers. The 2013 Recast 
Directives especially paid more attention to rights, in the sense of 
providing, for example, more rights in terms of legal assistance in ap-
peals (European Parliament and Council 2013a, 4); of proper infor-
mation on the possibility to apply for asylum (ASGI 2013, 2); and of 
conceding similar access for persons entitled of international protection to 
employment, education, recognition of qualifications, social welfare, and 
healthcare as for the citizens of the Member States. Furthermore, proposals 
in the sense of extended recognition of family members and swift access to 
the labour market for applicants (and hence more rights) of international 
protection have been made. (European Commission 2016a). 
Notwithstanding the extension of rights, though, impartiality has not 
always been fulfilled: many persons in need remained out of the ‘la-
bels’ codified by the EU (although the possibility existed for Member 
States to provide for other forms of protection). Also, differences per-
sisted in the scope of rights provided to these two categories, even 
                                          
18 However, as reported by the Asylum Information Database (2016, 2), eligibility for 
long-term residence status only applies after 5 years. ‘By design, the EU asylum acquis 
therefore contrasts with asylum systems in other regions of the world, where granting 
asylum opens up avenues for permanent residence’. This is for example the case in the 
United States and in Canada. Also, further limitations have been proposed under the 
2016 Regulation proposal on Qualification for obtaining the long-term resident status 
in case of presence in a Member States other than the one that granted protection. If 
adopted, this sanction would discriminate beneficiaries of international protection 
with respect to other third-country citizens in the Union, which are not subject to sanc-
tions for irregular movements in the Union (ECRE 2016, 21). 
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though the EU in principle aims at ‘aligning rights’, with persons enti-
tled of subsidiary protection being penalized. Differences remain in the 
duration of resident permits, respectively to last at least three years for 
refugees, and one year for subsidiary protection, which is renewable – 
an ‘unjustifiable distinction between the two statuses’ according to 
ECRE based on the assumption that subsidiary protection is more ‘per-
manent’ (ECRE 2016a, 16). Differences also persist in the provision of 
social assistance, seemingly based in the more ‘temporary’ form of pro-
tection attached to the subsidiary status. The tendency to ‘categorize’ 
migrants and asylum seekers – and hence underline their different 
treatment – is visible also in the concepts of ‘relocation’ and ‘hotspot’19, 
where specific reference is made to persons ‘in clear need of interna-
tional protection’, a label that underlines, for example, that some ap-
plicants (of specific nationalities) deserve more and immediate protec-
tion than other applicants. Both concepts remind a threefold system of 
rights: one for irregular immigrants to be returned; one for asylum 
seekers to be relocated; and one for asylum seekers of different nation-
alities of those eligible for relocation (see table 2.1). 
Even in the case of persons already granted protection, the scenario 
looks bleak. The 2016 proposal for Regulation on qualification seems 
to generally restrict the rights of persons entitled of international pro-
tection envisaging, the obligation to remain in the Member State that 
granted that protection (a restriction of movement applied before only 
to asylum seekers) (European Commission 2016d, 6, 13, 4, 15). The fail-
ure to achieve ‘mutual recognition of positive asylum decisions’ that 
would allow the movement of beneficiaries of international protection, 
ECRE (2016a, 21) explains, contravenes the EU’s commitment to ‘a uni-
form asylum status, valid throughout the Union’. A more worrying 
proposal is the one that underlines the ‘temporal’ nature of protection 
in the EU, for as long as it is needed.20 As reported by the Commission, 
‘the absence of checks on the continued need for protection gives the 
protection a de facto permanent nature, thereby creating an additional 
incentive for those in need of international protection to come to the 
EU rather than to seek refuge in other places, including in countries 
                                          
19 As for the hotspot, the absence of a clear legal nature may weaken the protection of 
migrants’ rights (Morgese 2015). 
20 In the past the Court of Justice had been called to provide judgment on specific cases 
regarding the revocation of the refugee status and contributed to specify (in a ‘positive’ 
sense for the refugee) a provision whose interpretation was not unidirectional, see Sal-
ahadin Abdulla and Others (Court of Justice of the European Union 2008). 
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closer to their countries-of-origin’ (European Commission 2016d, 13). 
The configuration of protection, and even of the ‘refugee status’ as non-
permanent, poses multiple concerns with respect to the possible limi-
tations to the right of asylum in the EU and indeed to possible integra-
tion perspectives (ECRE 2016, 2), and raises the doubt that the principle of 
protection is somehow subordinated to EU’s internal interests. In fact, it 
seems not to take into account the ‘protracted’ nature of most of the situa-
tions characterizing displacement and forced migration (AIDA 2016). 
As explained above, the blurred nature that some of EU’s instruments 
are assuming, aimed at pursuing irregular migration and asylum final-
ities, seems also to have specific impact rather than generalized dis-
comfort. In fact, according to the 2016 proposal for revision of EURO-
DAC, the principle upon which minors cannot be fingerprinted seems 
to be overcome (fingerprints have been proposed from up to 6 years) 
(European Commission 2016e, 4). The proposal also opens up for stor-
ing collected data for 5 years; to share some of the data with third coun-
tries for the purpose of return (European Commission 2016e, 4), which 
were strongly forbidden before according to data protection criteria 
and opening the possibility that sensible data can be given to alleged 
actors of persecution and serious harm (ECRE 2016c); and to share all data 
stored for law enforcement purposes (European Commission 2016e, 5). 
An evaluation of how ‘return’ has been understood and defined by the 
European Union also opens space for evaluation from the point of view 
of impartiality. Within the 2008 Directive on Return, the vagueness 
with which ‘detention’ has been defined has left ample space of ma-
noeuvre to Member States, but has also given way to many pronounce-
ments of the EU Court of Justice. In general, there have been many 
contestations to Member States’ practices associated with a discre-
tional interpretation of the terms and definitions present in the Di-
rective, especially related to the fundamental rights of migrants to be 
returned. Moreover, as a consequence of the ‘refugee crisis’, urgency 
measures have partially side-lined fundamental rights. In the 2015 Ac-
tion Plan on Return, the idea has been put forward that the return rate 
should be incremented (with an increased accent on forced return) and 
return procedures simplified and swiftly implemented (European 
Commission 2015f, 5), with inevitable implications on the carful assess-
ment of individual rights. 
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Family unity is a right embodied in the Charter of the Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union. However, family reunification is not an 
international right and not a fundamental right for the EU, although in 
many Constitutions of the Member States it is expressly cited as a fun-
damental right (Balboni 2015, 185). The EU has been both vague (the 
statement ‘Member States may’ was reiterated continuously in the 2003 
Directive on family reunification) and restrictive (setting many limita-
tions)21 with respect to family reunification of third-country citizens. 
Much space has been left to Member States’ interpretation with regard 
to the ‘requirements’ necessary to exert the right in terms of accommo-
dation, sickness insurance and stable and regular resources (Council 
2003, 4). Requirements in this sense, such as accommodation, look ex-
tremely demanding; in particular given the fact that they are not simi-
larly imposed on nationals or other EU citizens working and residing 
in the national territory (Morozzo della Rocca 2004). The European 
Parliament brought an action to the ECJ against the Council, claiming 
that some provisions of the Directive went against the right to family 
life and the non-discrimination principle as codified in the Convention 
on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Euro-
pean Commission 2008a, 4). The sentence of the Court (C-540/03) has 
been relevant in many aspects, emphasizing (as the C-578/08 Case) 
that, notwithstanding possible restrictions and derogations, the provi-
sions should not undermine or run counter to the promotion of family 
reunification (European Commission 2014c). In an evaluation on jus-
tice as ‘impartiality,’ a consideration of ‘integration’ as intended by the 
EU cannot be avoided. The EU has considered integration as a process 
through which rights and obligations are conferred to third citizens as 
they belong and apply to EU citizens. While this is remarkable, it also 
takes into account that the EU endorses the principle that ‘the length 
of residence has an influence on the level of rights of the person con-
cerned’ (European Commission 2003d, 5). Hence, it can be inferred that 
not only different statuses enjoy different rights, but also that different 
integration perspectives exist for third-country citizens. For example, 
‘EU long-term residents’ are those mostly benefitting of rights and, 
                                          
21 Among limitations, the Directive made clear that a sponsor can exert the right to 
family reunification when holding a residence permit valid for at least one year, and 
provided he/she has ‘a reasonable prospects of obtaining the right of permanent resi-
dence’ (European Commission 2014c, 3). This provision has raised many interpretative 
dilemmas (European Commission 2011a, 2). 
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hence, of integration provisions in the EU.22 In a similar way, integra-
tion opportunities for Blue Card holders (and general admission con-
ditions) seem to be quite simplified and extended with respect to other 
categories of migrants.  
Indeed, a thorough assessment of justice as ‘impartiality’ would be 
made better once an effective analysis of arrangements with third 
countries (such as that with Turkey of March 2016) is undertaken. 
From now it suffices to say that some of the concepts analysed in this 
report are at the basis of these agreements (i.e. safe third-country, re-
admission, hotspot, ordered arrival), with all the problems they al-
ready entail in terms of human rights observance. 
Justice as mutual recognition 
Dialogue and reciprocity are the basic features of a policy aimed at mu-
tual recognition, that is, one that rules out the possibility to determine 
a priori what is normatively right and fair. According to this notion, 
each relevant subject (individual, group, polity) has the right to be rec-
ognised in their unique identity, and particular groups are entitled to 
special rights due to their collective identity – to the point the these 
‘concrete others’ may prevail over the ’generalized other’ (Eriksen 
2016). Justice as impartiality and justice as mutual recognition may 
well be at variance, given that even when a formally just order uphold-
ing human rights exists, people may still be treated unfairly (Eriksen 
2016, 19). Consequently, ‘having a say in a reason-given process’ be-
comes crucial as far as justice is understood as mutual recognition, 
which contemplates due hearing and recognition, respect for individ-
ual identities and the practices and activities that are valued, belonging 
and difference (Eriksen 2016, 19-20). More than in the other two con-
ceptions, justice as recognition is concerned with the status of one subject 
being recognised by others, rather than being about claims on resources. 
Looking specifically at the legal context, it is possible to say that mu-
tual recognition is key to achieve impartiality. In the realm of law, in 
fact, two degrees of impartiality exist: the impartiality of the legislator, 
which translates into a general and an abstract norm; and the impar-
                                          
22 To be noticed, the ‘long term status’ cannot be given to persons residing temporarily, 
having a temporary protection, residing for the purpose of study, or vocational train-
ing. 
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tiality of the executor, which contemplates the norm as inevitably ap-
plied to the single case. Hence, notwithstanding the presence of the 
abstract law, the evaluation has to be individual in order to be impar-
tial (Balboni 2016). This specification finds confirmation in every legal 
act of the EU on migration, where, together with the general law, pre-
scription is made for individual evaluations of migrants and of the dif-
ferent circumstances they are in. This does not imply that mutual 
recognition is always satisfied in practice. More importantly, and of 
interest for this work, this does not even imply that the same terms and 
definitions present in the legislation inevitably conform to this crite-
rion of justice. To the contrary, this brief reflection shows that this 
sometimes has been contradicted in the same content of legislation. 
The principal way through which the EU has satisfied a mutual recog-
nition definition of justice has been through the increasing attention 
paid to ‘vulnerable categories’ which have been given rights that were 
not envisaged before or which have been attached peculiar rights, by 
virtue of their specific exigencies.23 Accordingly, for example, as soon 
as in 2000 the EU has recognized that protection could no longer be 
granted only on the basis of the Geneva Convention, given the increas-
ing mismatch between ‘the nature of the demand and the criteria of the 
Geneva Convention’ (European Commission 2000, 5). Hence, subsidi-
ary protection has been inserted as a specific form of protection for 
persons having experienced or likely to experience serious harm. On 
the negative side, though, it can equally be said that some vulnerable 
person fail to be recognized as in need of protection, independently 
from their self-perception. 
Some categories of persons have been generally recognized as espe-
cially vulnerable, in particular minors and unaccompanied minors: for 
both of them, specific rights are contemplated which derogate from 
general rights and obligations.24 A similar attention has been sometimes ap-
plied to women with respect to, for example, female asylum applications 
                                          
23 For example, for the decision over the responsible state (Dublin), minors cannot be 
separated from their parents or guardian; unaccompanied minors have to join their 
family legally present in one of the Member States, provided this is in the interest of 
the minor (Council 2003a, 4) and that represents the views of the minor according to 
age and maturity (European Commission 2016a, 44). 
24 It is to be noticed that EU law does not prohibit the detention of minors, while the 
same is prohibited in many Member States. 
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through a ‘gender perspective’ (European Parliament and Council 2013a). 
A peculiar attention has also been reserved to the family and to its 
unity: a fundamental right, but also a crucial self-identification tool. 
Recognizing their vulnerability, refugees have been conceded more fa-
vourable conditions for the exercise of family reunification, by encom-
passing for instance other dependent members, by not being required 
to have resided for a certain period after being joined by their family 
and to possess accommodation and other resource for the exercise of 
that right (Council 2003, 5-6). Persons entitled of subsidiary protection 
rights have been equally considered eligible for family reunification. 
However, some restrictions imposed seem not to take into due account 
the peculiarities of some migrants: in the case of polygamy, for exam-
ple, no more than one spouse is allowed and the reunification of fur-
ther children could be restricted (European Commission 2008a, 6). Fur-
thermore, even ‘protected’ categories have been subject to restrictions: 
in their assessment of entry and residence of minors above 12 years 
arriving independently from their families, national authorities may 
evaluate whether they fulfil integration conditions required in the 
Member States (Council 2003, 3). Also, for minors of more than 15 
years, entry on grounds other than family reunification could be re-
quired (European Commission 2008a, 5). Indeed this is disputable 
given that art 24 of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the Euro-
pean Union establishes the principle of the ‘superior interest’ of the 
minor, which applies in all circumstances, even in decisions regarding 
family relations (Balboni 2015). 
As for integration, it is defined by the EU as a ‘two-way process based 
on mutual rights and corresponding obligations of legally resident 
third-country nationals and the host society which provides for full 
participation of the immigrant’ (European Commission 2003d, 17-18). 
The entire definition scores positively in terms of ‘mutual recognition’, 
in particular when it is underlined that the host society should create 
an environment conducive to third-citizens’ integration. Also, it is 
clearly affirmed that specific persons may have specific requirements 
and priorities (European Commission 2003d, 25). Against this back-
drop, the possibility allowed to Member States to introduce ‘integra-
tion measures’ – that is, measures whose mandatory compliance by 
migrants is a sign of effective integration into the country – contrasts 
with the understanding of integration provided, as it leaves space to 
the possible introduction of measures that may fail to recognize and 
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protect migrants’ specificities.25 Also, given the fact that integration is 
about the provision of more rights and given the fact that (as observed 
above) these are linked to the permanence in the territory of the EU, 
asylum seekers and other vulnerable but ‘temporary’ categories (such 
as persons having received temporary protection) may remain de-
prived of such rights.  
Other terms are subject to non-definitive evaluations. ‘Resettlement’, 
for example, presupposes the recognition of the needs of protection of 
some persons residing out of the EU – that is, needs of protection that, 
according to the EU, range far beyond a traditional understanding of 
refugees according to UNHCR practices by encompassing, for exam-
ple, socio-economic vulnerabilities, displaced persons, and those with 
family links (European Commission 2016b, 10-11). Yet, as seen before, 
resettlement opportunities are selective by nature and hence limited 
and confined to some states, risking to leave out other vulnerable per-
sons perceiving themselves as in need. In a similar way, the concept of 
‘safe country of origin’, and, more specifically, that of a ‘Common list 
of safe countries of origin’ is controversial. The ‘safety’ of the origin 
country does not leave out the possibility that some persons within 
that country may be in need of special attention and recognition. While 
the EU ensures that examination is individual, the reiterated presence 
of the term in Documents regarding procedures for asylum applica-
tion, for example, and the Dublin Regulation, and the ‘accelerated’ pro-
visions envisaged in these cases, seem to convey the idea of a ‘prelim-
inary’ assessment firstly based on nationality, so that protection be-
comes more a question of ‘where’ rather than ‘who’ gets protection 
(AIDA 2016b, 6). As ECRE (2016b) explains, the ‘first country of asy-
lum’ and ‘safe third-country’ concepts are based on a misinterpretation 
of the Refugee Convention, which does not envisage the obligation to ap-
ply in the first country refugees reach after fleeing their country of origin. 
Also, it is far from given that protection ensured in first countries of asylum 
and in safe third countries equals the one ensured in the EU. The ‘safe third-
country’ concept, moreover, is to be applied to persons not already 
given protection (as in the first country of asylum), but that could ‘poten-
tially’ receive such protection (ECRE 2016b, 56). The existence of different 
                                          
25 This has been the case of the ‘agreements’ or ‘contracts’ introduced to stress the need 
of migrants to conform to the values and fundamental laws of the hosting country 
which de facto look as binding unilateral impositions on migrants, as we will show 
later discussing Member States’ positions. 
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lists of ‘safe third-country’ in the Member States opens further questions 
regarding mutual recognition and impartiality. 
Table 3.2: ‘Safe countries’ according to different EU Member States (Euro-
pean Commission 2015c).26 
Member 
State 
Country considered as safe 
Austria Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia, Kosovo, 
Montenegro, Serbia, EEA Countries/Switzerland, Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand 
Belgium Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina. FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, 
Serbia, India 
Bulgaria Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, 
Serbia, Ukraine, Algeria, Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania, 
Armenia, Bangladesh, China, Georgia, India, Turkey 
Czech Rep Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia, Kosovo, 
Montenegro, Serbia, EEA Countries/Switzerland, Liechtenstein, 
Canada, USA, Mongolia, Australia, New Zealand  
Denmark Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia, Kosovo, 
Montenegro, Serbia, EFTA Countries, Moldova, Russian 
Federation, Canada, USA, Mongolia, Australia, Japan, New 
Zealand 
France Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, 
Moldova, Benin, Cape Verde, Ghana, Mauritius, Senegal, 
Tanzania, Armenia, Georgia, India, Mongolia 
Germany Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia, Serbia, Ghana, 
Senegal 
Ireland South Africa 
Luxembourg Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia, Kosovo, 
Montenegro, Serbia, Ukraine, Benin*, Cape Verde, Ghana*, 
Senegal 
Malta EFTA Countries/Switzerland, Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, 
Gabon, Ghana, Senegal, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, 
Jamaica, Uruguay, USA, India, Australia, Japan, New Zealand 
Slovakia Montenegro, EEA Countries/Switzerland, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, 
Seychelles, South Africa, Canada, USA, Australia, Japan, New 
Zealand 
UK Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia, Kosovo, 
Montenegro, Serbia, Moldova, Ukraine, Gambia*, Ghana*, Kenya*, 
Liberia*, Malawi*, Mali Mauritius*, Nigeria, South Africa, Sierra 
Leone*, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador*, Jamaica, Peru, India, Mongolia, 
South Korea 
*Safe only for males  
A close look at how relocation has been conceived recently by the Eu-
ropean Union leaves with two equally valid arguments: it rightly 
points at some of the most vulnerable persons in recent years, but it 
                                          
26 Of interest is that some of these countries are considered ‘safe’ only for males, con-
tributing in this sense to the concept of justice as ‘mutual recognition’. 
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does so in terms of nationalities. Nationalities eligible for relocation are 
considered on the basis of previous recognition rates, which may in 
them be biased by the reality of the time. Also, such selection upon 
nationality concretely eliminates the possibility for persons of the 
‘wrong’ nationalities to be considered in ‘clear need of international 
protection’. A further idea subsumed in relocation is that ‘an applicant 
does not have the right under EU law to choose the Member State re-
sponsible for his or her application’ and that it is not the right of per-
sons to be relocated to decide their state of relocation (while Member 
States may express a preference for applicants to be relocated on the 
basis of language, cultural and social ties or demonstrated family likely 
to positively contribute to integration) (Council 2015b, 5). This raises a 
paradox: while EU citizens become more ‘European’, persons in need 
of protection become more ‘nationalized’ (Menéndez 2016). A similar 
assessment can be made for the ‘hotspot’, where the mixed purposes 
of the approach creates a threefold partition whereby vulnerabilities 
are differently assessed and where rights are automatically reduced for 
those persons ticking the wrong box. Again, while the system reiterates 
‘individual examination’, the pre-selection operated fails to conform to 
a definition of mutual recognition. 
A final consideration on return and on the external dimension is in or-
der. The recent urgency attached to increase the rate of returns and to 
make them quicker does not score positively on ‘mutual recognition’: 
both criteria may underestimate exigencies especially of those persons 
residing in the states with whom the EU has recently urged to create 
return and readmission agreements (African countries) (European 
Commission 2015f, 10). However, it is fair to point out that the EU has 
always given precedence to the concept of ‘voluntary’ return, which 
indeed recognizes the role of migrants as active actors in the process. 
Besides, while self-interested, the idea of ‘reintegration’ is also an effort 
at recognizing the specific exigencies of migrants that, when returned, 
need an environment which provides for their exigencies in a sustain-
able way. In a similar way, the ‘brain drain’ phenomena considered in 
Mobility Partnership and Circular Migration underlines the necessity 
of the proper reintegration of migrants, that is, the full exploitation of 
migrants’ acquired competences and of an environment which duly 
answered the migrants’ exigencies. 
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Italy and migration 
Italy’s approach to migration is again under the spotlight as it has been 
in past times. It was then confronted with massive amounts of people 
fleeing their countries and aiming at the EU. Migration is part of Italy’s 
history, though not in the same vein as for other European countries. 
When countries such as Germany, UK or France were engaged with 
‘Gastarbeiter’ and naturalizing former colonies’ citizens, Italy was still 
largely an emigration country. The progressive shift into an immigra-
tion country has been recent. The Testo Unico, the key document on 
migration, was issued in 1998 at the end of a decade when Italy expe-
rienced massive inflows of asylum seekers (richiedenti asilo/‘pro-
fughi’) from the former Yugoslavia Republic. Surprisingly, the docu-
ment only scarcely addressed asylum matters, which instead found 
                                          
27 This chapter directly draws from longer papers elaborated by researchers working 
on national case studies: Melegh, Vancsó, Mendly, Hunyadi and Vadasi (Hungary), 
Corvinus University of Budapest;  Karimanidou (Greece), Glasgow Caledonian Uni-
versity; Olsen (Norway), ARENA, University of Oslo; Ceccorulli (Italy) and Grappi 
(France), University of Bologna; Zotti (United Kingdom and Germany), University of 
Bologna and Catholic University of Milan. 
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proper treatment more recently with the transposition of European 
Regulations and Directives. This legislative void is all the more puz-
zling if one considers that the right of asylum has been fully ingrained 
in the Italian Constitution as follow: 
The Italian juridical system conforms to the norms generally 
recognized by the international law; The juridical situation of 
the foreigner is regulated by the law in conformity with norms 
and international treaties; The foreigner to whom the effective 
exercise of the democratic freedoms granted by the Italian Con-
stitution is impeded in his country, has the right of asylum in 
the Republic, according to the conditions established by the law; 
Extradition of the foreigner for political crimes is not permitted. 
(Costituzione della Repubblica Italiana 1947, art. 10) 
The timid approach toward asylum has sometimes been accompanied 
by an assertive approach in the realm of migration, especially as a con-
sequence of more or less artificial ‘emergencies’ that, albeit not re-
ported in the legislation, have informed important approaches to mi-
gration. The ‘Bossi-Fini’ law of 2002, as maintained by some of its crit-
ics, followed a specific philosophy, strongly characterized by the re-
striction of many rights, from entrance to  defence against expulsion, 
and decisions on asylum matters, running contrary to Article 13 of the 
Constitution (Zorzella 2002). Similarly, Law Decree 160/2008 has tried 
to redirect migration policy in unquestionable restrictive terms, by re-
stricting, for example, family reunification opportunities, both with 
reference to family members and to the economic capacity needed to 
exercise such right (Pastore 2008). Hence, in the period 2008-2011, the 
general approach was to associate migration to the preservation of 
‘public security’ (Renoldi e Savio 2008; Zorzella 2011), with a strongly 
controversial legislative output, (Law n°94 of 2009), establishing the 
crime of illegal entrance and permanence in the territory of the Repub-
lic (Savio 2009). Hence, ‘Irregularity’, became a crime (Peprino 2009). 
Terms, definitions and concepts: the peculiarities of the 
Italian case 
Even though aimed at regulating migration, the term ‘migrant’, ap-
pears very infrequently in the Testo Unico: the most used word is in fact 
‘foreign/alien’ (straniero). When the term ‘migration’ is employed, it 
is done so in order to assume a specific connotation, such as in the case 
of ‘clandestine immigration’ and ‘extra-communitarian immigration’. 
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These are terms which progressively became part of the national jar-
gon on migration to describe respectively irregular immigration and 
the inflow of persons from outside the then European Community, 
even though in the public debate, this term often overlaps with an un-
derstanding of the EU that predates the 2004 enlargement. While 
deeply employed in the law and by commentators, the term ‘clandes-
tine immigration’ has increasingly taken on a negative connotation to 
refer in particular to the ‘illegality’ surrounding undocumented mi-
grants entering Italy. Today, the term is scantly used, and essentially 
only by anti-immigration positions. 
In the same vein as the EU’s legislation and the legislation of EU’s 
Member States, the term ‘asylum seeker’ is generally not used, opting 
for a more neutral ‘applicant’. ‘International protection’ has substi-
tuted the restricted reference to ‘asylum’ to encompass different cate-
gories of protection defined by the EU, but also specific to the Italian 
case (humanitarian protection).  
Other terms employed (often for the first time) by the Italian legislation 
have raised great debate and criticisms by commentators, while allow-
ing an increasingly frequent recourse to the different Courts of the Ital-
ian system, both for interpretative and legitimacy purposes. That was 
the case, for example, with the introduction of Temporary Permanence 
Centers (Centri di Permanenza Temporanea) for the first time in 1998. 
The introduction of the centres was motivated by the necessity to better 
manage expulsions and to conform with other European states, where 
these centres were already operative (Nascimbene 2001; Einaudi 2007; 
Di Martino 2014). The centres raised a major debate on the logic and 
legitimacy of ‘administrative detention’ (detenzione amministrativa). 
It is worth to remember that that the European Convention on Human 
Rights envisages the possibility to deprive the liberty of the individual in 
case of ‘the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an 
unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is 
being taken with a view to deportation or extradition’ (Art. 5, C.1,f). 
The main controversy over the concept was that it allowed for the de-
tention (‘trattenimento’) of persons even in the absence of a penal 
crime. The concept implied the restriction of the personal liberty of mi-
grants, and it assumed a peculiar emphasis in Italy as it was in clear 
contrast with the Constitution (Art.13) (Savio 2015; Caputo 2000), 
which recites that ‘no form of detention, inspection, search nor other 
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restriction to personal freedom is allowed if not as a consequence of an 
act motivated by the judiciary authority and only in the cases and the 
modalities foreseen by the law’. Throughout time, though, these re-
strictions have been intended as key tools of the migration policy both 
by their supporters and promoters, as well as by their critics. This has 
been heightened when even more restrictive understandings of the 
term have been adopted by centre-right coalitions in 2002 and 2009, 
and when the possibility of ‘holding’ persons in open (but also closed) 
centres has been contemplated for asylum seekers. At the time of writ-
ing, and as a result of the increasing security threats to the EU, the Cen-
tres for identification and Expulsion have been upgraded anew as key 
instruments; something which inevitably puts the emphasis on other 
terms, such as ‘detention’, ‘expulsion’, and ‘irregular immigration’, 
and seems to re-propose a ‘migration-security’ nexus. 
The word ‘centres’ is extremely controversial in Italy,  as it recalls the 
idea of people to be kept in specific places and separated from the rest 
of the community. Along the same lines, it is to be noticed that there is 
a tension between the concepts of ‘trattenimento’ and ‘accoglienza’ as 
referred to asylum seekers: the Italian legislator has marked a differ-
ence between persons in CIE (close structures) and persons in other 
centres (CARA). As a matter of fact, ‘accoglienza’ has a slightly less 
aseptic and more positive flavour than ‘reception’, the English word 
used with respect to asylum seekers. 
Another concept particularly debated has been that of expulsion, 
which in the Italian legislation has been articulated in three different 
terms: push-back (‘respingimento’); expulsion with accompaniment to 
the frontier (‘espulsione con accompagnamento alla frontiera’); and ad-
ministrative axpulsion (‘espulsione amministrativa’), causing interpreta-
tive and practical confusion. The use of these specific terms by the legisla-
tor, and the emphasis on coercion, run contrary to a European approach 
who has firstly prioritized the ‘voluntary’ character of return. Also, commen-
tators have underlined that insistence on these concepts has been mainly an 
attempt at emphasizing a specific approach to the handling of migration: a 
punitive one rather than a regulative one (Casadonte and Di Bari 2002). 
The concepts of ‘residence contract’, ‘integration agreement’, ‘human-
itarian protection’, and ‘humanitarian corridors’ are also peculiar to 
the Italian case, and are discussed below. In fact, the section rests on a 
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preliminary evaluation of possible dimensions of justice. The term ‘com-
pact’ (‘migration compact’) is also worth mentioning, proposed by Italy as 
a ‘new approach’ to handle relations with third countries on migration, –  a 
concept that has been endorsed by the European Union discussing the New 
‘Partnership Frameworks’ with third countries as ‘Compacts’. 
Observations on the three understandings of justice from 
the Italian case 
Justice as non-domination 
While it is difficult at this stage to envisage acts of ‘domination’ em-
bodied in the terms and concepts of the Italian legislation, some ele-
ments are worth considering. 
For example, by linking the amount of quotas for workers to coopera-
tion on the fight against ‘clandestine immigration’ and on the effective 
readmission of irregular nationals, Italy has somehow exerted its influ-
ence on relations with specific countries through the concept of ‘de-
creto flussi’ (‘flow decree’). Thus, Italy has discriminated between 
countries by privileging those with whom effective cooperation on mi-
gration management was at play. 
While the concept of domination (non-domination) is likely to apply 
mostly in relations with third countries (of origin and transit), it is 
worth noticing how the concept of ‘hotspot’ has been perceived as ‘im-
posed’ in the Italian landscape as a measure to ensure the proper fin-
gerprinting of all migrants, while not taking in due account the fact 
that most of the migrants arriving in Italy were not eligible for reloca-
tion. Furthermore, the strict number of nationalities intrinsic to ‘relo-
cation’ will mean that these migrants will leave Italy, even though 
these are the most complex cases (Di Filippo 2015, 40). Hence, the in-
troduction of the concept of ‘hotspot’ in the Italian jargon may suggest 
a case of ‘domination’ from other Member States. 
Justice as impartiality 
In principle, the law should presuppose ‘impartiality’ (non-discrimi-
nation, also with reference to third citizens) as its raison d’être. How-
ever, traces of ‘discrimination’ are present in the Italian case. Mainly, 
these traces are embedded in the rights and obligations attached to spe-
cific categories of migrants. The same categorization effort does not 
only serve regulative purposes: additionally, it marks differences be-
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tween individuals in terms of their status as rightful claimants of jus-
tice. Thus, while respect for fundamental human rights cannot be ques-
tioned and should apply to all migrants (non-refoulement, right of asy-
lum, right of family life for example), these rights may sometimes be 
restricted for certain categories of migrants. 
A first observation regarding the Italian case is that, in a similar way 
as in the case of the EU’s legislation, permanence and the prospect for 
a stable or permanent residence in the territory of the Republic allows 
the granting of more rights. Also, the ‘regular’ residence of migrants is 
the precondition for sharing the same civil rights as Italian citizens. 
This is not to say that regular migrants’ rights perfectly match those of 
Italians, rather that irregularity is a rightless condition (aside from 
basic human rights such as emergency medical treatment), and that a 
rightless condition in no can way lead to the prospect of integration 
into the Italian society and system. 
That said, the ‘decreto flussi’ – the only regular access into the Republic 
– is in itself discriminatory as it provides the idea that only a certain 
number of persons is allowed entrance, and that these persons are ‘se-
lected’ among others. Indeed, there is only limited space left in this 
concept for an assertive role of migrants as bearer of specific claims 
(see below on mutual recognition). While it is assessed that regular mi-
grants enjoy more rights than irregular ones, some specifications are 
worth mentioning as they also are subject to discrimination. First, in 
the case of specific jobs, preference is given to Italian citizens and those 
of the European Union. Second, ‘the residence contract’ introduced by 
the Bossi-Fini law for dependent workers (but not for EU long-term 
residents) is a precondition for the issuing of the residence permit, and 
puts workers in a subjugated position with respect to their employer. 
Contrary to what the meaning of the word may suggest, ‘contract’ in 
fact denotes a term devoid of reciprocity, assuming domination traits 
(see mutual recognition below) (Zorzella 2011). 
While providing a minimum and basic understanding of family mem-
bers eligible for family reunification, the EU leaves space to Member 
States for optional positive interpretations. Many commentators have 
noticed that in Italy, family reunification has been progressively re-
stricted from its initial provision in 1998. In particular due to the Bossi-
Fini law and the Law decree 166/2008 leading to a pejorative situation 
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with respect to other Member States and the de facto closure of possible 
regular access into the Italian territory (Zorzella 2002; Pastore 2008). 
Beyond creating confusion, the proliferation in Italy of ‘labels’ for dif-
ferent centres (CDA, CARA, CIE, hotspot) has opened up space for 
‘discriminatory’ attitudes, as the creation of these centres leads to the 
establishment of ‘a special right for foreigners’ (Caputo 2000, 52). As 
evidenced by Marchetti, asylum seekers collected in different centres 
‘are divided in groups with different rights and opportunities’ (2015, 
167), even when the asylum seekers had the same juridical status. The 
lack of a clear juridical nature for the hotspots seems also to have an 
impact for rights claim. 
On the positive, with respect to the legislation of other Member States, 
the Italian Republic has tried to approximate the rights shared by per-
sons entitled to refugee status and those entitled of the status of sub-
sidiary protection (5 years is the duration of the residence permit in 
both cases, topping the rank set by the EU). However, subsidiary pro-
tection is still characterized by some restrictions. Also, while humani-
tarian protection is specific to Italy and is substantiated by the same 
Italian Constitution, the related residence permit only lasts two years 
and rights cannot be compared to the other forms of protection (for 
example, family reunification is not a possibility). As observable from 
statistics, amid a high degree of rejection of applications for the refugee 
and subsidiary protection status, the trend has brought with it a 
greater release of humanitarian protection residence permits. 
Finally, the ‘right of information’ has been particularly underlined in 
the Italian legislation (also for migrants in CIE), something which com-
plies both with an understanding of justice as ‘impartiality’ and ‘mu-
tual recognition’, given that rights as well as obligations deriving from 
their specific status should be known by every migrant, and given that 
in principle all migrants (even those in CIE) are informed of their right 
to apply for international protection, something which may satisfy self-
perception criteria. The hotspot approach, though, has been accused of 
denying migrants this fundamental right by not properly informing 
them on the possibility to apply for international protection (Zorzella 
2015; Morandi and Schiavone 2015). 
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Justice as mutual recognition 
The hotspot ‘system’, ‘area’, and ‘approach’ as it has been invariably 
labelled (suggesting possible interpretations this term may assume), 
opens more avenues for evaluation with respect to this third concept 
of justice. On the one hand, by automatically selecting people in clear 
need of international protection, it seems to recognize the particularly 
vulnerable situation of some migrants (Syrians, Eritreans and Iraqis) 
arrived in the last years in Italy, fleeing from wars and conflicts. On the 
other hand, this approach based on ‘nationality’, may side-line or post-
pone the concerns of other possible groups which equally perceive 
themselves as in need of protection. This consideration, indeed, is ex-
tendible to the EU more at large.  
Certainly, the Italian legislation is not devoid of terms which entail 
‘mutual recognition’ of migrants. Vulnerable persons are particularly 
given attention to (important is the recent introduction of victims of 
trafficking, genital mutilation, persons affected by serious illness, or 
mental disorders among the list of vulnerable persons (AIDA 2015)). 
According to the EU legislation, minors and unaccompanied minors 
(whose detention is prohibited in Italy) are particularly protected cat-
egories and their voices have to be taken into account (although in the 
case of unaccompanied minors Italy still lacks an organic law, which is 
currently under discussion). Reference to gender has also increased. 
The concept of ‘corridoi umanitari’ (‘human corridors’) is seemingly 
implying a peculiar attention to the needs of specific vulnerable per-
sons. Humanitarian residence permits refer to specific categories of 
persons not included in the EU ‘international protection’ understand-
ing. They are a further attempt to recognize the needs of these mi-
grants, and are released without proper identification documents, doc-
uments ascertaining sustenance capabilities, accommodation or suffi-
cient means to return to the origin country (Bonetti 2008) and can be 
conceded in the absence of a formal request for international protec-
tion. Seemingly, the SPRAR system for asylum seekers (the ‘second re-
ception tier’) has been believed to offer specific attention to the differ-
ent needs of its hosts (even though, the refugee crisis has seen a large 
recourse to emergency structures (CAS), that by definition entail emer-
gency measures which cannot take into account the singular exigencies 
of the persons present in the structures) (see Morandi and Schiavone 
2015). Moreover, social protection and emersion programmes are pe-
culiar measures of the Italian case, recognizing the specific needs of 
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certain migrants, such as victims of trafficking and violence. In partic-
ular, a victim does not only obtain a special residence permit, but has 
also access to emersion programmes (Giammarino 2000, 54). 
Finally, the concept of ‘integration’ is conceived to specifically take into 
account individuals’ peculiarities and identities – in particular to be 
cherished and promoted in the education system. However, this latter 
impression seems to be contradicted by another concept, namely that 
of ‘integration agreement’. If in principle the words ‘agreement’ and 
‘integration’ denote mutual reciprocity and consent (Zorzella 2011), 
they may in reality, as drafted by the Legislator, look like as an act of 
‘domination’ (or not recognition) of the migrants’ identity and peculi-
arities alongside an act of ‘discrimination’ (see the second concept of 
justice above) if one considers that the same agreement is not requested 
for the Italian citizens (Cuttitta 2016). 
France and migration 
As Gérard Noiriel explains, the ‘immigrant’ is in France a ‘republican 
invention’. It was not until the Third Republic that the concept started 
to circulate as part of the effort to govern a mobile working population 
(Noiriel 1988). After the end of the colonial empire, and most remark-
ably after the independence of Algeria, France had to face the presence 
of millions of foreigners from the former colonies. The high mobility 
with these countries gradually introduced a separation between work-
ers, students and trainees, and then linked family reunification to 
housing and other requirements (Sayad and Gilette 1984). Even after 
the independence of former colonies, the condition of particular na-
tional groups with historical links to France continued to be regulated 
with specific provisions, which partially waive from the general rule. 
This experience worked as a precedent for the future laws dealing with 
migration. 
The colonial past resulted also in a geographical stratification between 
‘metropolitan France’ (part of the Schengen space) and the five ‘over-
seas departments’ part of the European Union (Guadalupe, Marti-
nique, Guyane, La Réunion and Mayotte), plus other territories in-
cluded in the Republic. The law on immigration currently in force 
(CESEDA) considers France as the ensemble of ‘metropolitan France’, 
Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon, Saint-Barthélemy and Saint-Martin (Art. L111-3). 
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The crisis of the early 1970s marked the beginning of an approach 
where the release of a permit to stay is strictly related to a labour con-
tract, and the process of regularisation becomes more difficult. By the 
end of the decade immigration became a major political issue for social 
and political reasons and the period marked the rise of a new discourse 
and legislative activism based on the need to control (‘maitriser’) the 
fluxes of migrants. During the 1980s, more than 15 laws, dozens of de-
crees, and more than 200 circulars were emitted – a trend that contin-
ued in the 1990s with annual interventions that increased the norma-
tive cacophony on immigration. In the same period, the debate polar-
ized around the support for migrants’ rights and their right to stay 
through the regularisation of the ‘undocumeted’ (‘sans-papier’), and 
the effort to fight ‘clandestine immigration’. The alternation in govern-
ment marked several shift towards the first or the second position until 
the introduction of more draconian conditions that made it harsher to 
be a regular migrant in France and acquire nationality though the so-
called loi Pasqua-Debré (1986, 1993 and 1997). 
The general attitude towards migrants shifted between ‘integration’ 
and ‘assimilation’, reflected in the restriction of the jus soli from a semi-
automatic procedure to something that must be activated and requires 
formal obligations, floating between the call for more strictness and 
more humanity. But it is only behind this opposition that we can see 
an emerging rationality, linking migration to the economic and demo-
graphic needs of the country: an utilitarian vision that in the following 
year would produce a tension between the search of a comprehensive 
framework to regulate migration, and the adoption of a ‘case by case’ 
approach. This tension cuts across the distinction between regular and 
irregular migration, leading to a growing precarisation of the regular 
stay. Even when it came to asylum policy, the increase in the number 
of demands has been coupled with a decrease in the rate of admissions 
during the period 1970-2000, from 90 per cent to less than 20 per cent 
(Cornuau and Duzenat, 2008). Behind the declarations, the practical 
orientation of the state has been a restraint of the conditions for the 
admissibility and the acceptance of the demand – including the use of 
subsidiary protection, introduced in 2003 – as a way to recognize the 
menace to individual freedom, while at the same time recognising 
lower rights than the refugee status. 
The rise of Nicholas Sarkozy as the Minister of the Interior in 2002 and 
then as President of the Republic in 2007, can be seen both as a turning 
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point and as a formalization of a tendency already in place. The dis-
course on the ‘chosen immigration’ (‘immigration choisie’) openly af-
firmed the right of France to decide whom to accept inside its territory, 
and the goal of increasing a qualified economic migration over familial 
migration, representing the vast majority of new permits. More re-
cently, a number of reforms have been introduced, following what the 
Ministry of the Interior defines as ‘clear, republican and consensual’ 
principles: namely the improvement of reception of the regular immi-
grants; the attraction of talents and high qualified foreigners; and the 
strengthening of the contrast to irregular migration. On the other hand, 
new incriminations have been introduced for the foreigner who re-
fuses the collection of fingerprints or escapes from a detention centre. 
In 2004 the adoption of the Code of entry and residence of foreigners 
and the right to asylum – or CESEDA (Code de l’entrée et du séjour 
des étrangers et du droit d’asile) – systematized the different laws and 
provisions in the field into a single text. The CESEDA was lastly re-
formed in the sections regarding asylum on 23 July 2015, and in the 
sections relating to the entry and rights of foreigners on 7 March, 2016. 
Even if the reforms were partly intended to contrast the precarisation 
of the stay through the generalization of the multiannual permit (carte 
pluriannelle), this is not likely to happen due to harsher conditions and 
a stricter control (Gisti et. Al. 2017). 
Terms, definitions and concepts: peculiarities of the French 
case 
Recent statistics set the number of foreigners in France up to 4 million 
and the number of immigrants up to 7.5 million (Bouvier and Coirier 
2016). This distinction between the immigrant (‘immigré’) and the for-
eigner (‘étranger’) largely depends on the historic mobility of the peo-
ple from the former colonies. ‘Immigrant’ is a concept primarily related 
to the country of origin of the person and not their actual legal status 
in France, and is defined as ‘a person born foreigner abroad and resi-
dent in France’. The concept of ‘foreigner’ (‘étranger’) is, on the con-
trary, referred to the present nationality and legal status of a person. 
As defined by CESEDA, art. L111-1, the foreigners are ‘the people 
without French nationality, either if they have a foreign nationality or 
if they don’t have a nationality’. Following the law, if a person has mul-
tiple nationalities, including the French nationality, he/she is consid-
ered as French in France. 
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Consequently, the CESEDA never refers to ‘immigrant’, but only to 
‘foreigners’ and widely uses the word ‘ressortissant’, literally describ-
ing a foreign citizen out of his or her own country. The distinction be-
tween ‘étranger’ and ‘ressortissant’ is relevant as not all foreigners are 
‘ressortissant’, as in the case of the stateless people. The same law refers 
to ‘immigration’ in two ways: (i) when it mentions the name of the in-
stitutions dealing with the process, and (ii) when mentioning the ‘ir-
regular immigration’ (‘immigration irrégulière’). When dealing with 
the people without papers, the concept of ‘irregularity’ is used in ref-
erence to a ‘situation’ (‘situation’), such as ‘the foreigners in irregular 
situation’ (art. L111-10). The law never uses the word ‘clandestine’, 
which is by the way used by branches of the state to describe actions against 
‘clandestine immigration’. The law uses instead the word ‘migrant’ when 
referring to the activity of facilitating the irregular entry and stay in the 
country: such as the ‘illicit traffic of migrants’ (‘trafic illicite de migrants’); the 
projects of co-development (‘codéveloppement des migrants’); or the help to 
migrants (‘aide aux migrants’) (arts. L622-1, L900-1 and L316-1). 
The rationale behind the use of ‘irregular migration’ was explained in 
1998 by the commission of enquiry of the French Senate, Masson 
Balarello, on the issue of regularisation. The commission pointed out 
that the use of the term ‘irregular migration’ contradicted the idea – 
implicit in the term ‘sans-papiers’ (without papers) used by the grow-
ing movement pushing for a mass regularisation of migrants – ‘that the 
concerned persons are ‘victims’, somehow deprived of a right from the 
administration, while it concerns foreigners staying irregularly in 
France’ (Masson and Balarello 1998). 
Generally speaking, a ‘foreigner’ is a person who lacks a basic right 
recognised to French citizens: the right to enter and stay without con-
ditions in France. A foreigner regularly staying in France has the same 
rights as a French citizen with some exceptions: only the citizens of a 
EU Member State have the political rights, and only in the local and 
European elections; only the citizens of a European Union Member 
State, Norway, Iceland, Lichtenstein, Andorra, Monaco, and Switzer-
land have access to job positions in the public administration (excluded 
the so called ‘sovereign positions’ such as diplomacy, defence etc.); the 
non EU citizens can access the public administration only for jobs in 
the field of research and education; social benefits such as health insur-
ance, maternity leave and the likes are recognised depending on the 
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working position. A foreigner can participate in the social life, includ-
ing being elected as union representative, but they cannot be elected as 
members of the ‘conseils des prud’hommes’, a form of arbitration. 
On the side of international protection, two main categories exist in 
France: the status of refugee and the status of subsidiary protection. 
The sources of the definition of refugees and recipients of protection 
are basically three: the French Constitution; the Geneva Convention of 
1951; and the UNHCR, while the normative framework is included in 
the book VII of the CESEDA. The term ‘subsidiary’ means that this 
form of protection is recognised only after the evaluation of the criteria, 
in order to be acknowledged as a refugee. A third category, that does 
not directly imply a form of protection, but must be included in the 
picture, is that of ‘stateless person’. 
The Art. L711-1 of CESEDA states that the quality of refugee ‘is recog-
nised to all persons prosecuted in reason of their action in favour of 
liberty’, following the definition of the French constitution, as well as 
to ‘all persons under the mandate of the High Commission of the 
United Nations for the refugees, art. 6 and 7 of his statute as adopted 
by the General Assembly of the United Nations the 14 of December 
1950’, and the persons ‘who correspond to the definitions included in 
the first article of the Geneva convention on the status of refugees of 28 
July, 1951’. All these three categories are recipients of the dispositions 
‘applicable to refugees as for the Geneva convention’. The article L711-
2 specifies that the ‘reasons of prosecution’ are evaluated following the 
conditions included in the directive 2011/95/UE 13 December 2011, 
concerning the conditions under which a foreign citizen or a stateless 
person can be a recipient of international protection. It also specifies 
that the aspects in relation to gender and sexual orientation are taken 
into account for definition of social groups; that there must be a direct 
link between the reasons of persecution and specific acts or the lack of 
protection; and that it makes no difference if the subjects own the char-
acteristics that motivate the acts of persecution, or these are an assump-
tion of the perpetrator. 
The CESEDA describes the conditions to obtain a permit for ‘vie privée 
et familiale’ in different articles (see sub-section 6, Arts. L313-11 et seq), 
considering the family as the nuclear family: namely the couple – in-
cluding both marriage, cohabiting and the union through PACS (Pact 
100 Michela Ceccorulli et al. 
 
civil de solidarité, a civil union which provides also for the same sex un-
ions) – a relation between a parent and their sons. 
Observations on the three understandings of justice from 
the French case 
Justice as non-domination 
France is a powerful funding member of the EU and it is safe to say 
that its relation with the communitarian decision is performed in full 
autonomy. The compliance of France with the EU regulation comes to-
gether with the process of joint elaboration of these rules. The fact that 
France’s borders are mainly internal to the Schengen space keeps the 
state relatively distant from the main point of crisis of the last years. 
Nevertheless, the situation in Calais, where a bottleneck is created to 
stop migrants who wants to reach UK, and in Ventimiglia, where a 
similar bottleneck is created on the Italian side of the border to stop 
migrants who want to reach France, reveal how the distinction be-
tween external and internal borders in the EU is somehow misleading. 
If we consider the relocation system developed by the EU, France for-
mally committed itself to receiving its quota, but the slow implementation 
of the whole project is making this commitment too difficult to assess. 
On the other hand, France has historical and more recent bilateral re-
lations with many third countries. An overview of the agreements 
signed with these countries reveals a more complex situation. Here we 
can note that the rise of a discourse based on co-development has pro-
duced a situation where the political and the economic advantage of 
France towards the concerned third countries is used as a leverage to 
impose France’s own priorities. In particular, France has used this ad-
vantage to control irregular migration and govern mobility in a more 
efficient manner for its economic system. This point is particularly ev-
ident in the way bilateral agreements make development aids and the 
possibility to include avenues for workers of a specific country contin-
gent upon the commitment to readmit expelled migrants and to 
strengthen the control over irregular migration (Panizzon 2013). 
This sheds light on the fact that the relation of domination or no-dom-
ination between countries is grounded in a mutual relation of domina-
tion between these countries and the mobile population. 
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Justice as impartiality 
France has strong commitments to international law, affirmed in the 
CESEDA and in all the procedures regarding migration and asylum. 
The observations and limits concerning the international regime of 
protection of migrants and asylum seekers can thus be applied to 
France. Nevertheless, at least two dimensions point out a relevant spe-
cific position by France; namely, the definition of the list of labour 
shortages, and the list of ‘safe countries’ compiled by OFPRA (Office 
for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons). The definition of 
labour shortages responds to the priorities adopted by the EU’s strat-
egy to promote growth and employment within the context of the Eu-
rope 2020 strategy. The very reforms towards the ‘chosen immigration’ 
can be considered as part of the effort by France as a Member State to 
attract talent and skills ‘with a sectorial approach to legal migration 
and flexible admission mechanisms which respond to each State’s pri-
orities’ (EMN 2015: 8). Following these needs, the possibility for a for-
eigner to get a work permit in France depends upon two conditions: 
first, the definition of the specific occupations open depending on his 
nationality and, second, the employment situation criterion. In terms 
of justice, it is difficult to connect this kind of procedure with a cosmo-
politan idea and even less with ‘impartiality’, unless we define ‘impar-
tiality’ as a technical parameter for the efficiency of the labour market. 
The definition of ‘safe countries’ opens up a different set of problems. 
In fact, it opposes the principle of ‘impartiality’ as it imposes the na-
tional identity before any other consideration of the individual condi-
tion or danger of the concerned foreigner, allowing for speed rejection 
of the demand of asylum. The national list of  ‘safe countries’, first in-
troduced with the reform of 2003, first released in 2005 and lastly 
amended in 2015, has been criticised for accumulating on the EU lists 
following considerations that are difficult to discern. It is possible to 
note a certain correspondence between the list of ‘safe countries’ and 
some of the major sources of application in recent years, such as Ko-
sovo and Albania. The number of included countries – 16 – may seem 
both too low and too high. In any case, it is difficult to relate this list 
with some form of generally applicable impartiality. 
Justice as mutual recognition 
The French state has progressively introduced normative instruments 
to insure the integration of foreign nationals into the value system of 
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the ‘République’. The ‘Contract d’intégration républicaine’ (CIR, intro-
duced with the reform of CESEDA of 24 July 2006, in substitution of 
the ‘Contract d’accueil et intégration’) includes the obligation for the 
applicant not only to comply with the French law, but also ‘to respect 
the key values of French society and Republic’. In order to explain this 
passage of CIR, the French ministry of the Interior has drafted a docu-
ment titled ‘Living in France’. The document starts with the explana-
tion of the ‘key values of French Society and Republic’ and states that 
‘France is synonymous with fundamental values to which the French 
are very attached’ and that ‘living in France means having rights as 
well as obligations’ (General Directorate for Foreign Nationals in 
France 2016, 5). Independently from the values enlisted in this docu-
ment, the mere existence of CIR should be understood as a lack of mu-
tual recognition as it reflects a solution to the long debate over multi-
culturalism in the name of the supremacy of the ‘République’. 
A second and more general tension regarding mutual recognition is 
present concerning the fact that migrants are always considered as 
subject of a state. As the discourse on the ‘chosen immigration’ clearly 
shows, the main focus of the French policy on migration is to affirm 
this field as a state prerogative and interest. Even the compliance with 
international obligations comes as an indirect consequence of the 
French state engagement with the international community and its 
membership in the European Union. What is clear is that the French 
state, as a sovereign state, recognises the claim by foreign individuals 
of moving and living in its own territory only as a specific segment of 
labour force or a specific class of vulnerable people. This implies strong 
consequences for the European migration system, as it rests in a mid-
dle ground between being rooted in nation states and a supranational 
political formation. While the European Union seems to replicate the 
logic of nation states when it comes to migration at a different scale, 
critics such as the French philosopher Etienne Balibar suggested that 
Europe, as a hybrid entity, should open new paths for justice that are 
not rooted in the political logic of sovereignty (Balibar 2001; 2016). 
Germany and migration 
For decades, German policymakers and public dialogue perpetuated 
the perception that Germany was not a country of immigration, even 
as it was becoming one of the world’s top destinations (second only to 
the United States in recent years). Since the early 2000s, Germany has 
undergone a profound policy shift toward recognizing its status and 
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becoming a country that emphasizes the integration of newcomers and 
the recruitment of skilled labour migrants. This approach to immigra-
tion and immigrants has been tested, however, amid the massive humani-
tarian inflows that began in 2015, which have stoked heated debate. 
The current conceptual paradigm underlying the legal and institu-
tional framework of the national migration system is the one that 
emerged in the early 2000s, when Germany suited up to embrace – de-
spite reluctances, enduring inconsistencies and ongoing debates – its 
new identity as a country of immigration and integration. The coun-
try’s previous self-depiction was one that denied immigration and in-
tegration as part of its identity, despite the millions of Gastarbeiter, 
mostly unskilled labourers from Italy, Turkey, Spain, and Greece, that 
arrived in the economic boom years between 1955 and 1973. The 1970s 
economic slowdown as well as the partially unexpected inflow of asy-
lum seekers in the 80s and ethnic Germans in the 90s are the main rea-
sons of this stance. 
Terms, definitions and concepts: the peculiarities of the 
German case 
The complexity of German authorities’ approach to migration is re-
flected in the diverse range of only partially overlapping, if not poten-
tially contrasting, concepts to be found in official sources – a complex-
ity that is only enhanced by a public debate not always able or willing 
to keep up with subtleties. For instance, Migration and Migranten are 
essentially socio-scientific notions rather than technical terms pertain-
ing to the German Aufenthaltsrecht (residence law), yet they occur in 
legal sources quite frequently, also as an effect of German policymak-
ers’ participation in wider debates aimed at defining notions and tar-
geting vested biases recurring in common and specialist parlance 
(Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Migration, Flüchtlinge und In-
tegration 2014; Senge 2015; European Commission 2012). More rele-
vant, although not specifically defined in legal terms, is the concept of 
Zuwanderung – translated in the EMN-glossary as migration – which 
refers to the actual flow of people entering the country from abroad. 
The legal use of the term – after which the immigration law currently 
in force (Zewanderungsgesetz) is named – is relevant because it implies 
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the legal distinction between regular and irregular entry in the coun-
try.28 More specifically, Zuwanderung entails the authoritative regula-
tion of the movement of people leaving their homeland (Heimat) 
through the enforcement of entry requirements – that is, the active gov-
ernmental management of a policy issue. This notion therefore differs 
from the ostensibly ‘neutral’ notion of migration – although even the 
scientific term Migranten can come to unwarrantedly singling out ‘spe-
cial groups’, such as poor families with non-German backgrounds in 
need of social assistance. The use of the concept of Einwaderung – the 
willing relocation of people moving to a foreign country in need of additional 
population for demographic, economic, cultural or any other kind of reasons 
(Germany as Einwanderungsland) is highly indicative of the underlying polit-
ical conflict over the Germany’s general stance toward migration. 
Though virtually irrelevant in lexical terms, the linguistic difference 
between Zuwanderung – implicitly referring to unwanted and uncon-
trolled entry and the governance thereof – and Einwanderung – which 
entails permanent establishment and social integration – has been a 
crucial point of the debate over a new immigration act in Germany 
since the choice of either term would elicit a completely different per-
spective on the matter at issue. Oddly enough, the EMN translates Ein-
wanderung as irregular immigration (European Commission 2012). 
However, the very difference between insiders/citizens and outsid-
ers/aliens is to some extent strained by categories like that of 
Spätaussiedler (repatriated ethnic Germans) – German nationals (Volks-
zugehörige) from the successor states of the former Soviet Union and 
other Eastern European states, who have established their stay perma-
nently in Germany by means of a special admission procedure. 
Spätaussiedler’s special entitlement to naturalization (Einbürgerung) 
emphasizes even more Germany’s conditional and differentiated ap-
proach to citizenship as a means to integration. The meaning of Volks-
zugehörige has been adapted several times, especially with regard to the 
importance of German linguistic proficiency. The language tests car-
ried out since 1996 required the acquisition of German language skills 
through family mediation. Since 2013, knowledge acquired elsewhere 
has also been allowed, which has led to a growth in the circle of poten-
                                          
28 The term erlaubt (allowed) is also used. Referring to resolution 1509 (2006) of the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the term 'illegal' is preferred when 
referring to a status or process, whereas the term 'irregular' is preferred when referring 
to a person (Council 2006)  
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tial returnees. The German Constitution, Art. 116, also refer to Sta-
tusdeutscher (As-if-German) or German without German citizenship, 
i.e. refugees or expellees of German nationality or as their spouse or 
descendant in the territory of the German Reich according to the situ-
ation of 31 December 1937. Moreover, the Bundesvertriebenengesetzes 
granted special rights to the exiled and refugees in order to favour the 
naturalization of Jews who had to flee during the Third Reich’s rule or 
had been left outside of the post-WWII German national borders. 
Unsurprisingly, over the last few years, asylum policy and legislation 
have also been at the centre of intense public debates, often fuelled by 
more or less genuine conceptual misunderstandings. To this regard, 
the notion of Wirtschaftsflüchtlinge (economic refugee) is notable. This 
category includes anybody who enters the country irregularly and 
then applies as asylum seekers, although their motivation is to im-
prove their living conditions, and not to escape persecution in their 
country of origin. The concept’s negative connotation, as well as the 
openly unwarranted bridging of the distinction between migration 
and asylum, express quite effectively the tensions agitating the Ger-
man society and a certain intolerance of nuances. Among the sources 
of disagreement and misperceptions is the variance of the legal 
grounds for the status of refugee (Flüchlinge) can be granted to asylum 
seekers (Asylbewerber, Asylsuchende, the term Asylant is also in use, 
mostly with a derogatory connotation). Apart from the international 
instruments the country is signatory to, protection of the right to asy-
lum in Germany is also guaranteed by the Constitution (Deutche Bun-
destag 1949, 16a), although concretely the latter plays a subordinate 
role compared to the safeguard granted through the Geneva Conven-
tion (every year, only one to two per cent of asylum seekers receive 
protection based on the Constitution). 
Moreover, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), the 
Ministry of the Interior’s agency in charge of asylum procedures, also 
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assesses whether applicants meet the requirements for subsidiary pro-
tection29 and temporary suspensions of deportations30, or because their 
repatriation is technically impossible, but are eventually going to have 
to leave the country. Failed asylum seekers (abgelehnte Asylbewerber) – 
with no claim to any form of protection and no pending appeal – are 
requested to leave Germany within a week if the application is rejected 
because manifestly unfounded or immaterial, 30 day in all other cases. 
A failure to comply normally results in deportation (Abschiebung). This 
is therefore legally different from the notion of Zurückweisung (rejec-
tion at the border) – which correspond to border control practices exe-
cuted in places (basically airports) that are conceived as lying virtually 
outside of the German territory – since, in this case, the incoming alien 
does not even come to the asylum application. This is also part of the 
crackdown on asylum seekers and migration launched by the govern-
ment in 2016, at least in part as an effect of the widespread reprisal 
against the alleged ‘loss of control’ of the country’s borders. If a depor-
tation order is not immediately enforceable, detention pending depor-
tation (Abschiebungsgewahrsam) of asylum seekers is legally possible. 
Land-level authorities – the states foreigners’ registration offices 
(Ausländerbehörden) and administrative courts are in charge of depor-
tations and actual repatriations (as well as the issuing or withholding 
of residence permits and inspections enforcement).   
Observations on the three understandings of justice from 
the German case 
Justice as non-domination 
As it can be argued, the compliance of migration-related concepts and 
norms with a notion of justice as ‘inter-governmental fairness’ is trou-
bled by Germany’s somewhat ambivalent foreign policy identity. The 
foreign policy identity has been wavering more and more conspicu-
ously between a post-World World II repute as a non-threatening, 
highly reliable partner on the one hand and the (domestic as well as 
                                          
29 The protection afforded to a third-country national or to a stateless person who does 
not fulfil the conditions for recognition as a refugee but who has provided sound 
grounds for the assumption that returning to her/his country of origin or, in the case 
of a stateless person, to the country of her/his previous habitual residence would in 
fact be liable to cause serious harm according to Article 15, and that Articles 17(1) and 
(2) is not applicable and that s(he) cannot benefit from the protection of that country.  
30 Duldung, literally ‘toleration’, is not a residence title; those who are granted one 
(Geduldete) are tolerated for international or humanitarian reasons or for the protection 
of the interests of the Federal Republic of Germany (§ 60a (1) Aufenthgesetz).  
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international) expectations of a more assertive role, better suited to the 
country’s interests, capabilities and status on the other. This inherent 
tension manifests itself most clearly within the European Union, where 
a balance between formal equality with fellow Member States and the 
country’s de facto leading role seems increasingly hard to strike. 
As far as formal definitions and policy instruments are concerned, the 
very preference for the Zuvanderung concept can be regarded as con-
ducive to domination outcomes, inasmuch as it involves the suprem-
acy of domestic public authorities managing immigrants through more 
or less strict governmental strategies, while also indirectly – but delib-
erately – influencing their relative home countries. What seems to be 
implied here is a unilateral exertion of pressure at the expenses of the 
mutual relationship inherent in a notion that emphasizes long-term in-
tegration rather than an effective response to an emergency. As for in-
tra-EU relations, possible evidence of dominance may be found in the 
German government’s inherently unfair demand that the countries ly-
ing along the Union’s external borders act strictly in accordance with 
the terms of the Dublin III System – that is, that they  bear the brunt of 
the migration wave, with virtually no extra support from other Mem-
ber States. On the other hand, the unilateral suspension of the Dublin 
III System in September 2015, which triggered Central Europe govern-
ments’ allegations of ‘moral imperialism’ is worth a mention. Apart 
from any considerations about the EU asylum policy’s structural flaws 
and the poor performance of national reception systems, what matters 
here is that the German government’s request appears untenable in 
terms of a genuinely ‘Westphalian’ notion of justice, as it wittingly 
overlooks the concrete conditions faced by Southern Europe countries. 
In this sense, the opportunity to resort to effective means like the quasi-
extraterritorial fast-track asylum procedure carried out in the transit 
areas of major German airports creates an objective normative ad-
vantage for countries with no (sensitive) external border. In this sense, 
the respect of justice as non-domination requires more than the mere 
compliance with the principle of formal equality and mutual recogni-
tions among nation-states, but also presupposes the ‘diplomatic’ ability to 
manage the inevitable differences in power and material conditions. 
Justice as impartiality 
While Germany’s conceptual and legal frameworks tend to comply to 
a considerable extent with universal criteria of justice focused solely 
on the claims of individuals as such, they also continue to be bounded 
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by nation-specific considerations, for reasons that largely complement 
those discussed with reference to justice as non-domination. The very 
existence of forms of ‘quasi-citizenships’ based on ethnic identities 
and/or historical backgrounds (ethnic German repatriates, Jewish im-
migrants) generates a discriminatory effect in terms of access to inter-
national protection and naturalization on migrants. As far as economic 
migration is concerned, compliance with the universalistic jus soli prin-
ciple coexists with rules that request relinquishing the applicant’s orig-
inal citizenship in order to access the naturalization process. Moreover, 
specific measures have been taken to select labour force with the pur-
pose of addressing skills gaps (Fachkräftemangel) – see the implementa-
tion of the EU Blue Card system for highly qualified persons, which 
ensures a faster access to permanent residence. Significantly, the same 
rationale has been successfully applied to free movement of labour 
within the EU, creating an advantageous transfer of skilled workers 
from Southern Europe. Even when it comes to asylum, the application 
of universal rules has a number of conditions attached. Though they 
conform quite effectively to the rule of law and are relatively safe from 
the executive’s exclusive control, Germany’s criteria and procedures to 
grant protection to asylum seekers prove to be no less sensitive to con-
tingent concerns than cosmopolitan inspiration. Notably, Germany’s 
current asylum system was made possible by the so-called 1993 Asylkompro-
miss – a constitutional change to tighten the hitherto generous condition to 
access to the status of refugees in the wake of the 1980s increase in the inflows 
of asylum seekers, mainly from Yugoslavia, Romania and Bulgaria. 
Significantly, the concept of ‘safe country’ is not only at variance, as a 
criterion by which to assess asylum applications, with the pre-emi-
nence of individual over nationality-related concerns maintained by a 
notion of justice as impartiality, but it also periodically updated based 
on contingent considerations about the economic and political feasibil-
ity of Germany’s asylum policy. Another aspect that makes the Ger-
man asylum legislation less consistent with cosmopolitan values are 
the distinctive sets of safeguards granted by different forms of interna-
tional protection. Far from being a merely technical issue, the differ-
ences between the possible grounds based on which protection is ac-
tually granted have become a political case since the executive’s at-
tempt in 2016 to curtail the number of incoming Ausländer (foreigners) 
granting a larger share of asylum seekers subsidiary protection instead 
of the ‘full’ status of refugee. The measure was expected to discourage 
new arrivals, as subsidiary protection, while excluding deportation, 
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also comes with a two-year ban on the refugee’s family reunification 
and a speed up deportation process for those not provided with a per-
manent right to remain. The government’s crackdown on migration 
has resulted in a string of successful appeals before Germany’s admin-
istrative courts, which have ruled full protection for 90 percent of the 
claimants. Accordingly, national courts can be regarded as effective 
subsidiary enforcers of impartiality principles, attesting to the idea that 
the ‘checks and balances’ at work within Germany’s institutional set-
ting is functional to the advancement of justice as impartiality. But it also 
relates in a problematic way to the goal of promoting collective (suprana-
tional) institutions as default modes to pursue this notion of justice.  
Justice as mutual recognition 
Few aspects of Germany’s migration-related conceptual and legal 
frameworks seem to fulfil the criterion according to which specific in-
dividual and collective identities are to be addressed per se and not in 
relation to concerns about resources – which instead emerge as a rela-
tively high, albeit variable, priority of the country’s migration policies, 
as seen above. Admittedly, Germany’s migration system includes 
well-structured, nationally standardised integration courses (which 
may become mandatory under certain circumstances) primarily des-
tined for migrants with long-term residence plans in order to support 
them in integrating into the economic, cultural and social life. Signifi-
cantly, specific integration courses have been designed for special tar-
get groups: immigrants with additional advancement needs (e.g. par-
ents, women, and youths). The federal government’s commitment to-
ward this goal is confirmed by the ‘Integration bill’ submitted a few 
months ago, aimed at launching a ‘two-way process that would foster 
integration while expecting incomers to do their bit’ (The Federal Gov-
ernment 2016). One particular aspect consistent with the notion of jus-
tice as mutual recognition is the role assigned to stale-level entities, 
such as local Foreigners Authorities, which are responsible for issuing 
residence titles and are the primary location for questions regarding 
residency and taking up employment, creating more favourable con-
dition to a genuine dialogue. The role of the Länder’s registration of-
fices, responsible for administering deportations, and state courts, usu-
ally in charge of asylum seekers’ appeals is also significant. It was these 
authorities that ruled out deportations to Afghanistan, pending new 
security reports, despite the agreement signed by the EU and strongly 
advocated for by the federal government. 
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United Kingdom and migration 
The legislation regulating immigration and asylum in the UK is a rela-
tively complicated patchwork of Acts of Parliament and statutory in-
struments – executive orders of subordinate legislations (e.g. the Im-
migration Rules) expanding on and clarifying the framework of immi-
gration law. These have been emended at a very high rate over the past 
decades, in order to keep abreast with the massive changes occurred 
in this policy area. Although the United Kingdom has received immi-
grants for centuries, the country has traditionally been a net exporter 
of people; only from the mid-1980s did the United Kingdom become a 
country of immigration. The 1990s differs markedly because of high 
levels of net immigration, a surge generated in large part by sustained 
economic growth. Since 2004, immigration levels have been boosted 
by an extraordinary wave of mobility from Eastern European coun-
tries, particularly Poland, whose citizens have free movement and la-
bour rights following the European Union enlargement. The recent ref-
ugee crisis only added to an already very high level of public anxiety 
about immigration, fuelled by media attention. This has ultimately led 
to significant changes not only in the political agenda of traditional and 
new parties, but also in the very conceptual framework underlying the 
common notions of what is right and what is wrong regarding a force-
ful phenomenon as migration. 
Terms, definitions and concepts: peculiarities of the UK 
case 
The United Kingdom’s law offers no unambiguous and practicable 
definition of ‘migrant’ or ‘immigrant’ (‘Foreign’, for the purposes of 
the Control of Immigration means 'non-Commonwealth' to 1998 and 
'non-Commonwealth' and 'non-EEA' from 1999). The distinction be-
tween those who have the ‘right to abode’ in the UK and those who 
have not is crucial. The stock of migrants who are not entitled to reside 
in the UK, either because they have never had a legal residence permit 
or because they have overstayed their time-limited permit or who are 
legally resident but breaching the conditions attached to their immi-
gration status, are often referred to as ‘illegal immigrants’. The termi-
nology ‘irregular (im)migrant’/‘migrant in an irregular situation’ has 
come into use because it better covers the diversity of deviations from 
the law whilst avoiding any problematic moral statement (Düvell 
2014). The Immigration Act 1971 Section 24(1)(a) defines ‘illegal entry’ 
as the offence of knowingly entering the United Kingdom in breach of 
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a deportation order or without leave. For the offence to be committed, 
a person must knowingly enter in breach of a deportation order or with-
out leave (UK Legislation 1971). Labour migration involves people 
coming to the UK for the purpose of paid work – i.e. whose primary reason 
for migrating or legal permission to enter the UK is for employment. 
An ‘economic migrant’ is not a legal classification, but rather an um-
brella term for a wide array of people that move from one country to 
another to advance their economic and professional prospects. In the 
UK’s public discourse, what is meant by ‘economic migrant’ – often 
with a derogatory connotation if not a xenophobic twist – is a person 
who has left his/her own country and seeks by lawful or unlawful 
means to find employment – i.e. for ‘personal convenience’ possibly at 
the expenses of local workers – in another country (Althaus 2016). Con-
sider for example how the purportedly right-wing British think-tank 
Migration Watch states that ‘[i]n the majority of cases the unsuccessful 
asylum seeker is, in fact, an economic migrant who has tried to take 
advantage of the asylum system in the absence of any other available 
means of obtaining lawful entry into the United Kingdom. This con-
clusion is reinforced when one considers that most asylum seekers are 
young men. Furthermore, many of them have paid huge sums of 
money to people traffickers to bring them to the UK’ (Migration Watch 
UK 2006). The British Government also makes use of the term ‘migrant 
worker’ as formulated in the UN Convention on the Protection of the 
Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Family to desig-
nate a person engaged in a remunerated activity in a state of which he 
or she is not a national (Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights 1990; Department for Business Innovation & Skills, 2015). The 
UK, like most countries with advanced economies, has specific policies 
in place to facilitate the mobility of highly skilled professionals and in-
vestors into its respective national economy. The most desirable mi-
grants are identified as expatriates (‘expats’). Restriction and selection 
of labour, education and investment immigration is pursued through 
the implementation of the 5 Tier Points Based System (which implicitly 
differentiates the concept of labour immigrant). 
Someone who has received a positive decision on his or her asylum 
claim from the Home Office, or has had a successful appeal, is issued 
documents confirming his/her status as a refugee (UK Government 
2012, art. 334). Successful applicants gain support not only for them-
selves but also for their ‘dependents’ regardless of their immigration 
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status (who can be can be a husband/wife/civil partner, an unmarried 
couple (if living together for more than 2 of the last 3 years), a child 
under 18, or a member of the household who is over 18 and is in need 
of care and attention due to disability). If the Home Office considers 
that a person does not qualify for asylum, but is still in need of inter-
national protection, he/she may be granted Humanitarian Protection.  
The Home Office has the power to hold individuals in detention when 
exercising immigration control. Asylum seekers and other migrants 
can be detained for administrative purposes – typically to establish 
their identities, or to facilitate their immigration claims resolution 
and/or their removals. Although detention is not a criminal proce-
dure, observers frequently point to the prison-like features of immigra-
tion detention in the UK, including both architectural similarities and 
‘conceptual parities,’ which make it arguably a form of punishment 
even if officially it is not recognized as such. Decisions on asylum and 
human rights claims made in the UK are made by the UK Border 
Agency, which is an agency of the Home Office. In order to become an 
asylum applicant and be recognised as a refugee in Britain, migrants 
need to be on UK territory (so, strictly speaking the migrants in Calais 
are neither refugees or asylum seekers from a UK legal perspective – 
at least as long as they remain in French territory). The safe country of 
origin concept is provided by British legislation (Nationality Immigra-
tion and Asylum Act (UK Government 2002, 94)). States are designated 
safe by order of the Secretary of State for the Home Office. The Secre-
tary of State may make such an order where they are satisfied that 
‘there is in general in that State or part no serious risk of persecution 
of persons entitled to reside’ there, and that removal there ‘will not in 
general contravene’ the ECHR. The UK participates in EU and bilateral 
readmissions agreements, and has memoranda of understanding for 
the return of nationals found illegally in the UK.  
The term ‘deportation’ applies to people and their children whose re-
moval from the country is deemed ‘conducive to the public good’ by 
the Secretary of State. Deportation can also be recommended by a court 
in connection with a conviction of a criminal offence that carries a 
prison term. Administrative removals (or just ‘removals’) refers to a 
larger set of cases involving the enforced removal of non-citizens who 
have either entered the country illegally or deceptively, stayed in the 
country longer than their visa permitted, or otherwise violated the con-
National case studies  113
 
ditions of their leave to remain in the UK. Voluntary departures in-
volve people against whom enforced removal has been initiated. (The 
term ‘voluntary’ describes the method of departure rather than the 
choice of whether or not to depart).  
Observations on the three understandings of justice from 
the UK case 
Justice as non-domination 
Arguably, the basic ‘negative’ conception informed by the idea of jus-
tice as non-domination is the most discernible in the definitions and 
sets of relevant norms underlying the UK’s migration policy. British 
norms and operationalized concepts seem to be directed to large extent 
against arbitrary interference and the subordination to others, favour-
ing the rule of law and counter-majoritarian institutions – as the judi-
ciary’s power to assess the liability of every public authority (political 
and administrative) established through the Human Rights Act 1998. 
The purpose of holding in check the power of individuals and non-
state groups is at least in principle pursued through the protection of 
the right of irregular immigrants, especially when employed not qua 
immigrants but as part of the country’s population. On the other hand, 
this purpose inherently at variance with that of preventing and eradi-
cating irregular (‘illegal’) situations – see the new 2015 measures 
against landlords renting to irregular migrants – which can still be as-
sociated with non-domination through the role of the government as 
gatekeeper on the membership to the ‘body politic’, watching over a 
plain field where all insiders enjoy the same ‘right to have right’ that 
comes with citizenship (or, at least, border clearance).  
As for non-domination within the international context, the British 
government’s conceptual framework appears quite consistent with a 
Westphalian notion of justice – that is, a procedural rather than a sub-
stantial idea of justice, one in which the role of global institutions is to 
foster deliberation and promote common practical reasons rather than 
sanction non-compliance in a legal fashion. In this perspective, the way 
migration is defined and regulated is contingent on national interests 
– first of all security interests. Accordingly, freedom of movement and 
hospitality duties could be rightly constrained or conditioned based on 
the primary goal of national security. The decision not to be automati-
cally bound by measures taken under the Schengen acquis (but to re-
tain a right to opt-in) can be regarded as being in line with this practical 
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conception of justice – although it put a strain on the on the strong 
principle of equality that ‘qualifies’ strict non-domination among the 
EU Member States. As long as the natural configuration of the country 
offered a better and less intrusive way to prevent illegal immigration 
than other measures, such as Schengen’s, it was reasonable – therefore 
right – to stick to national norms and the respective concepts. Migra-
tion laws and, even more so, border control rules have rested on an 
ever-stronger notion of ‘territoriality’, which in turn hinges on the UK 
being an island (UK Government 2014). Arguably, this seems to have 
relieved the UK’s public authorities, compared to continental Eu-
rope’s, from conceptualising immigration an inherently global issue, 
to be reckoned with through novel mind-sets and institutional tools.  
Potential and actual infringements of the principle of non-domination 
are to be found in the EU readmission agreements and the bilateral 
memoranda of understanding for irregular migrants the UK partakes 
to, owing to asymmetries in the parties’ bargaining power. However, 
any specific measure aimed at curtailing migration can end up being 
perceived by other countries’ government as unfair treatment of their 
national abroad (as in the case with India and the British government’s 
and the scrapping of post-study work visa). The post-Brexit UK’s goal 
of retaining access to the EU internal market while dismissing the free-
dom of movement (and of migration) of EU citizens can also be regarded 
as an attempt to dominate relationships with former EU fellow members.  
Justice as impartiality 
Looking at the UK’s regulatory approach of migration and asylum, a 
major source of potential and actual infringements of the principle of 
impartiality – hinging on the idea of general/universal rights of indi-
viduals and collective entities – is the role assigned to Immigration 
Rules as a source of law, which attest to the post-statutory phase of the 
UK’s immigration policy (Cerna and Wietholtz 2011, 204). While a part 
of the British legal order – being de jure statutory instruments and hav-
ing been able to curb the Parliament’s sway – Immigration Rules are in 
fact non-legislated ‘rules of practice’, not bound to be abstract or gen-
eral, as required instead of statutory law. This has allowed the Home 
Office to regulate a great many aspects of the British immigration pol-
icy at its complete discretion. Being extremely flexible tools for the 
‘loophole-closing’ and ‘fine-tuning’ that has characterised the British 
legislative approach, Immigration Rules have been very much at odds 
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with the principles of justice as impartiality. Moreover, unlike in an-
other countries, the latter have been put under considerable strain by 
policy instruments designed to select immigrants based on their pro-
fessional qualification in order to fill gaps in the national labour market  
such as the 5 Tier Point System, which provides for ‘fast track’ proce-
dures for highly qualified migrants, sponsorship systems, et cetera.  
Also the concept of ‘safe countries of origin’ (defined in Nationality 
Immigration and Asylum Act (UK Government 2002, 94)) may be in-
consistent with the principles underlying impartiality, at least to the 
extent that its use is prompted by the desire to speed up the processing 
of asylum seekers’ applications, rather than ascertaining – in a virtually 
unbiased and selfless manner – that ‘there is in general in that State (of 
origin) or part no serious risk of persecution of persons entitled to re-
side’ there, and that removal there ‘will not in general contravene’ the 
European Convention on Human Rights (in this case there also seems 
to be a merely instrumental implementation of the ECHR). On the 
other hand, regardless of a tendency to criminalize irregular immigra-
tion, a series of measures – i.e. the direct enforceability of the ECHR 
via the Human Rights Act 1998 – have also provided for an effective 
protection in the UK of the universal rights of immigrants despite their 
irregular status. The UK ensures quite effectively that the basic rights 
of irregular immigrants cannot be violated in the enforcement of im-
migration laws and the implementation of measures to control migra-
tion, also when it comes to the delicate issue of deportation. 
Justice as mutual recognition 
The declared goal of the Immigration Act 2014’s – as stated by the then 
home secretary May – to ‘create a really hostile environment for illegal 
immigrants’ may well be regarded as a token of the UK’s conceptual 
and legislative attitude toward mutual recognition concerning migra-
tion (Travis 2013). Another publicized goal of recent years’ migration 
laws and policy measures is quite revealing: the so-called ‘net migra-
tion-target’, i.e. the intent to reduce net migration to the UK from EU 
and non-EU countries from hundreds to tens of thousands per year 
(Sims 2016). Both purposes reveal a marked ‘managerial’ underlying 
stance according to which migrants (as well as asylum seekers) seem 
to be primarily conceived of as a policy issue, to be managed with gov-
ernmental tools as effectively and in line with overarching national in-
116 Michela Ceccorulli et al. 
 
terests as possible. As one can see, such an  approach  is only margin-
ally based on aspects like ‘dialogue’ and ‘reciprocity’, as it rather as-
sumes the policy object to be essentially passive. 
This is confirmed, among others, by the rationale of the UK’s naturali-
zation’s rule. Not unlike in other countries, foreigners that wish to be-
come British citizens have to demonstrate to know and be able to join 
values and principles, history and culture as well as the law of the UK, 
besides mastering the English language and being willing to get in-
volved in the community life. The process, however, is not designed as 
a voluntary adhesion to fundamental features of the British citizenship 
premised on the mutual recognition of the recipient political commu-
nity (represented by the public authority) on the one hand and the cit-
izen-to-be on the other. Instead, the process resembles much more a 
bureaucratic scrutiny of requirements by the UK Visa Bureau – and 
basically the same goes for the ascertainment of the commitment to the 
country preliminary to the grant or refusal of Indefinite Leave to Re-
main or temporary visa. In this sense, the different requirements ap-
plied to people from inside the European Economic Area appear just 
the entailment of specific bureaucratic conditions rather than the ac-
knowledgment of actual identifying aspects. 
This is also in line with the process of ‘normalisation’ undergone by 
the UK’s national identity, which over the last three decades has been 
progressively rationalised through the removal of special rights and 
conditions to abode formerly assigned to specific categories of people 
based on their ties to the British Empire and then the Commonwealth, 
and a widespread negative evaluation of the multicultural integration 
strategy’s results (Platt and Platt 2013). A certain UK disinclination to 
justice as mutual recognition can also be detected, as regarding asy-
lum, in the British legal system of the third-country system, which fur-
ther exempts the Home Office from the obligation of dealing with a 
number of asylum requests, shifting the burden on the countries of 
‘safe arrival’ unilaterally designed by the Home Office. Moreover, un-
like with repatriations to the country of origin, the return to third safe 
countries cannot be appealed to by asylum seekers. Although the same 
‘buck-passing’ is to be found within Dublin III System too, at least in 
principle this can be thought of as the undesired outcome of a struc-
turally flawed (but still value-laden) common policy, whereas the 
functional equivalent implemented by the UK government permits to 
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avoid any ‘significant’ encounter with the asylum applicant without so 
much as the admittedly faulty ‘peer pressure’ operating within the EU. 
Greece and migration 
Greece is a relatively ‘new’ country of immigration since it was trans-
formed into a country of transit and settlement in the 1990s (Gropas 
and Triandafyllidou 2007; Kasimis 2012). Until then it was predomi-
nantly a country of emigration. Although small numbers of immi-
grants arrived in Greece in the 1970s and 1980s, significant numbers of 
migrants from the former Soviet Union republics and Balkan countries 
settled in Greece following political and economic unrest after the col-
lapse of communist regimes. These flows also included ethnically 
Greek returning migrants, such as members of the Greek minority in 
Albania and Greek post-civil war refugees in Eastern European com-
munist states (Gropas and Triandafyllidou 2007). In addition, because 
of its geographical position, Greece is a main point of entry to the Eu-
ropean Union for migrants from Asian, Middle Eastern and African 
countries fleeing armed conflict and political and economic instability 
(Triandafyllidou and Maroukis 2012), recently including Syrian refu-
gees displaced by the Syrian conflict (UNHCR 2016a).  
Several legislative instruments were introduced to address the new dy-
namics of migration. Law 1975 of 1991 was a first attempt to regulate 
the entry and residence and was followed by law 2910 in 2001. Both 
laws were predominantly focused on controlling entry and considered 
economic migration as temporary.  These tendencies are also evident 
in Law 3386 of 2005 which, however, attempted to provide for long-
term residence and integration (Baldwin-Edwards 2009; Triandafylli-
dou 2009). Nevertheless, migrants faced significant difficulties in 
maintaining legal status because of strict provisions on entry and resi-
dence and work permits and administrative inadequacies (Triandafyl-
lidou 2009; Maroukis 2013). As a result, four regularisation programs took 
place between 1997 and 2007 (Baldwin-Edwards 2009). The provisions of 
Law 3386/2005, subsequent amendments and other laws transposing EU 
directives – for instance on family reunification and long term residence 
status – were codified in Law 4251/2014 (Government Gazette 2005; 2014).  
The first law specifically on refugee protection was introduced in 1996. 
It established normal and accelerated procedures and introduced the 
concepts of manifestly unfounded applications and safe third-country 
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in line with developments in EU soft law. The Europeanisation of ref-
ugee and asylum law accelerated in the late 2000s with the transposi-
tion of the Dublin Regulation (2003) and the Reception (2007), Proce-
dures (2008) and Qualifications (2008) directives. Following wide-
spread criticisms on the country’s asylum and reception systems, Law 
3907/2011 introduced significant reforms – establishing the Asylum 
and First Reception Services – and transposed the Returns Directive 
(Government Gazette 2011). In 2016, Law 4375/2016 introduced 
amendments to the asylum and reception systems aimed at facilitating the 
implementation of the EU-Turkey agreement (Government Gazette 2016).  
Greece has also ratified key international and regional human rights 
instruments – including the Geneva Convention, the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights, International Covenant of Social, Economic 
and Cultural Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights – which safeguard the human rights of migrants. In addition, 
the Greek Constitution prohibits the ‘extradition of aliens prosecuted 
for their action as freedom-fighters’ and guarantees the ‘protection of 
their life, honour and liberty’ of every person in Greek territory ‘irre-
spective of nationality, race or language and of religious or political 
beliefs’ (Hellenic Parliament 2001, Art 5, para. 2). It also guarantees 
equal access to social security for all persons working in Greece. Overall, the 
Greek legal framework largely conforms to international and regional legal 
standards, although specific definitions and categories diverge on occasion. 
Terms, definitions and concepts: the peculiarities of the 
Greek case 
The term ‘migrant’ is not used in Greek law. Current law uses the 
terms: ‘foreign national’ (‘allodapos’), defined as ‘natural person who 
does not have Greek nationality or is stateless’; ‘third-country na-
tional’, defined as ‘any natural person who is not a Greek national or 
the national of any other EU Member State’; and ‘EU national’, defined 
as ‘any person who is a national of an EU Member State’ (Government 
Gazette 2005; 2014). Similarly, while the term ‘illegal immigrant’ –
‘lathrometanasths’ or ‘paranomos metanastis’ – is not used in Greek 
law, the term ‘illegal immigration’ (‘paranomi metanastefsi’) occasion-
ally is (EMN 2014). With reference to illegality, the law distinguishes 
between third-country nationals who ‘reside legally’ on the one hand 
and those who or ‘reside illegally’ or have ‘entered illegally’. However, 
the terms ‘migrant’, ‘economic migrant’, ‘economic migration’ and ‘il-
legal immigration’ has been used in official documents such as reports 
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submitted to UN or EU bodies, press releases by the government and 
ministries and parliamentary debates.  
The definitions of ‘refugee’ ‘refugee status’ and ‘subsidiary protection’ 
are identical to those in the Geneva Convention and EU directives on 
qualification and procedures (Government Gazette 2013; 2016). The 
terms ‘applicant for international protection’ or ‘applicant for asylum’ 
– are used in law to signify asylum seekers (Government Gazette 2016, 
Art. 34; 2014, Art. 2; 2010, Art. 2). Other legal definitions and categories 
in domestic law – such as ‘safe third-country’ ‘return’ ‘family reunifi-
cation’ ‘unaccompanied minors’ - generally transpose their equiva-
lents from EU legal instruments. There are, however, occasional differ-
ences between domestic and EU legal norms. For instance, when Law 
3907/2011 transposed the Returns directive, migrants ‘apprehended or 
intercepted by the competent authorities in connection with the irreg-
ular crossing by land, sea or air of the external border’ (European Par-
liament and Council 2008, Art. 2, par. 2a; Government Gazette 2011, 
Art. 17 par 2a) were excluded from its remit.  The text of the directive 
leaves the choice to include migrants apprehended at the border to the 
discretion of member states (European Parliament and Council 2008, 
Art 2). Similarly, there is no list of designated safe third countries in 
Greek law.  
Migration has generally been a controversial issue in Greece. The use 
of the terms ‘illegal immigrant’ and ‘illegal immigration’ is particularly 
significant in the Greek context since it has framed media and public 
debates on migration since the 1990s (Karamanidou 2016; Pavlou 
2009). Their widespread use constructed migration as a predominantly 
negative phenomenon, associated with criminality and social threat. 
The significance of ‘illegality’ is also evident in legislation which pri-
oritises control and deterrence over refugee protection or long-term in-
tegration. For instance, migrants entering the country in an unauthor-
ised manner are labelled as ‘illegal’ upon entry to Greek territory in 
accordance to the provisions of Law 3386/2005, even if they intent to 
apply for asylum. As will be discussed further on, this has significant 
consequences for migrants’ rights.  
Another significant feature of the Greek legal framework concerns dis-
parities in terms of rights attached to different legal categories. While 
essential human rights are generally guaranteed, socio-economic and 
civil right are dependent both on legal status and employment. This 
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often results in markedly different arrangements in relation to rights 
attached to different statuses. Recognised refugees, for instance, are 
given the full range of rights prescribed by the Qualifications directive. 
Third-country nationals generally have access to socio-economic 
rights, but it is legal residence and employment that guarantees most 
welfare entitlements (Government Gazette 2014; Maroukis 2013). In 
contrast, undocumented migrants are only entitled to emergency 
healthcare and use of public services relating to matters such as volun-
tary return and renewal of residence permits (Government Gazette 
2005, Art. 82; 2014, Art. 26). 
Key controversies relating to legislation between 2009 and 2016 con-
cerned citizenship, violence against migrants, and more recently on the 
Syrian refugee crisis and the EU-Turkey agreement. In 2010, the gov-
ernment introduced law 3838/2010 which facilitated the granting of 
citizenship to migrants and granted the right to vote in local elections. 
The law challenged dominant exclusionary perceptions of ethnic citi-
zenship, which was opposed by right-wing parties, and eventually de-
clared unconstitutional by the Greek Supreme Court.  Incidents of vi-
olence against migrants, linked to the extreme right party of Golden 
Dawn, highlighted the shortcomings of anti-discrimination legislation 
and attracted widespread criticism by human rights organisation 
(Council of Europe 2013). The adoption of the hotspot approach in 
2015, the EU-Turkey agreement and the introduction of Law 
4375/2016 brought on significant and controversial changes to the 
country’s asylum laws, most notably in relation to the application of 
the concept of ‘safe third-country’, detention of migrants in need of in-
ternational protection in closed Reception and Identification Centres 
and their return to Turkey. 
Observations on the three understandings of justice from 
the Greek case 
Justice as non-domination 
If justice as non-domination is conceptually located in relations be-
tween EU member states on the one hand and third countries on the 
other, it appears difficult to relate to the Greek context. There is little 
evidence that the Greek state has imposed migration-related measures 
on third states as an independent actor. For example, while Greece has 
bilateral readmission agreements with neighbouring states such as 
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Turkey, most are EU-wide ones (EMN 2014). A more pertinent ap-
proach would consider the extent to which Greek legal frameworks 
and practices are dominated by the European Union and other mem-
ber states. The Europeanisation of domestic migration and asylum 
laws and harmonisation with EU legislative developments is an out-
come of the country’s membership, but it has not always served its interests 
nor safeguarded migrants’ human rights. The Dublin Regulation, for ex-
ample, exacerbated pressures on already weak asylum and reception 
systems (Karamanidou and Schuster 2012; McDonough and Tsourdi 2012) 
before the suspension of returns to Greece following the MSS v Belgium and 
Greece judgement of the European Court of Human Rights and the EC-4/11 
and EC-411/10 judgments of the European Court of Justice.  
The management of the 2015 refugee crisis further illustrated these ten-
sions. The hotspot approach and the EU-Turkey agreement resulted in 
migrants being contained in Greece in order to facilitate return to Tur-
key and placed disproportionate pressures on the Greek border con-
trol, asylum and reception systems (AI 2016a; ECRE 2016a). At the 
same time, policies aimed at alleviating pressure in Greece, such as 
support by EASO and FRONTEX personnel, relocations of asylum 
seekers to other EU states and financial assistance have proved insuf-
ficient in addressing the challenged posed by the intensity of refugee 
and migration flows (AI 2016a). It is thus questionable whether the 
hotspot approach and the EU-Turkey agreement adhere to the princi-
ple of non-domination, since they do not appear to take into account 
the interests of the Greek state. 
Justice as impartiality 
The principle of justice as impartiality suggests that human rights 
norms are applied to all migrants equitably and requires states to avoid 
causing harm in the sense of putting migrants in situations where their 
basic human rights of migrants are violated (Eriksen 2016).  Serious 
harm, defined as facing the death penalty or execution, torture or in-
human or degrading treatment or punishment, or serious and individ-
ual threat by indiscriminate violence in international or internal armed 
conflict, is a key concept in both European and Greek law (Council 
2014(a), Art. 15; Government Gazette 2013, Art. 2). The Greek legal or-
der, however, gives rise to several categorisations that appear not to 
adhere to the principle of impartiality and that are likely to expose mi-
grants to serious harm. 
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First, the designation of migrants as ‘illegal’ upon entry, while rooted 
in law, risks causing harm to migrants because of potential exclusion 
from the asylum procedure and the possibility of refoulement to a 
country with insufficient protection safeguards.  By being labelled ‘il-
legal’, migrants are placed under the remit of the provisions of Law 
3386/2005 on unauthorised entry, which allow for their detention and 
return. If entering through the Greek-Turkish borders, the Readmis-
sion Agreement between the two countries allows the Greek authori-
ties to initiate the immediate return to Turkey (Government Gazette 
2002).  While the implementation of the Readmission Agreement has 
not been successful (EMN 2014), the legal context it established has al-
lowed for practices of both informal and formal return mainly to Tur-
key (AI 2010a; 2014). In addition, labelling migrants entering Greece as 
‘illegal’ rendered access to the asylum procedure problematic because 
it excludes them at the point of entry from legal provisions on recep-
tion and asylum procedures.  
Second, access to the asylum procedure and international protection 
was further complicated by considering Turkey a ‘first country of asy-
lum’ for Syrian nationals and ‘safe third-country’ for migrants of other 
nationalities following the EU- Turkey agreement (UNHCR 2016b). On 
this basis, most applications by Syrian, Afghani and Iraqi nationals 
have been declared inadmissible (Greek Asylum Service 2016a; ECRE 
2016) and not examined in their substance. The blanket application of 
the safe third-country concept contradicts the requirement for individ-
ual assessment of the circumstances of each application (ECRE 2016b; 
UNHCR 2016b) and increases the risk of refoulement. There are also 
serious doubts on whether Turkey is in practice a safe country, given 
that instances of chain-refoulement to unsafe countries of origin or 
transit have been recorded both before and after the EU-Turkey agree-
ment (AI 2010b; 2016b). Therefore the application of the ‘safe third-
country’ concept increases the risk of harm and thus may not adhere 
to conceptions of justice as impartiality.   
Third, recognition rates in Greece have been historically very low in 
comparison to the EU average, despite an increase after the establish-
ment of the Asylum Service in June 2013. For instance, recognition rate 
in 2012 was 0.8 percent compared to the EU average of 25 percent and 
in 2014 14 percent compared to 33 percent (European Stability Initia-
tive 2015; Greek Asylum Service 2016a). Given that the Common Eu-
ropean Asylum System entails the harmonisation of both definitions 
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and procedures for examining and deciding on asylum applications, 
the significantly lower recognition rate in Greece suggests that legal 
categories are interpreted in a more restrictive manner than other in 
other member states and therefore not compatible with the principle 
of impartiality. It could further suggest a degree of arbitrariness 
(Eriksen 2016) contrary to conceptions of justice as non-domination.  
Fourth, domestic law on occasion accords rights in a manner that does 
not adhere to the principles of equality and impartiality. For instance, 
legally resident third-country nationals and recognised refugees are el-
igible for family reunification, but recipients of subsidiary and tempo-
rary protection and humanitarian status are not (Kasapi 2016). Refu-
gees can also be unified with a broader range of family members than 
legally resident third-country nationals, even if this only applies for 
three months following recognition (Government Gazette 2008; 2014). 
Similarly, unaccompanied minors with refugee status have full access 
to mainstream education, while those in detention do not. Further, do-
mestic law differentiates between ethnically Greek migrants (‘omoge-
neis’) and non-ethnically Greek foreign nationals. For instance, 
spouses of ‘omogeneis’ entering Greece through the family reunifica-
tion procedure can obtain a residence permit for five years compared 
to the maximum of three years proscribed for long-term residents 
(Government Gazette 2014, Art. 71, 81). These arrangements suggest 
that access to human rights is not equal or impartial, but negotiated by legal 
definitions as well as by nationality and migrant status (Morris 2012).  
Justice as mutual recognition 
Greek legislation on asylum and immigration recognises, to an extent, 
the specific identities of migrants through the category of ‘vulnerable 
groups’. This category includes unaccompanied minors, persons who 
have a disability or an incurable or serious illness, the elderly,  women 
in pregnancy or having recently given birth, single parents with minor 
children, victims of torture, rape or other serious forms of psychologi-
cal, physical or sexual violence or exploitation, victims of trafficking in 
human beings, and persons with a post-traumatic disorder, in particu-
larly survivors and relatives of victims of ship-wrecks, a sub-category 
added in Law 4375/2016. In relation to reception, individual belonging 
to vulnerable groups are entitled to special care, socio-psychological 
support and medical treatment (Government Gazette 2007; 2011; 2016, 
Art. 14). In the case of hotspots, the Director of Reception and Identifi-
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cation centres can transfer unaccompanied minors and those belong-
ing to a vulnerable group to a Reception and identification Centre lo-
cated inland or to other appropriate structures (Government Gazette 
2016, Art. 15). In addition, asylum applications by individuals belong-
ing to vulnerable groups should be examined by priority, and case-
workers conducting interviews should have training on the specialised 
needs of women, children, and victims of violence and torture who ap-
ply for asylum (Government Gazette 2016, Art. 52). Women applicants, 
in particular, can request to be interviewed by women caseworkers and 
with the aid of female interpreters (Government Gazette 2016, Art. 52). 
However, other legal categories and definitions interfere with the 
recognition of specific identities and vulnerabilities. While the trans-
posed Procedures Directives of 2005 and 2013 state that the detention 
of asylum seekers should be exceptional and advise against the deten-
tion of unaccompanied minors and pregnant women (Government Ga-
zette 2016, Art. 46) the blanket application of illegality upon entry to 
Greek territory and provisions relating to hotspots have allowed for 
the detention of vulnerable groups (FRA 2011; AI 2016). Similarly, the 
detention of individual belonging to vulnerable groups under return 
procedures is permitted (Government Gazette 2011). In addition, the 
application of the safe third countries concept can be interpreted as 
challenging conceptions of justice as mutual recognition, since Turkey 
is considered safe without regard to the specific identities and experi-
ences of individual asylum seekers.   
A further arrangement that runs counter to justice as mutual recogni-
tion concerns the selection of asylum applicants for relocation is made 
on the basis of nationality. Currently, only nationals from Burundi, Er-
itrea, Mozambique, Bahrain, Bhutan, Qatar, Syria and Yemen are eligi-
ble for relocation (Asylum Service 2016b). However, selection on this 
basis ignores the specific circumstances and identities that might ren-
der applicants of other nationalities eligible for international protection.  
Lastly, while the concept of integration may entail the recognition of 
the migrants’ specific identities in other national contexts, in Greek law 
it is conceptualised primarily as a process of socio-economic participa-
tion and familiarisation with Greek culture, history and language 
(Government Gazette 2014). As such, there is little in law to suggest 
conformity with the principle of mutual recognition. 
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Hungary and migration 
After the fall of the socialist system in Hungary, the first legal change 
was to quicken up the return of Hungarians living in the West who 
had left the country, or even those who may have lost citizenship due 
to restrictive policies (Hungarian National Assembly 1989). The Hun-
garian government assumed that the returning migrants were ethni-
cally Hungarian and refugees of repressive of political systems. Hun-
gary joined the Geneva Convention with geographic limitations in 
1989. Also Hungary received larger number of ‘refugees’ from neigh-
bouring countries, notably Romania, who crossed the border illegally 
and asked for asylum in Hungary due to ethnic and political repres-
sion in the sending country. Legislation had to be changed in 1993 by 
the effect of the war in Yugoslavia (from 1991) as the number of immi-
grants, asylum seekers radically increased and the regulations in prac-
tice failed to manage the situation. In 1993 the Act on the Entry, Resi-
dence and Settlement of Foreigners in Hungary or ‘Aliens’ Act’ (Hun-
garian National Assembly 1993b) came into force to tighten the 1989 
law. Finally, in 1998 an Act on Asylum entered into force (Hungarian 
National Assembly 1997), which ended the geographical limitations 
for refugees and specified the three categories of refugees applying to 
the Hungarian case with different procedures and rights. 
During the EU pre-accession period, national rules and legislations on 
migration were adapted in order to harmonize with EU legislations 
and norms. The 2001 Act on the Entry and Residence of Foreigners 
(Hungarian National Assembly 2001) which was the legal basis of the 
free movement of EU citizens in Hungary, divided the legal status of 
immigrants into EU citizens and third-country nationals. In 2004 join-
ing the EU both regulations and the institutional system of migration 
issues were transformed. In 2007 Hungary joined the Schengen Zone 
and thus complete freedom of movement was introduced. In the same 
period Hungary also introduced complete freedom of employment for 
EEA citizens. At the same time (between 1999 and 2011) Hungary in-
troduced a special system for people in EU countries and Third Coun-
tries with historical and ethnic ties for gaining special privileges in mi-
gration and gaining citizenship outside the border of Hungary. 
Terms, definitions and concepts: peculiarities of the 
Hungarian case 
The Hungarian legal documents do not refer to ‘migrants’, but to per-
sons with varying specific legal status allowing several forms of 
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longer-term residence. The usage of the more international notion of 
‘migrant’ (‘migráns’) has only gained momentum in non-legal dis-
courses (public and media discourses) in the wake of the ’migration 
crisis’ of Europe. The Hungarian legal system defines the main types 
of migration (‘bevándorlás’) in reference to the EU legislation. In addi-
tion, it intends to provide exclusive rights to third-country and EU na-
tionals with Hungarian background. Four main types of migrants are 
recognized in the Hungarian law: the asylum seekers and beneficiaries 
of international protection (Hungarian National Assembly 2007c), the 
EEA citizens (Hungarian National Assembly 2007a, act I), and the 
third-country citizens, except asylum seekers (Hungarian National As-
sembly 2007b), and the ‘Hungarians abroad’ (co-ethnic Hungarians 
living outside of the country). 
The Hungarian legal system uses the term ‘illegal migration/migrants’ 
instead of ‘irregular’, but it does not refer to ‘legal’ or ‘regular migra-
tion/migrants’; here the focus of the related acts is on the process of 
permissions and visas. Hungary follows different treatments in terms 
of rights according to categories of legal immigrants. 
A residence permit in Hungary is provided on humanitarian grounds for 
various reasons: for a person recognized as a stateless person or as an 
exile (beneficiary of tolerated stay – ‘befogadott’); for any third-coun-
try national who has applied to the refugee authority for asylum or for 
subsidiary form of protection or temporary protection; any third-coun-
try national who was born in the territory of Hungary who has fallen 
from the custody of his/her guardian having custody according to 
Hungarian law, as well as unaccompanied minors. Moreover, resi-
dence permit is granted on humanitarian grounds to third-country na-
tionals who cooperate with the law enforcement authorities in fighting 
crime, in addition to those who have been subjected to particularly ex-
ploitative working conditions, or to third-country national minors who 
were employed illegally without a valid residence permit or other au-
thorization for stay. 
Particularly interesting seems to be the understanding of family mem-
bers for family reunification purposes, although there is a differ-
ence/between those who enjoy the right of free movement (EEA na-
tionals and their family members) and third-country nationals. In the 
latter case, the definition of ‘family member’ refers to the spouse, the 
minor child in common with his/her spouse, the minor child of 
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his/her spouse (also including adopted child in both cases). Neverthe-
less, even dependent parent(s), sibling(s) or other direct relative(s) may 
be granted residence permit for family reunification purposes if 
he/she is unable to care for him/herself due to his/her health status. 
In case of refugee’s family members (that also includes the parent of a 
minor refugee) the above-mentioned kinships are recognized even in 
the lack of documentation proving the family relationship, except for 
the marriage with the spouse which must have occurred prior to the 
arrival of the refugee. The validity of the residence permit issued for 
family reunification could not be longer than the residence permit of 
the sponsor. In the case of EEA nationals, the definition is even wider. 
In addition to the above-mentioned groups, it also refers to civil part-
ners and to ‘those who have been granted residence by the authority as 
family members’ (Hungarian National Assembly 2007a, Art. 2, par. bh). 
Unaccompanied minors, a particularly vulnerable category, may never 
be detained. In case of an unaccompanied minor whose application 
was rejected, besides the fundamental guarantees for non-refoulement 
return may not be implemented except for family reunification or 
(public) institutional care, which is provided in the country of origin.  
If this condition is not met, only the unaccompanied minors receive a 
humanitarian residence permit. 
The Hungarian legal system distinguishes four types of protection 
which are concerned with Refugee status in the EU law. These are the 
refugee (‘menekült’), the beneficiary of subsidiary protection (‘ol-
talmazott’), the beneficiary of temporary protection (‘menedékes’), and 
tolerated stay (‘befogadott’). Of particular interest, the ‘tolerated stay’ 
is granted for ‘a foreigner not complying with the criteria for recogni-
tion as refugee or beneficiary of subsidiary protection but, in the event 
of his/her return to the country of origin, s/he would be exposed to a 
risk of persecution for reasons of race, religion, ethnicity, membership 
of a particular social group or a political opinion or to behaviour’ 
(Hungarian National Assembly 2007c, Section 25/A). The refugee au-
thority recognizes somebody as a person with tolerated stay if the pro-
hibition of refoulement has been established in the immigration proce-
dures, or the application for asylum has been rejected, but the prohibi-
tion of refoulement has been established. 
Before 2010 the Hungarian immigration policy on beneficiaries of in-
ternational protection was rather permissive concerning obligations or 
optional provisions stemming from EU law. From 2010 onward the 
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Hungarian legislation has become steadily stricter. Within the frame-
work of EU directives of the Common European Asylum System, it 
means that Hungary transposed mainly the stricter rules from the Ac-
quis, such as asylum detention that was introduced in 2013. The person 
granted refugee status, or subsidiary protection, receives a national 
identity card (not a residence permit), and the refugee/subsidiary pro-
tection status has to be revised every three years. The Immigration and 
Asylum Office (IAO) is responsible for the asylum procedure, and the 
integration of the beneficiaries of international protection. Neverthe-
less, the IAO is also the immigration authority, not only the asylum 
authority. This centralized administration means a unified application 
of law on the one hand, but it also means that the local authorities have 
no role in the process. 
The basic rights, benefits and material conditions are the same for both 
‘regular’ applicants and those who are put under asylum detention 
(Hungarian National Assembly 2013, Section 89). Furthermore, in line 
with the EU Directive, detention should be a last resort. Still, in practice 
in Hungary, (asylum) ‘detention became a key element in the Govern-
ment’s policy of deterrence’, UNHCR observed (UNHCR 2016c). The 
difference regarding the right to the provided benefits lies between 
those who are indigent (in case of first-time applicants, the reception 
with all the benefits is free of charge) and those who are not, or later 
proven to have concealed their financial possibilities (they either have 
to pay or refund later). Since 2015, applicants, who are not in detention, 
are also entitled to join the Hungarian public work programme (Hun-
garian National Assembly 2015a). Furthermore, after nine months, asylum-
seekers may work under the general conditions applying to foreigners. 
Reception of asylum applicants is organized around three types of fa-
cilities: reception centres (‘befogadó állomás’), community shelters 
(‘közösségi szállás’) and guarded asylum reception (detention) centres 
(‘menekültügyi őrzött befogadóközpont’). The possibility of private 
accommodation is also given but is in practice atypical. The Asylum 
Act also identifies persons with special needs: ‘unaccompanied chil-
dren or vulnerable persons, in particular, minor, elderly, disabled per-
sons, pregnant women, single parents raising minor children or per-
sons suffering from torture, rape or any other grave form of psycho-
logical, physical or sexual violence’ (Hungarian National Assembly 
2007c). Persons under these categories are provided special treatment 
throughout the whole process. Those, who do not apply for asylum 
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and enter Hungarian territory illegally, or who overstayed and lack 
appropriate documents, are dealt with by the aliens policing authori-
ties (See Hungarian National Assembly 2007b; and Hungarian Gov-
ernment 2007). They are treated separately both when it comes to pro-
cess and detention facilities (alien policing detention centres).  
As the number of asylum-seekers started to increase significantly in 
Hungary in the middle of 2015, the reception system underwent some 
important changes. Simultaneously to completing the border fence and 
sealing the green border, the Government introduced the so called 
‘transit zones’. These zones were established at the southern border of 
Hungary (in Tompa, Röszke, Beremend, and Letenye, the latter two at 
the Hungarian-Croatian border did not operate). In the transit zones, 
asylum and immigration authorities, and the security services are pre-
sent. This is where applicants for asylum are registered, and primary 
interviews are conducted. In case of applicants who do not belong to 
any of the vulnerable groups, a specific accelerated procedure, the so-
called border procedure, is conducted. Transit zone resembles the 
hotspots in its functioning (accelerated procedure and all its possible 
shortcomings). As from the summer of 2015, with daily arrivals reach-
ing 6 or even 11 thousand people, the authorities established tempo-
rary facilities - sometimes also referred to as ‘transit zones’, which may 
have caused confusion - in the capital (at, and in the proximity of, main 
railway stations) throughout the summer period until September. 
After having established it in 2010 and following the criticism of UN-
HCR and the European Commission, the Hungarian asylum authority 
ceased to apply the ‘safe third-country’ concept in 2012. The situation 
became more controversial when the Hungarian government, strug-
gling with the inflow of asylum-seekers in the summer of 2015, went 
further in codifying this policy by publishing the list in a decree (Hun-
garian Government 2015b), that named the safe third countries. The 
list included: all EU Member States, EU candidate countries (except 
Turkey, which was added to the list later, in Government Decree 
63/2016, following the EU-Turkey deal – (Hungarian Government 
2016)), Member States of the European Economic Area, US States that 
do not have the death penalty, Switzerland, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ko-
sovo, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.  
In September 2015, struggling with the management of the situation, 
Hungary was also offered ‘hotspot assistance’ by the Commission, 
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which was, turned down by the government shortly after (Hungarian 
Government 2015a). Behind this move were two basic convictions: 
first, that Hungary is not a ‘frontline state’ in the sense that asylum-
seekers reach its territory only after having already been in another EU 
Member State, namely Italy or Greece (this can be important when it 
comes to executing transfers based on the Dublin Regulations). Sec-
ond, that migration should not be simply ‘handled’, it should be 
stopped. According to government officials, the whole hotspot system 
design builds on an opposing conviction, with different relocation and 
resettlement options, and with setting up the hotspots themselves 
within the territory of the EU. 
An interesting point on the understanding or misunderstanding of dif-
ferences between resettlement and relocation happened on February 
2016, when the prime minister announced that Hungary should hold 
a referendum on whether the country should accept the proposed 
mandatory quotas of ‘settling’ (the expression he used was not ‘reloca-
tion’ or ‘resettlement’, but ‘settling’ or ‘settlement’). The aim of the ref-
erendum was to contest the obligatory distribution of asylum applica-
tions, (mis)interpreted by the referendum and the government as a 
mandatory relocation system. As we can see, the EU decision in 2015 
was about ‘relocation’ and the translation of the referendum question 
into English used the word ‘resettlement’. However, the question was 
about future obligatory settling/settlement or, more precisely, forced 
settlement. As everyday people - even the media - do not have 
knowledge or experience about the differences between the two concepts 
(or even three: ‘relocation’, ‘resettlement’ and ‘settlement’) – nor is it de-
fined in any Hungarian legal documents, the goals and effects of the EU 
decision about relocation or resettlement could easily be misunderstood.  
Observations on the three understandings of justice from 
the Hungarian case 
Justice as non-domination 
In the case of Hungary, the problem of dominance appears basically 
on two territories of legal and institutional arrangements. On the one 
hand, the problem is given by some arbitrary actions, procedures and 
arrangements of the Hungarian state for limiting access to interna-
tional protection by third-country nationals. On the other hand, we 
find arbitrary actions of the Hungarian state introducing extraterrito-
rial naturalization without consulting the concerned states, such as the 
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procedures and arrangements concerning third-country nationals with 
historical-ethnic ties to Hungary. 
In the first case, the Hungarian state gave way to, and engaged in, 
dominating practices vis-à-vis individuals and third states alike by ac-
tions, such as making amendments to existing law in Act CXL of 2015 
(which included the criminalization of the ‘crossing of the border clo-
sure’) (Hungarian National Assembly 2015b), the legally questionable 
implementation of the accelerated border procedure (violation of hu-
man rights), and the introduction of a state of exception in case of crisis 
situation caused by mass immigration, or bringing in new legal ar-
rangements, such as the concept and listing of safe third countries. 
Along with this, the state managed to effectively exclude some poten-
tial asylum-seekers from enjoying their internationally guaranteed 
rights, and arbitrarily altered a sensitive, interstate legal procedure, 
that impaired the interests of a third state, namely, Serbia. Act CXL of 
2015 is also noteworthy because of the introduction of the concept of 
‘crisis situation caused by mass immigration’, a kind of state of excep-
tion in the Agambenian sense, in which legal guarantees of non-domi-
nation may be suspended, allowing the government to use exceptional 
measures, and disregard important laws. Also Hungary is trying to block 
the return of asylum seekers to Hungary within the Dublin system. 
Concerning the second category of dominance, as of Act XLIV of 2010, 
ethnic Hungarians can be naturalized on preferential terms (Hungar-
ian National Assembly 2010). This act was aimed at the unification of 
the Hungarian nation in its symbolic sense, including those ethnic 
Hungarians who have been excluded since the Treaty of Trianon 
(1920), which after World War I, distributed two thirds of the historic 
Hungarian territories among the neighbouring countries. The highly 
political decision was contested among these countries, specifically for 
those prohibiting dual citizenship, and thus caused tensions in the bi-
lateral diplomatic relationships. 
As a way to understand that, we have to be aware that this situation was 
partially produced in a context where states are formally equal partners, 
but practically are in complex, and highly unequal relationship with each 
other even in terms of being integrated into migratory global flows. With-
out a deeper analysis of the frustrations this caused, we can safely assume 
that the recent Hungarian rhetoric and policy of dominance is not just a 
factor of political will, but also structural processes behind. The Orbán 
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government’s address of this issue – for the first time since Hungary’s 
accession – has been verbally hostile against the EU ‘dominance’ since 
its 2010 inauguration. The ‘migration crisis’ provided an excellent op-
portunity for further criticisms of the incorrect policies invented and 
enforced by EU bureaucrats. The most conspicuous issue was the 
‘forced settlement quota’. Interpreting policies laid down in the Coun-
cil Decision 2015/1523 (Council 2015b) as arbitrary interference in 
Hungarian sovereignty, the government brought ‘external domina-
tion’ directly in the middle of the question. Nonetheless, we have to be 
aware that the Hungarian position within the EU also holds the risk of 
being dominated by other actors who have vastly different institution-
alized practices and historical migratory processes than that of Hun-
gary who has been both an emigrant and has just received migrants 
from neighbouring countries.  
Justice as impartiality 
The principle of impartiality is endangered in various ways in Hun-
gary, most notably in: i) The lack of integrated view on the various cat-
egories of migrants in migration policy documents and the lack of the 
implementation of any complex strategy of integration of migrants; ii) 
The establishment a four pillar system which contains various hierar-
chies and priorities with differential procedures among and within cat-
egories of migrants. In Hungary until September 2013 there was no 
governmental Migration Strategy - which could have provided some 
normative principle to the various categories of migrants. Although its 
adoption could be considered positive, there were also some critical aspects 
from the point of view of impartiality: 
1. It could not integrate all the processes of migration, most im-
portantly immigration and emigration which could have given 
a basic impartial perspective of handling together the rights of 
outgoing ’Hungarians’ and incoming ‘foreigners’.  
2. The document promised the construction of a universal per-
spective for an integration strategy for all migrants but this has 
not been adopted ever since. 
3. The migration strategy stated that Hungary supports and facil-
itates all forms of legal migration, although official communi-
cation of the government from 2015 blatantly contradicts this 
principle. 
4. Lack of monitoring and evaluation of the strategy.  
(UNHRC 2016d)   
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The Hungarian institutional system is built on four, hierarchical pillars 
(Melegh 2016). The state clearly aims at the priority to ensure full rights 
to Hungarian minorities living outside the country. There are certain 
privileges, the most important one is that Hungary provides full citi-
zenship for those who can prove that he/she had a Hungarian ancestor 
born in the territory of (historical) Hungary (Hungarian National As-
sembly 2010). Another pillar of the policy is the category of EU and 
EEA citizens benefiting from free movement (of persons and labour) 
based on the EU law. The third pillar is the third-country nationals 
who are treated in accordance with EU policies/legislation with re-
gards to third-country nationals. The fourth pillar refers to those seek-
ing international protection and/or crossing the borders of Hungary 
in an irregular manner whose rights were strictly tightened in 2015 and 
2016 as an answer to the migration crisis. The hierarchical treatment of 
the different ‘types’ is a sign of the lack of impartial treatment.  
Justice as mutual recognition 
Justice as mutual recognition refers mainly to integration policies and 
the recognition of cultural and social diversity. Three areas where jus-
tice as mutual recognition is clearly in danger are:  i) The unequal ac-
cess to nationality and thus the preferential treatment which reduces 
the institutional capacities toward immigrants without historic-ethnic 
ties to Hungary; ii) The unequal recognition of migrants who do not 
form an accepted ‘historical minority’ which enjoy certain legal and 
cultural support having that status; iii) The lack of institutionalized 
recognition of cultural diversity.  
With regard to the access to nationality the key problem is not the pref-
erential treatment of certain groups, but the withdrawal the institu-
tional capacities handling the application for nationality of other mi-
grants. Since 2011 the Hungarian government has channelled most of 
its institutional resources helping the privileged group while resources 
has been dramatically reduced for the other groups. The EEA migrants 
enjoy the social and political rights that come with EEA citizenship 
(Melegh and Feischmidt 2013). The formation in the early 1990’s of a 
privileged zone of ‘Europeans’ as a governmental priority with a ‘club 
logic’ is reinforced with the appearance of increasing number Hungar-
ian emigrants directed mainly to EEA countries since 2004 (Melegh 
2016). As said, the co-ethnic Hungarians originating from EU and non-
EU Member States have favourable conditions at all levels of the im-
migration process. Howsoever, these special treatments of mutual 
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recognition are not out of political aspiration since it entitles national 
level voting rights for them. The mutual recognition of immigrants 
with ethnic backgrounds of historical minorities is more favourable than 
other TCNs because they could have well established autonomy on a 
local governmental level and organizations which facilitate their socio-
cultural recognition and integration. At the same time they enjoy pref-
erential treatment in accessing local and national media and various 
forms of cultural funds. They also enjoy certain privileges of political 
representation on a national level. However, the other TCN groups re-
ceive no institutionalized support such as language and vocational 
training, or housing support. 
The mutual recognition as regards to cultural diversity is institutional-
ized only in a limited way. There is a clear hierarchy of general recog-
nition of diverse cultural origins and identities. The Hungarian gov-
ernment is maintaining a repressive and assimilatory discourse of 
building a homogeneous nation. These homogenization efforts are also 
related to the structure of the historical migration processes Hungary 
has been experiencing. 
Norway and migration 
Norway is a somewhat exceptional country in Europe in political 
terms. It is one of the few European countries that are not members of 
the European Union. Rather it has structured its connections with Eu-
ropean institutions and organizations through membership in the Eu-
ropean Economic Area (EEA) and a host of other agreements and ac-
cessions to EU policies. Moreover, Norway has a long-standing tradi-
tion for active internationalism through the United Nations and its 
many organizations, as well as a forerunner in state-led foreign aid 
programs for developing countries. There has been considerable con-
sensus in Norwegian society and politics on this line of policy which 
has also been an integral part of the country’s foreign policy. 
The issue of migration was not high on the agenda in the first two dec-
ades of post-war politics and institution-building, perhaps not so sur-
prising as Norway for a long time was a country of emigration rather 
than one of immigration. In institutional terms, Norway was a signa-
tory to both the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights (1948) 
and the Refugee Convention (1951). In this sense, Norway institution-
alised basic principles such as the right to apply for asylum and non-
refoulement, that is the right not to be returned to country of origin in 
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cases of serious threats to life or freedom. Moreover, the regulation of 
foreigners and access to Norwegian territory was part of the budding 
Nordic cooperation of the 1950s. Through the signing of the Nordic 
Passport Union (1952) with the other Nordic partners (Denmark, Fin-
land, Iceland, and Sweden) Norway instituted passport-free travel in 
the region. In other words, Norwegian migration politics at this time 
did distinguish not only between citizens and non-citizens, but also 
accorded a special status to Nordic citizens through free movement 
across regional borders. 
Toward the end of the 1960s Norway started to see an increase in mi-
gration. This happened conjunctively with a larger European trend of 
increased labour migration both internally in Europe as well as from 
countries outside Europe (Messina 2007). This new wave of migrants 
was almost exclusively labour migration to low-skilled jobs. The main 
sending countries of migrants to Norway were Pakistan, Turkey, Yu-
goslavia and other countries in Southern Europe (Kjelstadli, 
Tjelmeland and Brochmann 2003). This wave of migrants was wel-
comed as there was a surplus of jobs in Norway’s budding oil econ-
omy. Nevertheless, after some years, labour unions and political actors 
argued for the need to curtail and regulate labour migration to protect 
the labour market for Norwegians. Thus, in 1975 Norway instituted a 
halt to open labour migration (‘innvandringsstopp’). 
In the 1980s and 1990s, then, migration to Norway was mainly by ref-
ugees through the UN refugee quotas and asylum seekers. The Balkan 
War ushered in new migrants from that part of Europe, while in the 
latest wave of migration there was an increase in refugees and asylum 
seekers during and in the aftermath of the wars in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. Moreover, in the period from 2014-2016 Norway also saw its 
share of the increased migration to Europe on the back of the Syrian 
civil war and increased geopolitical tensions in the Middle East. This 
latest development led to extensive debates on asylum policies, recep-
tion of asylum seekers, and the future of integration policies. 
Overall, Norway’s approach to migration has been law-based, partly 
based on international conventions and on domestic laws covering dif-
ferent aspects to access to Norwegian territory. The territorial notion 
to migration has been strong. The Immigration Act focuses in this 
sense much on territorial access. Nevertheless, there has been a ten-
dency in recent years toward a more comprehensive approach. This 
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means that access, integration once residence is established, and citi-
zenship policy has been seen as part of one more coherent policy field. 
Terms, definitions and concepts: the peculiarities of the 
Norwegian case 
Norwegian law on migrants is regulated through different legislative 
arrangements. The Immigration Act (Utlendingsloven 2016) is the 
main piece of legislation which regulates the entry to national territory 
of foreigners and their eventual residence there. There are also certain 
regulations (‘forskrift’) that the Government and its Ministries can is-
sue that do not need to go through the legislative process, but need to 
be in accordance with existing law. Finally, Norwegian migration law 
exists in a context of European law as well as human rights conven-
tions and other international treaties. As an EEA member, Norway is 
bound by the EU treaties where these apply. In the case of migration, 
this has specific consequences for labour and economic migration to 
Norway due to the rights attached to free movement. Moreover, Nor-
way has decided to take part in the Schengen system of passport-free 
travel in Europe as well as the Dublin system on asylum applications. 
The European Convention on Human Rights and other more specific 
human rights codes have also been part of Norwegian law since 1999. 
The domestic laws and principles on migration are, then, bound by 
these pieces and principles of international and supranational legislation. 
While clearly regulating migration, the Immigration Act does, how-
ever, not make use of the term ‘migrant’, rather it is based on the word 
‘foreigner’ (utlending) which is also part of the very title of the law. 
The term ‘migrant’ is, then, not clearly defined as such in the Immigra-
tion Act, yet the law regulates a host of different aspects of migration 
to Norway. The law defines a foreigner as anyone who is not a Norwe-
gian citizen.  The law stipulates in order to give the grounds for regu-
lation and controlling access and exit from Norwegian territory and 
the stay of foreigners. Crucially, the law states that this should be in 
accordance with Norwegian migration policy and international obli-
gations. In other words, the law is not standing on its own: it needs to 
be seen in accordance with broader policy-making. Moreover, the law 
clearly states that it is to facilitate legal movement across national bor-
ders. In this sense, the law defines a migrant as someone who enters 
Norwegian territory legally. From this follows that Norwegian migra-
tion law is focused on legal migrants and legal migration. There is no 
self-standing law on ‘illegals’. Rather, the main law on migrants and 
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foreigners gives the rules and regulations under which different cate-
gories of migrants can have access to Norwegian territory and follow-
ing this take up residence, first temporary and then possibly permanent. 
Observations on the three understandings of justice from 
the Norwegian case 
Justice as non-domination  
It is obvious that Norwegian asylum policy as it has been defined in 
this report is at least close to the least demanding conception of justice, 
that is, justice as non-domination. A main principle in the legal defini-
tions of asylum seekers and refugees is that the categories for protec-
tion should be clear. Moreover, there is clearly an effort in the legisla-
tion to avoid arbitrary decisions that may harm some individuals more 
than others. The more demanding conceptions also fall by the wayside 
when we look at state-to-state relations in asylum affairs. This is for 
instance the case when Norway decides on so-called safe countries for 
returning migrants and failed asylum seekers. This is clearly not a sys-
tem where mutual recognition or impartiality is of significance. Nor-
way decides on safe countries based on information from LANDINFO 
which is an independent government agency. While the recommenda-
tions from LANDINFO rely on an array of sources, safe country deci-
sions have been disputed, both by the UN High Commissioner for Ref-
ugees (Crouch 2016) or by official representatives of sending states 
such as Afghanistan (Berglund 2016) In this sense, Norway seemingly 
does not adhere to the reciprocity which forms the core of the justice 
as mutual recognition as it can be doubted whether it has sought to 
‘(…) establish cooperative arrangements and active dialogues with af-
fected parties in order to determine what would be the right or best 
thing to do in any given circumstance’ (Eriksen 2016, 20). 
Justice as impartiality and justice as mutual recognition  
Given Norway’s increasingly strong interconnectedness with the EU 
and EU legal principles, one can argue that its migration law in part 
approximates a notion of justice as impartiality. Economic migrants in 
Norway are basically EU or EEA citizens who exercise their rights un-
der EU law. Rights to free movement and the principle of non-discrim-
ination based on nationality are part of the Norwegian migration re-
gime. There is no ‘universal’ right to economic immigration to Nor-
way: it is limited to EU and EEA citizens. In this sense, in terms of eco-
nomic migrants, we cannot deem this too close to a notion of justice as 
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mutual recognition in a global sense. It is a territorial extension of rights 
to the transnational realm, where the notion of national belonging is 
less prevalent for rights attribution. While transnational, it is, however, 
still limited only to European citizens. Arguably, this transnationality 
falls somewhere between the first two notions of justice as non-domi-
nation or impartiality. Clearly, the principle of non-discrimination 
based on nationality rests on an understanding of a negative freedom 
where, for instance, a worker should be exempt from arbitrary disad-
vantage in the labour market as a result of their nationality. Yet, it is 
also clear that this does not extend to a cosmopolitan law for all in a 
universal sense which would be a requirement to meet the basic pre-
cepts of justice as impartiality. The definition of economic migrants in 
Norway, through the ‘EEA connection’ is quasi-cosmopolitan in its ex-
tension of rights to non-citizens with EU citizenship or nationality in 
an EEA country, yet falls short of universality in a true cosmopolitan 
sense. Rights as economic migrants in this Europeanized setting are 
not human rights: they are transnational rights which extend the terri-
torial remit of rights considerably. 
 
 
Chapter 5  
National case studies: Perspectives of justice 
and implications for the EUMSG 
 
 
Enrico Fassi, Giorgio Grappi and Antonio Zotti 
Catholic University, Milan and University of Bologna 
This chapter draws together the results of the preliminary analysis on 
the migration legislation of Italy, France, Germany, the United King-
dom, Hungary, Greece and Norway. Considered together, and exam-
ined thorough the lens of the three conceptions of justice examined 
above, the case studies point out the tensions and potential contradic-
tions existing both between the different demands of justice and, em-
pirically, within several components of the EU Migration System of 
Governance (EUMSG). 
Justice as non-domination 
Some of the terms and concepts used in the migration domain – be they 
nation specific or EU norms and regulations and their transpositions 
into national contexts – testify to potential violations of the principle of 
non-domination as to the relationships between the EU, Member States 
and third countries, and/or between the EU and Member States.  
The emergence of power-informed relationships with third countries 
is one of the most significant cases found through this analysis. The 
Member States, as well as the EU, adopt and elaborate approaches – 
based on quid pro quo practices or privileged relations with some coun-
tries at the expense of others – that rely on the existence and the exploi-
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tation asymmetrical power relations. For example, through the ‘de-
creto flussi’ (‘flows decree’) approach – linking foreign workers’ quo-
tas to the third-country’s cooperation in the fight against ‘clandestine 
immigration’ and the readmission of irregular nationals – Italy can ex-
ert its power on relations with specific countries, privileging those 
countries where effective cooperation in migration management is at 
play and discriminating the others. De facto discriminatory legal and 
conceptual framings like this reveal subtler instances of the arbitrary 
interferences presented above. As it may already be inferred, the third-
country’s integrity and sovereignty can be encroached upon with 
measures whose definitions and declared targets do not directly in-
volve a state-to-state relationship. In this sense, instruments like the 
‘decreto flussi’ are liable to infringe the non-domination principle af-
fecting both migrants and their country of origin.  This is similar, to a 
large extent, to the approach developed by France in drafting bilateral 
agreements with third countries. Here, the rise of a discourse based on 
the concept of ‘co-development’ has produced a situation where the 
political and economic advantage of France towards the concerned 
third countries is used as a leverage to impose France’s own priorities, 
in particular to control irregular migration and govern mobility in a 
more efficient manner for its economic system. Germany is also a no-
table case, since it does not only push its agenda on third-countries 
through ‘regular’ bilateral agreements provided with readmission 
clauses. Arguably, Germany has realized a subtler and possibly more 
effective way to exert domination on third states through the (in)fa-
mous EU-Turkey deal on asylum seekers – the controversial ‘informal’ 
agreement where Germany is considered one of the primary advo-
cates. What makes the deal relevant in normative terms is that it alleg-
edly enables a Member State to indirectly dominate over third, non-
signatory countries (e.g. Syria) without the drawbacks that a bilateral 
commitment would entail. 
On the other hand, Member States can be (or perceive themselves to 
be) victims of domination by the EU or by other Member States. One 
case in point is Greece, where the whole process of Europeanisation of 
migration and asylum legislation has not always served the country’s 
national interest. Greece and Italy, more than others, have endured 
EU’s specific approaches, such as the Dublin regulation, the hotspot 
approach, the perverse consequences resulting from the understand-
ing of the relocation system, which have only exacerbated pressure on 
already weak systems. Italy, for example, has perceived the hotspot as 
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‘imposed’ by the EU, as a measure to ensure the proper fingerprinting 
of all migrants and ‘select’ different categories of migrants.  
The case of Hungary is particularly interesting as it shows both dy-
namics at play. On the one hand, the country’s perception that its po-
sition within the EU holds the risk of being dominated by other actors 
that have vastly different institutionalized practices and historical mi-
gratory processes, has often led Hungary to react to ‘EU dominance’, 
for example criticizing the ‘forced settlement quota’ system (Council 
Decision 2015/1523, Council 2015b) as arbitrary interference in Hun-
garian sovereignty. At the same time, Hungary gave way to, and en-
gaged in dominating practices vis-à-vis individuals and third states 
alike. Not only is Hungary trying to block the return of asylum seekers 
to Hungary within the Dublin system, but the state managed to effec-
tively exclude potential asylum seekers from enjoying their interna-
tionally guaranteed rights, and arbitrarily altered a sensitive, interstate 
legal procedure, that impaired the interests of a third state, namely, 
Serbia. Moreover, with Act XLIV of 2010, Hungary established prefer-
ential terms to naturalize ethnic Hungarians, including those ‘histori-
cal’ ethnic Hungarians that since the Treaty of Trianon (1920) have 
been living in the neighbouring countries. This was a highly political 
decision that was not conciliated with these countries and caused ten-
sions in the bilateral diplomatic relationships. In this sense, the case of 
Hungary adds to the exam of justice as non-domination provided in 
the previous chapter indicating that, despite the ‘Westphalian assump-
tion’ underlying this normative notion, attention must also be paid to 
mutual perceptions and national identities in order to accurately identify 
interference effects despite the relative lack of ‘material factors’ at play.  
The perspective of state-on-state domination – either in a direct form 
or through the takeover of the EU system– may seem so threatening 
that the intergovernmental dimension per se might be regarded as a 
danger. If that were the case, any conception of justice different from 
non-domination would be not just an alternative vision but rather a 
solution to an objective problem. Nevertheless, the zero-sum-game is 
only one of the possible configurations of non-cosmopolitan, non-su-
pranational relations among Member States, between the Member 
States and the EU or with third countries. The persistence of a ‘West-
phalian’ dimension was not intended, especially in Europe, as ruling 
out all non-state actors as simply irrelevant. This goes for the migration 
policy area too and in the case of Member States in particular, where 
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decentralised and sometimes local actors play a relevant role. In nor-
mative terms, the presence of a plurality of governmental actors trying 
out new ways to achieve gains in terms of effectiveness does not (nec-
essarily) mean impinging on cosmopolitan values or ruling out any 
possible role of the EU in this policy area. Breaches of the principles of 
non-domination are expected, both within the EU and in dealing with 
third states, but neither is inevitable. 
Justice as impartiality 
All case studies present formal reference to international norms and 
values in the treatment of migrants and refugees – e.g. the International 
and European Convention on human rights – but also to the Constitu-
tions of some of the Member States, which, in certain cases, similarly 
envisage the respect of fundamental human rights. Beside the adhe-
sion to the principles of the protection of human rights, being signatory 
to these international instruments can also imply a concrete commit-
ment to the mentioned role of ‘enforcer’ of cosmopolitan values and 
norms. This seems to be the case with the stable integration of UNHCR 
members in their respective asylum process. Moreover, many coun-
tries among those examined recognise specific ‘national’ statuses of 
humanitarian protection. The distinction between the rights recog-
nised to refugees and the recipients of other forms of protection (see 
for example residence permits durance above) can contrast the principle of 
impartiality, as it produces different categories of individuals in need. 
Even though several Member States have abandoned the use of nega-
tive terms such as ‘illegal’ or ‘clandestine’ migrants, opting for the 
more neutral ‘irregular’, only regulars have full recognition of rights 
and the treatment of irregular migrants is always at risk of rights vio-
lations. As has been noted,  where the term ‘illegal’ is widely used, 
such as in Greece,  this implies an even greater risk of violation of mi-
grants’ rights, adding to a more general problematic access to rights 
depending on different legal categories and nationalities. This kind of 
discrimination is nevertheless more general than simply related to one 
case. All countries have different treatments on the base of nationali-
ties, starting from the right to regularly enter the countries, such as in 
the framing of the ‘decreto flussi’ in Italy or bilateral agreements 
framed in France, that create a differentiated system of entry depend-
ing on nationalities, skills and occupations. At least as far as formal 
documents are concerned (the same does not go for public debate), 
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Germany seems able to avert (or more effectively hide) the subtle pro-
cess of ‘criminalisation’ by using terms tantamount to ‘unpermitted’.  
The relation between regular stay and ‘work contracts’ emerges as a 
source of potential limitation against impartiality, as it discriminates 
in different ways individuals and nationalities depending on job avail-
ability and actual opportunity to access work. Given the emphasis on 
‘universality’ in conceiving justice as impartiality – deliberately factor-
ing out, in a sense, ‘contingent’ aspects – it comes as no surprise that 
tensions regarding the compliance with this normative conception are 
forceful at the national level, where labour- and welfare-related policy 
issues are more relevant. More generally, the relation between the pos-
sibility to get a work permit and the double criterion of nationality (bi-
lateral agreements) and employment situation, via the labour shortage 
evaluation such as in France or targeted recruitment policies such as in 
the Five-tier Point System active in the UK, are hardly compatible with 
a cosmopolitan idea of justice and even less with impartiality, unless 
we define impartiality as a technical parameter for the efficiency of the 
labour market. Moreover, the formal link between the employment sit-
uation and the residence permit – epitomized by the Italian ‘residence 
contract’ – can create a direct subjugation to employers.  
A restrictive interpretation of family reunification, noted in most cases, 
is also a source of concern, as while the unity of the family is consid-
ered as a value to protect, the access to family reunification can be re-
stricted in many ways as seen above. In Italy for example, family reu-
nification has been defined in a pejorative way through time. 
A final observation concerns the different types of limitation of per-
sonal freedom in detention centres, sometimes of asylum seekers and 
even of minors. Here we can observe the production of a sort of ‘special 
right’ for foreigners. This is even more visible in all types of emergency 
approaches dealing with migrants, notwistanding the ordinary legis-
lation, and even more remarkable after the introduction of new centres 
with a dubious juridical nature as part of the hotspot approach in coun-
tries such as Greece and Italy. 
Finally, as observed in the evaluation of the EU’s approach, the defini-
tion of a national lists of ‘safe countries’ potentially opposes the prin-
ciple of impartiality. 
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Justice as mutual recognition 
One aspect that emerges from the case studies is the tension between 
justice as mutual recognition and the power that the EU and Member 
States have to unilaterally create and impose categories to other sub-
jects, thus producing particular identity labels that may or may not be 
shared by the subject themselves. As noted by Mounz, while this ‘re-
produces the power of the State through simultaneous inclusion and 
exclusion […] People, meanwhile, do not imagine their lives or identi-
ties in the terms of immigration policies and the categories they pro-
duce (in Baird 2016, 6). As pointed out above, the lack of dialogue and 
reciprocity makes it virtually impossible to comply with the recogni-
tion principle, since it prevents the involved parties from unravelling 
‘sticky labels’ and bring to the fore the ‘concrete other’. 
This tension is visible, for example, in each case where ethnic or na-
tional belonging of the migrants has been considered the predominant 
criteria to classify incoming people – regardless of their specific sub-
jectivity, both in terms of self-representation and peculiar life experi-
ences. Moreover, a conceptual and legal framing based primarily on 
executive and bureaucratic rules rather than statutes – as it is the case 
with the UK – leads to a relationship between the arrival country’s 
public authorities, and the migrants and/or states of origin that is in-
formed by a (more or less latent) hierarchical principle. This normally 
discourages any genuine form of dialogue.  
Moreover, in the case of the Member States, the ‘emergency approach’ 
adopted had the effect of reducing the attention to specific needs of 
groups or individuals. If the emergency approach has tended to con-
sider migration as a temporary phenomenon, and thus acts against a 
more holistic view, the security issue related to the terrorist threat has 
led to even further risks. In the French case, for example, the formal 
declaration of the ‘state of urgency’ after the terrorist attacks in Paris 
in November 2015, converted into law, has led to an increase of the 
powers of police against the normal judiciary procedure, resulting in 
many complaints by organizations concerned with human rights pro-
tection and reports of mistreatment. Even the normal functioning of 
the state of urgency has an impact on migrants’ life, as it justifies the 
increase in border control, identity control and administrative search 
inside the French national borders. 
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Several countries have introduced a compulsory form for migrants 
where they have to declare their respect and adherence to the laws and 
values of the country. This is the case for Italy, with the ‘integration 
agreement’, and France, with the ‘Republican Integration Contract’, 
but also other countries such as Germany and Hungary have similar 
instruments. These documents are accompanied with personalized 
paths to integration, where the migrants must show their knowledge 
of documents such as the national Constitution or their commitment 
to the learning of the national language. Independently from the val-
ues embodied in these ‘agreements’ or ‘contract’ (a misleading name, 
given that migrants have no choice but to sign them), they represent a 
reduced attention to cultural difference and the imposition of suppos-
edly shared national values over migrants. It is nevertheless worth of 
notice that the value of these documents is mostly symbolic and, for 
this very reason, particularly insidious, as they contribute to the pro-
duction and reproduction of the image of migration as a threat to the 
national identity and something external. This is even more significant 
if we consider that these documents refer to some fundamental values 
or rules of the country, but only migrants are required to formally com-
mit to these values and rules. This responds to a shift in the approach 
towards migration that we can observe in many Member States, where 
the increase in the restrictions and conditionality clauses for regular 
migration have been accompanied by a nationalization of the discourse 
over migration and a resurgence of the theme of national identity. A 
remarkable case is that of France, where the presidency of Sarkozy has 
shifted the discussion towards a direct link between migration, inte-
gration and national identity with the consolidation of separated com-
petencies in a new ministry created in 2007. 
Overall, the enlisted examples show that the opposition between ‘the 
concrete other’ and the ‘generalized other’ is complicated by what we 
can consider an internal split in ‘the concrete other’ when dealing with 
migration policies. A split is created between citizens, being individu-
als entitled to universal rights, and migrants, being a subject of a state 
(this also explains the different provisions for the stateless persons). 
We observed before how the different treatments on the basis of na-
tionalities can produce different sources of tensions for all the concep-
tion of justice we are considering. Yet it is worth adding that, inde-
pendently from these different treatments, a ‘generalized other’ of the 
foreigner is created by linking migrants to their national origins. Before 
they are subjects of rights, migrants are conceived first and foremost 
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as citizens of other countries. This eliminates the possibility that a ‘gen-
eralized other’ is formed on the basis of the common concrete interests 
of people of different national origins and cultural formation vis-à-vis 
the hosting country. This implies strong consequences for the Euro-
pean migration system of governance, as it rests in a middle ground 
between nation states and a supranational political formation. While 
the European Union seems to replicate the exclusive logic of nation 
states on migration at a different scale, the possibility of a new path for 
justice not rooted in the political logic of sovereignty remains open. 
Chapter 6  
The EU, migration and justice: a tentative 
conclusion 
 
 
Sonia Lucarelli 
University of Bologna 
Seen from a normative standpoint, migration is a very tricky issue in 
that it touches upon and puts under strain the legitimate justice claims 
of a number of different actors: states, non-state polities (the EU), in-
ternational organizations, but also citizens, individual migrants, clus-
ters of migrants (asylum seekers, regular and irregular migrants and 
so on). What each one of these actors perceives as a legitimate justice 
claim might appear an essential violation of justice from the perspec-
tive of another. The relation of migration to a concept of justice based 
on a multi-layered evaluation is equally complicated to assess; namely, 
justice as non-domination, as impartiality and as mutual recognition. 
As already observed, these three conceptions refer to different levels 
of interactions between the subjects of what we defined as the EUMSG. 
Non-domination refers to a condition in which an actor is not subjected 
to (i.e. is free of) any kind of arbitrary interference or control on the 
part of other actors. Impartiality recalls an idea of ‘equal basic rights 
and liberties’ and the pre-eminence of human rights over sovereignty 
rights. Mutual recognition stresses the role of reciprocity and the right 
of each relevant subject (individual, group or polity) to be recognised 
in their identity, ruling out the possibility to determine ‘a priori’ what 
is normatively right and fair.  
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The existence of competing (or conflicting) normative claims is by no 
means only true of migration, yet people’s transnational movement is 
a particularly troublesome issue as it touches upon the fundamental 
sovereign prerogative of a state to decide who is allowed to enter and 
stay on its own territory and with which rights and duties. This implies 
to include specific questions in relation to the three conceptions of jus-
tice in our discussion. In dealing with non-domination, we have to con-
sider the complex relation between the EU and its Members States, as 
well as the relations with third actors. In terms of impartiality, we have 
to inquire how legal categories are defined and their impact on the ap-
plication of universal norms of human rights. In dealing with mutual 
recognition, we have to ask to what extent the lack of recognition with re-
spect to the subjectivity of migrants may correspond to an act of injustice. 
The analysis conducted on terms, definition and concepts employed 
within the EUMSG has highlighted the inevitable tensions between 
ideal aspirations and the concrete handling of migration. In an ideal 
cosmopolitan world, the freedom to move from one country to another 
would be granted as a universal right, and there would be no distinc-
tion between types of migrants. In the real world, organized in states 
or not-too-dissimilar polities (the EU), migration is the de facto entry in 
a socio-political community of citizens (with rights, duties, values and 
a shared political identity) assumed to be a coherent group where the 
immigrant is an ‘odd man out’. As a consequence, the hosting commu-
nity attaches labels (refugee, economic migrant, regular/irregular mi-
grant, asylum seeker) and applies selection criteria (nationality, coun-
try of origin, risk of persecution, gender, age, ethnicity, historical back-
ground, economic situation) to immigrants. Based on this categoriza-
tion, immigrants are sent through different paths, staying in different 
types of temporary hosting structures, having different prospects of 
remaining in the country of arrival or being returned home or some-
where else. In an ideal cosmopolitan world, all this would amount to a 
system of domination of states on individuals. In the real world, how-
ever, this is just the outcome of the rules of the game that make socio-
political life as we know it possible – and probably more democratic 
than it would be if a world state did exist and humankind were actu-
ally organized in a world cosmopolitan polity.  
However, an evaluation of justice only based on sovereign states’ pre-
rogatives would not be sufficient for a number of reasons. First, the 
Westphalian logic is by no means the only one that is able to provide 
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legitimacy to international conduct, as evidenced by the development 
of international law, particularly with reference to human rights. Sec-
ond, being that migration is a global, age-old phenomenon that has 
greatly affected the features of today’s socio-political world, it seems 
reasonable for it to be managed through instruments of supranational 
governance and global norms, even though the latter still fare very 
poorly in terms of effectiveness and coherence. Third, in a world pop-
ulated by subjective individuals and not (only) national citizens or hu-
man beings as natural rights bearers, each and every migrant is a 
unique person, whose migration claims should be evaluated based on 
their subjective features for a system of migration to be really fair and 
just. In the long run, then, the real world’s migration governance is 
called to strike a balance among different logics of justice, which, at 
least today, appear hardly reconcilable.  
The burden of this reconciliation weights on the EUMSG, even more 
than traditional state actors. This occurs for two main reasons. The first 
has to do with the expectations about the EU as an international actor. 
The EU has shaped its self-representation around the idea of being a 
community of values where human dignity, freedom/liberty, democ-
racy, equality, justice, rule of law, solidarity, regulated liberalism/cap-
italism and ecological modernisation are in centre (Lucarelli and Man-
ners 2006). The EU’s foreign policy has been based on those values, and 
a certain distinctiveness in this respect has frequently been claimed by 
the EU itself, scholars (Manners 2002; Keukeleire and Delreux 2014; 
Whitman 2011) and observers (Cf. Chaban et al 2015; Lucarelli 2014). 
Ultimately, the EU’s legitimacy and credibility depends on its ability 
to show coherence with respect to those values, and effectiveness with 
respect to its own political objectives (Lucarelli, Cerutti, Schmidt 2011). 
It comes as no surprise, then, that the EU frequently refers to its own 
values in its documents on migration, is highly attentive to the respect 
of international agreements and underlines the importance of respect-
ing human rights and the human dignity of migrants. It is not surpris-
ing either, that, among the declared aims of the EU’s search and rescue 
operations in the Mediterranean, the protection of the EU’s borders is 
accompanied by the protection of migrants’ lives (see the Agenda on 
Migration of 2015). At the same time, however, the protection of bor-
ders can actually trump the protection of human rights – as it is the 
case with the recent EU-Turkey agreement. In this case, the discrep-
ancy between actual behaviour and self-representation becomes all the 
more clear and troublesome for a values-based actor as the EU. 
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Second, migration governance is particularly problematic to the EU 
due to the latter’s peculiar system of governance. The existence of dif-
ferent levels of governance, a highly complex system of shared compe-
tences between EU institutions and the Member States, and the array 
of different national legislations on migration existing in each Member 
State make the EU system of migration vulnerable to a series of 
breaches of justice. Cases of ‘internal domination’ on EU-Member 
states have occurred and have been denounced in Italy, Greece, and 
Hungary. At the same time, instances of Member States-to-Member 
States ‘internal domination’ have resulted from lack of solidarity, as 
well as unilateral decisions affecting others (i.e. Germany’s decision to 
let in Syrian refugees without prior consultations with its fellow Mem-
ber States). Moreover, breaches of the impartiality principle are also 
the inevitable result of small-yet-relevant differences among the Member 
states’ legal systems and practices with respect to migration and asylum.  
However, there is another feature of the EU system of governance that 
impinges on the EU’s ability to abide by justice in its migration policy: 
its complex nature as a ‘process’ other than an ‘actor’. By its own char-
acter, the EU is not only an international actor, but also a process of in-
tegration of states – a process/actor that has always tried to cope with 
the double goal of 1) (re)creating the conditions for the process to carry 
on, and 2) being efficient as an actor in the management of a certain 
policy area. The massive arrival of migrants to the European territory 
and their uneven distribution among the Member States soon started 
to challenge and put at risk the main achievements of the European 
integration process (the Schengen agreement above all), as well as the 
EU’s credibility in the eyes of increasingly Eurosceptic domestic pub-
lics. The EU’s response has consisted in an attempt to manage the do-
mestic challenges posed by migration, while at the same time safe-
guarding migrants’ safety. However, the instrument used (attempts to 
Europeanise the national component of the EU migration system, the 
hotspot and relocation approaches, agreements with third countries, 
Trust funds) have sometimes resulted in more breaches of justice as 
non-domination (against EU-Member States and EU-third countries), 
impartiality (as in the case of the EU’s list of safe countries of origin, or 
the weak human right protection conditionality clauses included in the 
EU’s agreements with third countries), and mutual recognition (the 
framing of the response as an emergency has diminished the ability of 
the system to ensure due attention to the distinctive other, which in-
stead tends to be collapsed into categories of generalised others). 
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Does this imply that the EUMSG fails to comply with justice claims and 
pursue its normative goals?  Such a verdict would be too harsh. The 
EU system is one of the most advanced in terms of attention granted 
to the protection of human rights, and has improved its ability to sub-
sume national differences while also guaranteeing a certain attention 
to specific individual needs, as evident with the introduction of sub-
sidiary protection and other forms of ‘humanitarian’ protection envis-
aged at the Member States’ level. Moreover, the tension among the 
three notions of justice is not an intrinsic feature of the EU, but can 
rather be regarded as a result of a conflict between the normative logics 
that underlie the three conceptions of justice, and that appears really 
hard to cope with. 
Furthermore, as stated in the introduction of this report, a final verdict 
on the compliance of the EUMSG with global justice cannot be 
grounded only on a preliminary assessment of the terms, definition 
and concepts employed and will need further research on the Euro-
pean practices.  
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Migration is at the heart of the current political debate in Europe. Moreover, 
the migration crisis has disclosed a number of normative and ethical issues 
connected to the current management of migration in the EU. This report provides 
a preliminary insight into the EU’s policy on migration. It looks specifically 
at the terms the EU chooses, the definitions it devises and the concepts and 
understandings it endorses in its migration policies. In order to grasp the actual 
working of an emerging EU Migration System of Governance (EUMSG), the 
same terms, concepts and definitions are also examined with reference to a set 
of national cases: Italy, France, Germany, United Kingdom, Hungary, Greece 
and Norway.
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